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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROTOCOLS FOR IEEE 802.11S-BASED SMART
GRID ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE NETWORKS
by
Samet Tonyali
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Kemal Akkaya, Major Professor
The ongoing Smart Grid (SG) initiative proposes several modifications to the existing
power grid in order to better manage power demands, reduce CO2 emissions and
ensure reliability through several new applications. One part of the SG initiative that
is currently being implemented is the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) which
provides two-way communication between the utility company and the consumers’
smart meters (SMs).
The AMI can be built by using a wireless mesh network which enables multi-hop
communication of SMs. The AMI network enables collection of fine-grained power
consumption data at frequent intervals. Such a fine-grained level poses several privacy concerns for the consumers. Eavesdroppers can capture data packets and analyze
them by means of load monitoring techniques to make inferences about household activities. To prevent this, in this dissertation, we proposed several privacy-preserving
protocols for the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network, which are based on data obfuscation, fully homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty computation. Simulation
results have shown that the performance of the protocols degrades as the network
grows. To overcome this problem, we presented a scalable simulation framework for
the evaluation of IEEE 802.11s-based AMI applications. We proposed several modifications and parameter adjustments for the network protocols being used. In addition,

vi

we integrated the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) into the protocol stack
and proposed five novel retransmission timeout calculation functions for the CoAP
in order to increase its reliability.
Upon work showing that there are inconsistencies between the simulator and a
testbed, we built an IEEE 802.11s- and ZigBee-based AMI testbed and measured
the performance of the proposed protocols under various conditions. The testbed is
accessible to the educator and researchers for the experimentation.
Finally, we addressed the problem of updating SMs remotely to keep the AMI
network up-to-date. To this end, we developed two secure and reliable multicast-overbroadcast protocols by making use of ciphertext-policy attribute based signcryption
and random linear network coding.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With the development of new communication technologies, the current Power Grid
is going through a transformation to the Smart Grid (SG), which will enable twoway communications of data between the utility company (UC) and the consumers’
smart meters (SMs) [1] to collect fine-grained power consumption data through the
deployment of SMs and smart data collection techniques [2]. The ongoing SG initiative proposes several modifications to the existing power grid in order to better
manage power demands, reduce CO2 emissions and ensure reliability. This is particularly important at the distribution level of the grid where there is a need for more
smart applications. Consequently, several new applications were implemented at this
level [3, 4]. The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is one of these applications
that enables utilities to collect, measure, and analyze energy consumption data at
more frequent rates, thereby adjusting power demands and the prices accordingly
(demand response and dynamic pricing).
The SG communication infrastructure involves a home area network of the electric
consuming devices in the consumers residence, a neighborhood area network (NAN)
of various devices including SMs which measure the power consumption, and a wide
area network that connects the consumers to the utilities [5]. In this dissertation, we
mostly focus on the NAN part of the AMI network and refer to this part when we
use the term the AM I network.
The AMI network can be built by using power-line communication (PLC) and
radio frequency (RF) technologies individually or together [6]. When compared to the
PLC, RF solutions require far less cabling work, thereby lowering the infrastructure,
deployment and maintenance costs. Considering that a typical AMI network consists
of thousands of SMs, a wireless mesh network (WMN) is the ideal RF solution to

1

cover such a large-scale area, which can be supported by a variety of wireless radio
technologies such as 802.16 (WiMAX), 802.11 (WiFi), and 802.15 (Bluetooth and
ZigBee). A wireless mesh network (WMN) is a wireless communications network
which enables any two nodes in the network to communicate with each other even
if they are not in each others communication range [7, 8]. WMNs have numerous
features such as self-organization, self-healing and multi-hop communication, which
make them flexible and adaptable, e.g., the coverage area of the network can be
extended by adding new nodes.

1.1

Data Privacy in the AMI Network

The AMI network enables collection of data at different periods. The frequency of
the data collection depends on the application and the premise. The period can be
in the order of seconds or minutes rather than daily [4]. However, such a fine-grained
level poses several privacy concerns for the consumers [9, 10].
The IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network is a WMN in which each node relays data
packets in order to enable multi-hop data communication [7,8]. Since the communication medium is air, eavesdroppers can capture data packets. The collected consumption data can be analyzed by means of load monitoring techniques to infer household
activities and behavior patterns of the consumers [11, 12]. Obviously, this is against
their privacy and can have social impacts. For example, a curious person can run
simple signal capturing devices to know what his/her neighbors are doing. Similarly,
at the commercial level, some companies may want to spy on their competitors. For
example, smart grid traffic analysis can reveal how long a factory works, the number
of workers present in the factory, etc. Revealing this information can cause financial losses, e.g., if a company knows that its competitors are producing too many
products, it can work on reducing the price of this product by offering sales on their
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products. Thus, any effective method of collecting and using fine-grained consumption information from SMs must provide sufficient protection of consumer privacy
while preserving the suitability of the data for legitimate uses.
Due to such privacy concerns, preserving consumer privacy in SG attracted a lot of
attention from the research community and several solutions were proposed to address
different needs by making various assumptions on the available resources [10]. Despite
such efforts, the privacy issue has been creating several problems in the deployment
of SMs throughout the US and making the consumers reluctant to participate in
SG programs [13]. This largely stems from the fact that all of these approaches at
some point assume a trust relationship between the utility companies (UCs) and the
consumers. The bottom line is that consumers may not even be comfortable with the
UCs that have the right to access their data whenever needed.
While a number of studies addressed these problems through some theoretical
approaches, their adoption in a realistic wireless mesh-based AMI has not been addressed. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by proposing various privacy-preserving
protocols that can be readily employed in the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network with
comprehensive security and reliability features.
Under these circumstances, our major problem we addressed in this dissertation
can be defined as follows: Given the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network, collect the
consumers’ power consumption data in a secure way such that the consumers’ actual
power consumption data cannot be obtained, and it is still possible to perform arithmetic operations on the concealed power consumption data for the AMI applications.
To this end, we proposed several privacy-preserving protocols based on data obfuscation [14] and data aggregation [15–17]. For privacy-preserving data aggregation,
we employed the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [18–21] and secure multiparty
computation (secure MPC) [22–24]. We assessed and compared the performance of
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the proposed protocols under the widely used ns-3 simulator. During the performance
evaluation, we observed that the performance of the protocols degrades as the network scales. To overcome the scalability issues, we came up with a scalable simulation
framework for the AMI network.

1.2

A Scalable Simulation Framework for the AMI Network

The AMI network is built as a WMN, and WMNs suffer from scalability issues as
the network grows. Therefore, in this dissertation, we present a scalable simulation framework for the evaluation of the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI applications. We
proposed several modifications and parameter adjustments for the network protocols
being used. Specifically, several parameters at the MAC layer were adjusted. Furthermore, we integrated a modified Address Resolution Protocol to take advantage
of Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol's proactive route requests/replies, which is IEEE
802.11s standard’s default routing protocol. Moreover, we introduced the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) to the application layer of the stack and proposed five
novel retransmission timeout calculation functions for the CoAP in order to increase
the reliability [25]. However, upon work showing that there are some inconsistencies between the simulator and a testbed [26, 27], we built an IEEE 802.11s- and
ZigBee-based AMI testbed and measured their performance under security and privacy requirements of the AMI network.
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1.3

Development of a ZigBee- and IEEE 802.11s-based AMI
Network Testbed

There has been some efforts to assess the performance of the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI
network that runs secure and privacy-preserving protocols [14,15,17,26–28]. However,
to the best of our knowledge, there is not any comprehensive work in the literature
that studies the performance of a ZigBee-based AMI network for privacy-preserving
protocols. ZigBee has different features than IEEE 802.11s mesh and considered
more lightweight that would consume less resources in terms of computation and
communication. Therefore, in this dissertation, we compare the performance behavior
of ZigBee- and IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network under different privacy-preserving
protocols. In addition to standard encryption, we utilize the FHE- and secure MPCbased protocols. The performance comparison is specifically done under an actual
testbed that was built at Florida International University Engineering Center. Note
that we opt not to utilize simulation as it has been shown that the ns-3 simulation
results for the AMI network do not match well with the testbed results [26, 27].

AMI Network

802.11s/Zigbee link
Gateway

4G/LTE
Utility
Control
Center

Smart
Meter
4G/LTE

TTP

WAN

Figure 1.1: A sample AMI communication network, gateway and long-distance communication to a utility company.
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We did not include the other technologies mentioned above in our work because
WiMAX is not a commonly used technology, and having WiMAX-supported devices
and maintaining their services are much more expensive compared to WiFi and ZigBee
devices [29]. Also, Bluetooth Low Energy mesh has just been introduced in July,
2017 [30].
A typical infrastructure for the considered AMI is shown in Fig. 1.1. SMs can
communicate their readings to the gateway of the network. The gateway reports the
readings to the utility company directly or through a trusted third party (TTP) over
any 4G/LTE network or the Internet.
After the implementation and deployment of the protocols, the state is changed to
maintenance in the software development life cycle [31]. Based on the bugs reported
and technological advancements, the protocols running on the installed SMs need to
be updated. However, this is a challenging operation [32,33]. Therefore, we proposed
two secure and reliable firmware update protocols for the AMI network.

1.4

Secure and Reliable Firmware Updates in the AMI Network

SMs can rule their physical components thanks to some programs called firmware.
The firmware occasionally needs to be updated to fix bugs and improve the services.
The SM firmware is proprietary, so the update file should be communicated to the
SMs in a secure way. In addition, the firmware update can target a specific subgroup
of the SMs rather than all of them in which case access control is required.
In this dissertation, we addressed the problem of multicasting the firmware update
remotely in the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network. Since it is not feasible to turn
them off and update one-by-one manually, in order to enable remote updates, we
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develop two secure and reliable multicast-over-broadcast protocols by making use of
ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption (CP-ABSC) [34] to provide not only
confidentiality and access control but also message authentication. The CP-ABSC
signcrypts based on an access tree such that the signcrypted data can be designcrypted
by those possessing the attributes that can satisfy the access tree.
The preliminary tests showed that increased size of the request due to signcryption
reduces reliability of the protocol. Therefore, we employed random linear network
coding [35] along with CP-ABSC in order to increase the reliability and use the
bandwidth and processing resources efficiently.

1.5

Major Contributions

In this dissertation, we focused on developing secure and privacy-preserving protocols
for the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network. Specifically, we filled a gap between the
theory and the practice by introducing privacy-preserving techniques into the AMI
network context. In order to simulate a scalable and more realistic AMI network
environment for the researchers and utility companies, we presented a scalable simulation framework. Although there are some inconsistencies between the simulator
and testbed behaviors, the proposed changes and methods can be applied to the AMI
network to solve the scalability issues. In addition to simulations, we analyzed the
feasibility of the proposed privacy-preserving protocols by conducting experiments
on an IEEE 802.11s- and ZigBee-based AMI testbed which is built at the Florida
International University Engineering Center and made accessible to the educator and
researchers at https://amitestbed.fiu.edu/. Finally, we developed secure and
reliable firmware update protocols to keep the protocols up-to-date without any human intervention as new technologies are emerged, and new bugs are detected in the
firmware.
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1.6

Organization of the Dissertation

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the following chapter, we
give a concise background information about the fundamental building blocks of this
dissertation. It is followed by a comprehensive literature review on which every individual work in this dissertation depends. In Chapter 4, we investigate how to enable
privacy-preserving state estimation in the AMI network via data obfuscation. In
Chapter 5, we present the FHE- and secure MPC-based privacy-preserving protocols.
In Chapter 6, we present a scalable simulation framework for the AMI network. We
develop a ZigBee- and IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network testbed and compare their
performance under security and privacy requirements of the AMI network in Chapter 7. It is followed by the secure and reliable firmware update protocols in Chapter 8.
Finally, we conclude the dissertation and present some future work for further studies
in Chapter 9.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, we present an introductory background information about the
fundamental building blocks of this dissertation. More detailed information can be
found in related chapters.
In the following section, we introduce the privacy-preserving techniques we used
to solve the research problem defined in the previous chapter.

2.1

Privacy-preserving Techniques

In this dissertation, we develop several protocols to be used for preserving privacy
on the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network. Specifically, we use data obfuscation, fully
homomorphic encryption (FHE) and secure multiparty computation (MPC) in these
protocols.

2.1.1

Data Obfuscation

Data obfuscation techniques provide unique opportunities that can be exploited at
the distribution level. They have the ability of protecting consumer privacy while also
allowing the UC to perform state estimation, billing and dynamic pricing [36, 37].
State estimation is used to monitor the state of a power system (i.e., voltage
magnitude and phase angle of every bus) in order to maintain reliable power supply.
Recently, there is some interest to do state estimation in low-voltage distribution
networks using meters and their instantaneous measurements (real power, reactive
power and voltage magnitude) [37] in addition to the measurements collected from
the distribution system substation [38].
Due to data collection from smart meters, privacy came to picture in state estimation in distribution networks. One possible solution to this issue is data obfuscation.
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The idea of data obfuscation is to hide the actual energy usage by randomizing the
fine-grained meter data. By perturbing the collected reading values in a linear space,
the UC can still monitor the distribution network and calculate billing for given intervals.

2.1.2

Data Aggregation

Another method for concealing the consumers’ private data is data aggregation. It
relies on aggregation of the private data at intermediate meters on the path towards
the gateway meter.
A minimum spanning tree of the network is found by the root node as illustrated
in Fig. 2.1 and each node is informed about its parent node. Each node sends its data
to its own parent node. The parent nodes aggregate the data they receive from their
child nodes with their own data and send the aggregated data to their parent node.
This procedure goes on until the root node.

Figure 2.1: A minimum spanning tree of a mesh network shown as black links and
nodes.
Data aggregation prevents the UC from accessing the consumers’ individual power
consumption data. However, since the medium is air, an eavesdropper can still capture
and analyze the individual data. Encrypting the data before transmission can be a
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solution. Moreover, if the traditional encryption methods (symmetric or asymmetric)
are used one node’s data is revealed to another node (the parent node). This problem
can be overcome by employing FHE [18, 20, 21, 39–47] and secure MPC [23, 24, 48, 49]
methods.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption enables to perform a set of operations on encrypted data
without revealing the plaintext such that when the resulting ciphertext is decrypted,
the decrypted value is equal to the resulting plaintext obtained when the same set of
operations are performed on the plaintext.
Two typical operations in homomorphic encryption are addition and multiplication. We can define homomorphic encryption on addition and multiplication operations in a more formal way as:
Let m1 and m2 be two plaintexts.
DSK (EPK (m1 )  EPK (m2 )) = m1 4 m2

(2.1)

where 4,  ∈ {+, x} and D, E, PK and SK stand for decryption, encryption, public
key and secret key, respectively.
The most commonly used homomorphic encryption method for data aggregation
in the AMI network is Paillier cryptosystem. The Paillier cryptosystem is a partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) method, which means that it can perform
only addition operation on encrypted data [50]. In addition, there is a newly emerged
homomorphic encryption mechanism: fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).
The FHE enables to perform both addition and multiplication operations on encrypted data. The most important disadvantages of the FHE are size of keys and
encrypted data, and very high computational delays [15, 28]. In this dissertation, we
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adapt the FHE for preserving privacy on the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network since
the PHE is already very-well studied in the literature.

Secure Multiparty Computation
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) [22] is another method for privacy-preserving
data aggregation. Secure MPC makes use of secret sharing to implement data aggregation. One of the most commonly used secret sharing scheme is Shamir Secret
Sharing (SSS). The protocol we develop in this dissertation mostly relies on the SSS.
In the SSS, we assume that there are n nodes in the network and all computations
are done in a finite field Zp , where p is a prime number. Let ri be the private secret
of node i. Node i chooses a unique point xi ∈ Zp other than zero and selects an
(n − 1) degree random secret sharing polynomial fi (x) with fi (0) = ri . It sends its
unique point xi to all other nodes and receives share values fj (xi ) computed by the
P
other (n − 1) nodes. Then, it computes F (xi ) = nk=1 fk (xi ). These steps are done
by all n nodes and F (xi ) values are sent to the gateway. The gateway can construct
an (n − 1) degree polynomial g(x) by using the F (xm ) values along with Lagrange
interpolation, where m ∈ {1, ..., n}. The constant term of g(x) is the aggregation of
all individual n private secrets.

2.2

Wireless Mesh Networking Standards

In this section, we introduce the technologies we used to build the AMI testbed.

2.2.1

WiFi Mesh Networking

Wireless Fidelity (WiFi) is the name of a technology for wireless local area networks,
which is based on IEEE 802.11 standards. WiFi mesh network was developed on top
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of IEEE 802.11s standard. IEEE 802.11s is a wireless local area network (WLAN)
standard and an amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard for mesh networking. It
defines how wireless devices can communicate with each other to build a mesh network. IEEE 802.11s integrates mesh networking services and protocols with existing
IEEE 802.11 protocols at the medium access control (MAC) layer.

2.2.2

ZigBee Mesh Networking

ZigBee is a WMN stack specification for personal area networks (PANs) which require
less power and cost less when compared to LANs. ZigBee has different features than
IEEE 802.11s, and it is considered more lightweight that would consume less resources
in terms of computation and communication.
ZigBee is based on IEEE 802.15.4 MAC/PHY layer standard [51]. Although the
standard does not define the mesh networking, ZigBee stack employs some routing
protocols such as Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) to implement mesh
networking.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
In this chapter, we categorize and present the related work which we referred for
each individual work in this dissertation.

3.1

Privacy Preservation in Smart Grid AMI Network

In general, the utility companies need fine-grained meter data for each customer to
monitor demand and the state of the distribution network as well as utilizing dynamic
pricing to reduce peak demand. Also, the utility companies would prefer to have the
data to generate the bill on-site rather than relying on each individual smart meter
(SM). Thus, the Smart Grid (SG) should allow the utility companies to collect and
use this fine-grained data while protecting it from being used to monitor or profile an
individual consumer’s behavior.
Various approaches of providing consumer privacy are surveyed in [52]. This work
categorizes these approaches into three groups: approaches that anonymize the finegrained meter data, approaches that mask or obfuscate the individual consumption,
and approaches that focus only on protecting communication of meter data from
threats in the communication network. In practice, the third category does not
provide any additional mechanism for ensuring privacy other than relying on the
trustworthiness of the utility companies.
[53] is another study in which recently proposed SG privacy protection mechanisms are surveyed. Pros and cons of the methods are investigated in terms of their
implementation complexity, efficiency, robustness and simplicity. In [54] a privacypreserving, usage-based dynamic pricing scheme is proposed for SG, which employs
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan scheme which is a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. [55] proposes a privacy-preserving demand response scheme employing
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Paillier cryptosystem to achieve privacy-preserving demand aggregation. [56] introduces human-factor-aware differential aggregation (HDA) attack which cannot be
prevented by existing privacy-preserving aggregation protocols. Two novel protocols are proposed to resist HDA attack while achieving privacy-preserving metering
data aggregation. [57] proposes an efficient privacy-preserving scheme, which employs
identity-committable signatures and partially blind signatures, for incentive-based demand response programs in order to enable the demand response provider to compute
individual demand curtailments in the SG.
Different from the above works, our privacy approach in this chapter is based on
data obfuscation or hiding. One of these obfuscation approaches in [58] explains the
necessary theoretical background on the ability of protecting consumer privacy while
also allowing the utility company to perform state estimation, billing and dynamic
pricing. However, this approach does not touch to the aroused problems during the
deployment of this approach in a real environment.
One of the major issues when obfuscation is used is to be able to securely distribute
the obfuscation values to each SM. In fact, we identified several new attacks that are
possible when obfuscation values are to be distributed in a wireless AMI network.
This problem by itself is an important networking problem since it requires new
communication protocols to securely and reliably transmit these values. As a result,
we introduce a secure distribution protocol from the gateway to the SMs as one of
the major contributions of this work. Second, securing the communication will not be
sufficient if the protocol suffers from intense interference and data traffic in a wireless
environment, causing some of the packets to be dropped. Today’s AMI network are
typically wireless and rely on a multi-hop architecture whether it is based on WiFi
or Zigbee standards. None of the works including [58] considers the impact of such
a wireless multi-hop network on the performance of the distribution of both data
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obfuscation values and data. Our work is in a sense a bridge between SG privacy
research and wireless networking. Final contribution of this work is to introduce
multiple gateways for increased security. When the single gateway is compromised,
it is possible for the entire obfuscation vector to be captured. In multiple gateway
version, the process of creating obfuscation values is split among the gateways.

3.2

State Estimation in Smart Grid Distribution System

SG should monitor the states of the grid to be able to take the most suitable action for
the network, generations, and consumers [59]. Therefore, state estimation is crucial
to utility centers for the reliability of SG functionality.
In power transmission networks, state estimation at the transmission level has
been studied since 1970s [60]. At the the distribution level, there has been several
studies in recent years. For instance, Dzafic et al. [61] presented a new approach
for a three-phase distribution system state estimation (DSSE). The approach makes
use of real time measurements such as current magnitude, real and reactive power
measurements. The weighted least squares error method is used for estimation of
the state variables. In another recent study for distribution state estimation, [62]
investigate the use of SMs’ power injection measurements for low-voltage system
observability and controllability. Failure resistance tests demonstrated that the state
estimation accuracy can be kept at a good level unless approximately 40% of all the
SMs in the network are lost. In addition to this study, [63] develop a state estimator
for low-voltage networks with and without distributed generations.
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3.3

Data Aggregation in Smart Grid AMI Network

In addition to preserving the consumers’ privacy, we utilize data aggregation to reduce packet traffic and consequently minimize the number of dropped packets in the
network. Power consumption data from different meters are collected and aggregated
at prespecified aggregator meters hierarchically. All collected data is aggregated at
the gateway and the aggregated data is sent to the utility server. The aggregator
meters perform the aggregation by using some arithmetic operations on the collected
data before they are transmitted to the next aggregator meter.
In order to preserve consumer privacy, several works made use of homomorphic
encryption and homomorphic arithmetic operations. For instance, Li et al. [64] used
Paillier cryptosystem to provide in-network data aggregation while protecting user
consumer privacy. The aggregation is performed at each level of a tree topology
whereas the other applications perform the aggregation only at the gateway. Li and
Luo [65] used homomorphic signatures for homomorphically encrypted data in order
to make in-network data aggregation more robust to errors and internal/external
attacks. Ruj and Nayak [66] proposed a decentralized security framework for data
aggregation and access control in SGs. Consumers’ private data are encrypted by
using homomorphic encryption. In [67], the authors focused on finding the optimal
placement for the data aggregation service, which minimizes the cost of in-network
processing.
Contrary to these studies, Ambrosin et al. [68] discourage to perform aggregation
on meter readings since it decreases the accuracy of the measured data. Instead,
they proposed a secure protocol that achieves anonymous metering data delivery to
a metering data management system (MDMS). Since the metering data report visits
at least one other SM in the network, the MDMS cannot associate the report with a
certain SM.
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While these useful approaches considered different aspects of data aggregation,
none of them studied the networking aspects such as reliability and delay. In particular, none of them considered the use of TCP in a multi-hop wireless environment
such as the one in the AMI network when privacy is considered. Our approach would
be complementary to these approaches as it will allow others to work under TCP
especially if the data sizes are larger.

3.4

TCP Modifications for Smart Grid AMI Network

There are a number of works which investigated the TCP performance for SGs. For
instance, the work in [69] proposes a scalable protocol that can handle both security
and reliability using a TCP-friendly congestion control scheme. Due to similar motivations of the work in [69], Khalifa et al. [70] proposed a TCP-based scheme, which is
called Split and Aggregated-TCP (SA-TCP). The scheme aggregates separate TCP
connections to the utility server at SA-TCP aggregators and those incoming packets
are forwarded over a single TCP connection between the SA-TCP aggregator and the
utility server. This scheme has a different goal from ours. There is no in-network
aggregation while in our work we utilize in-network data aggregation at intermediate
nodes.

3.5
3.5.1

Homomorphic Systems
Partially Homomorphic Encryption

PHE has attracted most of the researchers’ attention studying SG privacy preserving
[44]. Among many PHE cryptosystems, Paillier [71] is widely proposed for data
aggregation in SG thanks to its addition property, smaller message expansion factor
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compared to others, and security features [10]. There are many SG privacy preserving
aggregation applications based on Paillier [55, 64, 72].
Ozgur et al. [26,27] carried out an experimental study. They built an AMI network
testbed comprised of Beaglebone Black boards and tested it with various parameters.
End-to-End and Hop-by-Hop data aggregation applications were implemented on
plaintext, Paillier and AES (Advanced Encryption System) encryption algorithms.
ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) and OpenSSL (Secure Sockets
Layer) certificates were used for two-factor authentication. These aggregation mechanisms were run on top of TCP and UDP transport layer protocols. By varying these
parameters, the aggregation mechanisms were tested both on the testbed and in the
ns-3 network simulator, and their performance was compared.
Our work in this chapter is different than other relevant work since we consider
encryption systems with the capability of supporting all arithmetic operations. Our
goal is to investigate how the overhead in such systems compare to PHE in a realistic
testbed using IEEE 802.11s-based mesh networks.

3.5.2

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Gentry proposed the first FHE system using ideal lattices in 2009 [47]. While this was
a great breakthrough for achieving FHE systems, the implementation of the proposed
approach was still far from being a reality. This is because FHE generates large-size
keys and ciphertexts when compared to other encryption schemes and the ciphertext
at some point become too noisy due to bootstrapping-needed that it may not be
decryptable at all. Therefore, since 2009 there have been a lot of efforts to build
practical FHEs based on Gentry’s work.
To this end, Smart and Vercauteren [40] presented an FHE scheme which had
both relatively small key and ciphertext size. However, it lacked the implementation of
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bootstrapping functionality. After a while, a faster FHE scheme was proposed in [46].
Besides these efforts, Gentry and Halevi [20] developed a working implementation of
a variant of Gentry’s FHE scheme. Despite such efforts, there was still not publicly
available implementation of any FHE scheme until recently when Perl et al. [39]
presented a working implementation of the Smart-Vercauteren scheme [40]. Brakerski
et al. [45] later presented a new FHE scheme that dramatically improved performance,
but based its security on weaker assumptions. This scheme did not need Gentry’s
bootstrapping procedure to evaluate arbitrary polynomial-size circuits.
While such implementations of FHE started to emerge, the adoption of such systems to be used in SG applications has yet to be investigated. So far, the only study
that utilizes a somewhat FHE is about wide-area supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) security [73]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first
to consider the feasibility and practicality of an FHE scheme for IoT-enabled Smart
Metering systems.

3.6

Secure Multiparty Computation-based Protocols

There have been a few studies using secure MPC-based protocols to perform data
aggregation in the AMI network. These protocols can be implemented with different
cryptographic schemes in order to make data aggregation private and secure. For
instance, Rottondi et al. [74–76] proposed a security architecture and a secure communication protocol for distributed aggregation of energy consumption metering data.
A light variant of Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem and Shamir’s secret sharing are used
to provide security and privacy in data aggregation. Thoma et al. [77, 78] proposed
a privacy preserving, secure MPC-based protocol along with Paillier cryptosystem
for smart meter based load management and billing framework. The proposed system is able to conceal consumers’ data and preserve its integrity without needing a
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trusted third party. Yang et al. [79] analyzed the privacy risks of currently used smart
metering techniques which collect fine-grained data in plaintext. They proposed a secure MPC-based solution as well as a data sanitization method which removes any
identifying data that enables to associate the data with a certain consumer.
Our work differs from these studies in two aspects. The network topology used
for the proposed systems is a kind of ring topology whereas we use mesh network
in our work geared for the AMI applications. A ring does not apply to the AMI
network. Also, they collect data once a day whereas in our application the meter data
is collected in a more realistic fashion with much higher frequency that introduces
additional overhead.

3.7

Reliability in Wireless Mesh Networks

Although the TCP-like protocols provide reliability, they introduce computational
delay and message overhead. These factors degrade the performance of a protocol as
the network scales. Instead, connectionless (without any handshake procedure) and
lightweight protocols can be preferred. The CoAP is a very good example to this
kind of protocols since it comes with a low header overhead and does not require any
handshake procedure before sending a message.
There have been a few studies investigating the CoAP in SG systems. For example,
Jung et al. [80] compare the performance of different web technologies including the
CoAP for SM data exchange over the Internet. The protocols were tested on a
testbed of two virtual machines (the service provider and consumer) with the ad-hoc
and periodic (15 mins) meter data reporting scenarios. The test results show that the
performance of the CoAP is comparable to the other technologies in both scenarios
in terms of computational demand, throughput and financial cost.
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Tanganelli et al. [81] set up a demonstration environment comprised of different
6LoWPANs (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks) for smart metering and home automation systems in order to test the feasibility of the CoAP. In
addition to smart metering, the CoAP can be used for other purposes in the AMI
network. Kim et al. [82] proposed a lightweight SDN (Software Defined Networking) controller based on the CoAP for resource-constrained AMI devices. The virtual
testbed and simulation results show that the proposed controller outperforms the
traditional controller in terms of reliability, communication overhead and latency.
The major complain about the CoAP in the aforementioned studies is its default
congestion control mechanism. The initial timeout value is randomly chosen between
2s and 3s, and it is simply doubled at each time the transmission timeouts. Since
the maximum number of retransmissions is 4, they can be exhausted easily as the
network scales [83]. Moreover, the CoAP considers all timeouts as congestion even
if it is due to the lossy paths. In such a case, the timeout value is doubled and this
causes the device to wait unnecessarily more than required at the next retransmission.
Therefore, the researchers have proposed several alternatives to the CoAP’s default
congestion control mechanism.
Balandina et al. [84] proposed a new method for calculating the retransmission
timeout (RTO) value in which a ratio between the estimated round-trip time (RTT)
and the RTO value is used to update the RTO value. Betzler et al. [85] compared the
CoAP’s default congestion control mechanism with the Congestion Control/Advanced
(CoCoA) [86] which provides an improved congestion control although it is more complex. The mechanisms were tested on the Cooja simulator [87]. The test results show
that the CoCoA performs as good as the default mechanism at least in terms of
throughput, and that it is able to reduce MAC layer buffer overflows in case the network is congested. In [88], they evaluated the performance of the CoCoA by using the
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Californium framework [89] on the FlockLab testbed [90]. Thereafter, they improved
the CoCoA (CoCoA+) [91] and conducted a comparative performance analysis of
CoCoA and a variety of alternatives [92] including state-of-the-art TCP mechanisms.
The test results show that CoCoA consistently outperforms its alternatives.
Bhalerao et al. [93] proposed a variant of CoCoA (CoCoA 4-State-Strong) which
uses a 4-state estimator for variable backoff timings to improve the throughput performance. Järvinen et al. [94] evaluated the scalability of alternative congestion control
mechanisms for the CoAP. They claim that all those alternative mechanisms are
scalable although they tested them on a system with 80 clients at most.
In our work, we modify the CoAP to provide reliability for large-scale IEEE
802.11s-based AMI network. Instead of its default congestion control mechanism,
we propose fixed, logarithmically increasing and exponentially increasing functions
for RTO calculation.

3.8

Scalability in Wireless Mesh Networks

The network scalability can be defined as the ability of keeping the throughput at an
acceptable level while increasing the coverage area by adding new nodes. There have
been a few studies investigating the scalability in WMNs. Akyildiz et al. [8] attract
the researchers’ attention to the different layer protocols such as routing, transport,
and MAC protocols for the reasons of the scalability issues in WMNs. Huang et al. [95]
investigate scalable WMN for dense urban areas and scalable ring-based WMN for
wide area coverage. They present the architecture of both WMN model and analyze
them analytically. Then, they define the scalability issues as optimization problems
and propose computation-based solutions. Also, they present some open issues about
quality of service, cross-layer design and cooperative communications. Srivathsan
et al. [96] investigate the scalability issues from both the hardware and software’s
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point of view. Different architectures for the WMNs are also discussed in their work.
They investigate the use of directional antennas and the effect of the radios used. In
software side, they highlight the importance of routing and MAC protocol design.
Finally, they make the observation that none of the proposed approaches have been
tested in a large-scale real network which is one of the several motivations of our work
in this chapter.
Nassereddine et al. [97] evaluated the scalability of the HWMP based on the ns2 [98] simulations. They used the Constant Bit Rate traffic type on top of UDP with
the packet size of 512 bytes. The simulation results obtained in a 225-node topology
show that the performance of the HWMP is highly sensitive to the number packets
traveling throughout the network and the network size. Hence, the HWMP does not
assure the scalability. This is the sole work in the literature that investigates the
scalability issues in IEEE 802.11s standard.
Our work differs from the aforementioned studies in that we use a modified version
of the ARP and HWMP [99–101]. In addition to the modifications, we adjust some
of the parameters in the protocols running at different layers. The last but not the
least is that we use 1024-node (32 x 32 grid) topology for our tests, and that all of
the nodes send their message periodically and simultaneously. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that investigates a network simulator’s stack to
develop a scalable simulation framework for the AMI applications.

3.9

Wireless Mesh Network Testbeds

There have been several studies investigating the performance of IEEE 802.11- and
802.15.4-based testbeds in the literature. For example, Garroppo et al. [102] built
an IEEE 802.11s-based WMN testbed consisting of four nodes to analyze the routing
protocol HWMP, and they proposed some enhancements to improve its performance.
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They tested their changes in a simulation environment with a larger network size,
and showed that fine tuning the HWMP parameters is at least as significant as the
metric computation. Singh et al. [103] built an IEEE 802.11s-based WMN testbed by
using the personal and laptop computers in their lab and evaluated its throughput
performance through UDP transmission protocols with varying data packet sizes. Our
work differs from this work in that we build the testbed so as to cover a larger area
with more nodes, and we test the privacy-preserving protocols running on top of both
UDP and TCP. Also, we test the performance of ZigBee mesh network technology.
Imboden et al. [104] built a linear WMN testbed using IEEE 802.11s and IEEE
802.11n. They implemented the IEEE 802.11n-based WMN by creating virtual interfaces at the IP layer. They evaluated the throughput performance of TCP and UDP
at both 2.4GHz and 5GHz frequency bands with different number of hops. The test
results demonstrated that the increased number of hops significantly deteriorates the
performance of IEEE 802.11n, and that network layer routing outperforms the link
layer path selection. In our work, we build a larger network by using IEEE 802.11s
and ZigBee standards and compare the performance of privacy-preserving protocols.
Takahashi et al. [105] built a WMN testbed of 22 nodes located in a rural area
for disaster management and presented the details about its design, operation and
management. They tested the link quality between the nodes in the mesh network
and showed that the packet delivery ratio is around 80%. When compared to our
testbed, they implemented a more sophisticated mesh access point consisting of an
OpenBlockS, two Atheros wireless LAN cards and a wireless LAN access point along
with a fan, timer and a temperature sensor whereas our nodes are comprised of more
simplistic devices. Also, we conducted our experiments in a building in which there
is almost all possible obstacles (e.g., walls, metal cabinets, workstations, personal
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computers, etc.) that can exist and can affect the performance of the communication
adversely in an urban area.
Ozgur et al. [26, 27] built an AMI network testbed and simulated the same testing environment in ns-3. They tested several privacy-preserving protocols along with
two-factor authentication via Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
signatures and SSL certificates. They developed a data collection application with
different data collection modes and tested them on both TCP and UDP to show
that if the testbed experiment results match the ns-3 experiment results. Test results
demonstrated that there are major discrepancies among the two environments particularly in data collection completion time metric. Our work differs from these studies
in the tested protocols, and that we tested the ZigBee-based AMI network testbed as
well.
Zimmermann et al. [106] introduced a hybrid WMN testbed called UMIC-Mesh
which is a compromise of real mesh network and a virtualization environment. The
real hardware used in the hybrid testbed enables to transfer the experiment results to
the real world deployments while the virtualization part makes it flexible to develop
various network protocols. However, they neither performed any experiments on the
proposed hybrid testbed nor compared its performance with that of a real world
WMN.
IEEE 802.11s standard uses the HWMP as its default routing protocol. However, it is not the only protocol for mesh routing. Optimized Link State Routing
(OLSR), Better Approach to Mobile Ad hoc Network (BATMAN) and BABEL are
some other protocols that can be used for mesh routing. Song et al. [107] designed
and implemented mesh routers and mesh clients. Then, they used these mesh routers
and clients to develop an IEEE 802.11-based WMN testbed. The Optimized Link
State Routing (OLSR) was selected as the multi-hop routing protocol. Abolhasan et
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al. [108] investigated the performance of OLSR, BATMAN and BABEL by focusing
on the multi-hopping performance and recovering from link failures. The test results
showed that BATMAN and BABEL outperformed OLSR in all performance metrics
examined. In another performance evaluation study based on a testbed, Hamidian et
al. [109] built a WMN based on Microsoft Mesh Connectivity Layer in an office-wide
area and analyzed its performance under multi-hop heterogeneous traffic. They concluded that even if the performance degrades as the network scales it is still promising
because the network can meet the users’ requirements if a good design that can limit
the number of consecutive hops between the source and the destination can be created.
Eriksson et al. [110] deployed a WMN having 21 mesh nodes in an office. They
investigated how different network designs affect the performance of user traffic. They
observed that the delays incurred by different designs are negligible and concluded
that all-wireless office meshes are feasible. Wu et al. [111] built a wide-area WMN
testbed called QuRiNet on Quail Ridge Natural Reserve in Napa, CA. The network
uses IEEE 802.11b/g as its underlying MAC protocol while using OLSR as its routing protocol. They tested several research projects such as channel assignment algorithms, rate control and routing relationship, evaluating the performance of queuing
theories and bandwidth estimation on the testbed. They have provided a web site
including a visualization and graphing tool, and an interactive map to get detailed
information about the individual mesh nodes. In our work, we build IEEE 802.11s
and ZigBee-based WMN testbeds with more simple and cheaper devices. Moreover,
we test periodic data collection protocols under security and privacy requirements of
the AMI network and assess their computational and communication overhead.
Furrer et al. [112] evaluated the performance of wireless communication technologies such as IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee networks, Bluetooth WPANs, and IEEE 802.11b
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WLANs in the IBM wireless sensor networking testbed. Several new and lightweight
messaging applications such as remote metering, location sensing and mesh networking protocols were tested in terms of efficiency and scalability. However, the tested
network consists of four devices, and the devices are located very close to each other.
Also, our work differs from this one in the tested applications because we tested
privacy-preserving protocols, which are comprised of computationally expensive operations that can push the resources to the limits.
Bansal and Sofat [113] deployed a WMN testbed at PEC University of Technology
campus and evaluated its performance under heterogeneous traffic. They measured
the SNR values to justify the location of the mesh points. Also, they tested the
testbed performance by downloading a 4.9MB file by a client with varying number of
hops. They did not provide any information about how they implemented multi-hop
routing although they used IEEE 802.11g as the underlying MAC protocol as we did
in this work. Casey et al. [114] built an IEEE 802.15.4-based testbed and tested it
in four different environments. Test results indicated that IEEE 802.15.4 standard
provides a reliable communication, and that the performance of the network heavily
depends on the position of the transmitter and the receiver. In contrast, we built a
ZigBee-based mesh network that runs on top of IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
Franceschinis et al. [115] compared the performances of ZigBee Pro and ZigBee
IP stacks. They tested the ZigBee IP stack with both HTTP over TCP and CoAP
over UDP. For the tests, they built two testbeds comprised of five nodes. ZigBee Pro
nodes used AODV as the routing protocol while ZigBee IP nodes used RPL. The test
results showed that ZigBee IP can outperform ZigBee Pro if CoAP is used. Abrignani
et al. [116] built a ZigBee-based testbed and an equivalent simulation environment
to show under which conditions the simulation can be considered reliable. The test
results showed that the simulation can give a similar results that can be obtained in a
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real environment in case of a specific range of data generation rates. The experiments
were conducted in a restricted area, so the nodes are very close to each other. Our
testbed deployments cover larger area and the tested privacy-preserving protocols
generate more overhead in the network. Also, we compare the performance of ZigBee
which is different than ZigBee IP and IEEE 802.11s on our AMI network testbed.
Unlike the aforementioned studies, we used two open-source wireless mesh networking technologies, IEEE 802.11s and ZigBee to build the AMI network testbed.
We evaluated and compared their performance on FHE- and secure MPC-based
privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols. Also, we implemented different data
collection mechanisms. We investigated how the message overheads and the cryptocomputational delays affect the performance of the network by testing them on a real
testbed.

3.10

Firmware Update in the AMI Network

Updating the firmware of the SMs in an AMI network is one of the crucial operations triggered by out-of-network agents such as the UC and the SM vendor. It
is crucial because a firmware update can remove security vulnerabilities as well as
improve/enhance the SMs’ functionalities. However, there have been a few studies
investigating the firmware update process. The primary work about updating a SM
firmware is the technical requirements document [117] in which the functional and
security requirements of the firmware update process are defined. In addition, [118]
presented a functional requirements specification for updating the firmware of a SM,
remotely. Kim et al. [119] introduced firmware update management and network
service management systems (FAN architecture) and describe the process of remote
firmware update for the devices in the AMI network. Similarly, [120] described the
remote firmware update process via the AMI network in a use case.
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Although the process is a non-real-time and non-time-constrained operation [121],
it still needs to be carried out in a secure manner in order to avoid downloading and
installing a malicious firmware update. For this purpose, Katzir and Schwartzman
[122] proposed a secure firmware update method for the devices connected to an
alternating current network in order to avoid malicious firmware updates. In the
method, a pre-defined pattern of changes in base frequency opens an update window in
which the devices accept firmware update requests. Fadlullah et al. [123] investigated
the applicability of KP-ABE in the AMI network and proposed a KP-ABE based
broadcast mechanism which eliminates the need for issuing multiple unicast messages.
Contrary to the aforementioned studies, in our work, we propose complete firmware
update protocols which are not only secure but also reliable. We utilize ciphertextpolicy instead of key-policy in order not to renew the private key of the users for each
firmware update with different access tree. Our protocols are based on CP-ABSC [34]
which provides data integrity, message authentication and access control as well as
confidentiality. Also, we introduce network coding to one of the protocols in order
to use network bandwidth more efficiently. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first study that investigates the performance of a secure and reliable firmware update
protocol employing network coding.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY-PRESERVING STATE ESTIMATION IN THE AMI
NETWORK
The future SG is envisioned as a viable solution for finding efficient and economic
methods of addressing a combination of several challenges: 1) using electricity more
efficiently [124–126]; 2) reducing the impact of energy production on the environment; 3) integrating renewable energy generated by individuals; and 4) building the
framework necessary for the use of electrical vehicles [4, 127, 128]. One part of the
SG initiative that is currently being implemented is the AMI, which provides twoway communication between the utility company and consumers’ ”smart” meters
(SMs) [1]. The utility companies can use this infrastructure to monitor power demands over short periods, provide more accurate billing as well as utilize dynamic
pricing to facilitate the reduction of peak demand. Typically, two-way AMI communication is ensured via a wireless mesh network (WMN) which can be based on either
IEEE 802.15.4 or IEEE 802.11s standards [4, 129].
Despite its potential, the implementation of the AMI has arisen concern of consumer privacy, since the fine-grained meter data being collected could be used to
infer activities and behavior patterns of consumers [12]. The frequency of the data
depends on the application and the premise and can be from 6 secs (for businesses)
to 15 mins (for residential) as opposed to once a month in the existing grid [4]. This
fine-grained data can reveal the types of activities going on in the house. Obviously,
this is against their privacy and can have social impacts. For example, a curious
person can run simple signal capturing devices to know what his/her neighbors are
doing. Similarly, at the commercial level, some companies may need to spy on their
competitors. For example, smart grid traffic analysis can reveal how long a factory
works, the number of workers present in the factory, etc. Revealing this information
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can cause financial losses, e.g., if a company knows that its competitors are producing
too many products, it can work on reducing the price of this product by offering sales
on their products. Thus, any effective method of collecting and using fine-grained
consumption information from SMs must provide sufficient protection of consumer
privacy while preserving the suitability of the data for legitimate uses.
Recently, there has been much research for addressing this privacy issue under
different assumptions [52]. While some of the approaches focus solely on the confidentiality of the meter data during its transit, others additionally strive to hide it
from utility companies by leaving the data handling to trusted third parties (TTP).
In this way, privacy can be provided by only giving the utility company the chance
to do monthly billing and thus no access to individual readings; however, the utility
companies then cannot perform distribution state estimation of the power grid which
includes collecting real-time state information from the grid including SMs. State
estimation is indispensable for SG reliability, particularly to be able to take the most
suitable action for the network, generations, and consumers [130]. Therefore, there
is a need to be able to perform both privacy-preservation and state estimation at the
same time.
To achieve both functions, data obfuscation techniques provide unique opportunities that can be exploited at the distribution level [58]. This work aims to realize
this unique opportunity by bringing together state estimation, privacy and wireless
data collection tasks in a realistic setup. The idea of data obfuscation is to hide the
actual energy usage by randomizing the fine-grained meter data. By perturbing the
collected reading values in a linear space, the utility company can still monitor the
distribution network and calculate billing for given intervals. Nonetheless, the obfuscation operation necessitates the distribution of obfuscation values to each of the SMs
in a secure and efficient way. Such distribution of values within the AMI network is
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crucial in order to ensure the plausibility of the privacy in addition to providing classical security services such as authentication and integrity. Another major missing
component in the existing privacy approaches is the feasibility and scalability of the
implementation in a realistic network by considering different parameters regarding
the network architecture. This chapter addresses these two issues in a comprehensive
manner.
However, the proposed obfuscation value distribution approach with a single gateway poses some issues regarding security and efficiency. First of all, a single gateway
will become a bottleneck when IEEE 802.11s is used with increased node count. This
is because of the increased hop counts, congestion and interference in the network.
Previous studies suggest using clustering within the AMI network and adjust the size
of each cluster based on network conditions [131]. Therefore, it is preferable to use
multiple gateways for scalability concerns.
Another motivation to use multiple gateways is due to the security of the distribution of obfuscation values. If a single gateway is being used, it is possible for all
obfuscation vector to be captured when the gateway is compromised. Splitting the
process of generating the obfuscation vector among multiple gateways could be used
to reduce this vulnerability.
The solution proposed in this work is to separate the vectors among multiple
gateways. Each gateway selects the weights for its given vectors and creates one
part of the obfuscation vector. Since each gateway is responsible for the SMs in a
portion of the grid, each gateway sends to the other gateways the elements of its
partial obfuscation vector that are associated to the meters for which these gateways
are responsible. Since each gateway only has a portion of the basis from which the
full obfuscation vector is derived, an adversary compromising one gateway would be
limited in the number of actual readings it could acquire. However, a compromised
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gateway can affect the distribution of obfuscation values to other gateways and hence
able to modify the final obfuscated meter readings. Since our main motivation in this
work is preserving privacy of meter readings and providing efficient communication
with the gateway, we have not addressed data falsification/injection issues. Such an
attempt by a compromised meter, for instance, can be detected and eliminated by
integrating an anomaly detection based mechanism developed for the AMI network
[65].
Specifically, by assuming an 802.11s-based WMN for the AMI, we propose secure
obfuscation value distribution approaches in order to implement data obfuscation in
an efficient manner based on a number of security goals identified. We then implement
this distribution approach and simulate obfuscated data traffic on ns-3 [132] by using a
draft version of the 802.11s implementation. Our goal is also to assess the overhead it
brings to the network and compare the overhead to that of a regular 802.11s network
which does not provide privacy preservation. The simulation results revealed that
such use of obfuscation does not bring any overhead in terms of packet losses or packet
delay compared to other approaches. With the ability to perform state estimation and
providing consumer privacy, the approach is feasible to be used in the 802.11s-based
AMI network.
Following the ability of SMs to contribute to the state estimation computations,
in this work, we also target distribution system state estimation where SM readings
are used. However, since the use of SMs would introduce privacy concerns, we focus
on the problem of privacy preserving state estimation which has not been studied
before in power grid state estimation research.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
some background on AMI network, state estimation in power grids, and describe the
assumptions, security goals and problem. In Section 4.2, we present our approach for
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obfuscation value distribution and obfuscated reading collection in a secure manner.
Section 4.3 introduces multiple gateways approach to the same problem. Section 4.4
is dedicated to security analysis and experiment results. Finally, we conclude the
chapter in Section 4.5.

4.1
4.1.1

Preliminaries
Underlying AMI Network

We assume that the AMI communication network consists of SMs that are connected
via a WMN with a gateway serving as a relay between the SMs. SM measures mainly
the real-time electrical energy consumption of the customers in addition to power
quality and instantaneous values such as voltage and current at their connection
points. In the current AMI systems, this data is either collected by the utility company control center or by a trusted third party (TTP). In this work, we assume the
existence of a TTP as well since handling every type of processing in a central control
center is not a scalable option [58]. A typical infrastructure for the considered AMI
in this chapter is shown in Fig. 1.1.
The mesh network is created using the new IEEE 802.11s standard which allows
mesh networking among the SMs through 802.11 MAC/PHY layer standard [133]
[134]. All nodes in 802.11s WMN are considered as Mesh Points (MP) and are able
to provide connectivity at the data link layer between other MPs. If an MP also
provides connectivity to the Internet, it is termed a Mesh Portal Point (MPP). In
our mesh network, the gateway is the MPP which collects meter readings that are
obfuscated at the MPs (i.e., SMs) via multi-hop routes. IEEE 802.11s standard
provides a routing protocol called Hybrid Wireless Routing Protocol (HWMP) as its
default routing protocol to find a multi-hop path towards the destination.
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TTP collects data from the gateway and stores this data for future access but
also forwards collected data in form of a data vector (e.g., an array) to the utility.
In addition, TTP is responsible for monthly billing computations. The utility is
responsible for creating and transmitting obfuscation base information for privacy
preservation purposes to the gateway which in turn creates the individual obfuscation
values and distributes to the SMs. We assume that the gateway communicates with
the TTP and utility via a long distance communication (e.g., LTE). However, the
utility and TTP may have other means for communication.
For security and privacy, we assume the availability of public key schemes since
symmetric key systems require a lot of overhead in terms of key management. Each
SM is initialized with a public/private key based on elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC). This was chosen since its overhead is the minimal in comparison to other
public cryptography schemes. ECC also uses a key size comparable to current symmetric cryptographic schemes, avoiding the higher computation of other public key
schemes due to the larger key size. The gateway knows the public key of every SM
in its mesh network. Every SM knows the public key of the gateway.

4.1.2

Weighted Least Squares State Estimation

A power system consists of a collection of buses, transmission lines and power meters. State estimation is used to monitor the state of a power system (i.e., voltage
magnitude and phase angle of every bus) in order to maintain reliable power supply.
Recently, there is some interest to do state estimation in low-voltage distribution
networks using meters and their instantaneous measurements (real power, reactive
power and voltage magnitude) in addition to the measurements collected from the
distribution system substation [38]. One of the techniques for this state estimation
process is called common weighted least squares (WLS) state estimation.

36

In this technique, the state of the network is estimated as a vector of variables
x = (x1 , . . . , xn )T using z = (z1 , . . . , zm )T consisting of measurements from the power
meters, where n, m are positive integers such that m > n and x ∈ Rn and z ∈ Rm .
Then, the state of the system is represented by:
z = h(x) + e

(4.1)

where h : Rn → Rm represents nonlinear dynamics such as the configuration of
transformers and buses in the grid and e ∈ Rm is measurement errors and unmodeled
dynamics. The state x is estimated to be x̂ by the following unbiased linear estimation:
x̂ = (H T W H)−1 H T W z

(4.2)

where W −1 is the covariance matrix of e.

4.1.3

Privacy-Preserving State Estimation

Due to data collection from SMs, privacy came to picture in state estimation in
distribution networks. One possible solution to this issue is to perturb the collected SM data. To this end, the authors in [58] create a distortion free obfuscation space from the span of a basis set O = {o1 , . . . , om−n } of kernel denoted as
ker((H T W H)−1 H T W ). Each oi ∈ O is a vector with m elements that will perturb
the SM values. Note that there are m − n such vectors that can be used for perturbation. The authors also create an obfuscated measurement vector named zobf , where
zobf = z + o, o ∈ O. They show that zobf can be used in place of z to calculate the
same estimated state x̂. In this way, without having access to actual power readings,
the state of the power grid can be estimated.
O is derived from the state of distribution of the grid such as the configuration
of the transformers stepping up or down voltages or buses branching off to multiple
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distribution lines. It can be sent by the utility company only when any one of these
dynamics changes. It can be reused for multiple readings until new ones are provided.
In order to create an obfuscation vector o, some random η weight values need to
be generated. At measurement time tj , the goal is to choose a random weight ηij ∈ R
j
for a vector oi ∈ span(O) = {η1j o1 + η2j o2 + η3j o3 + . . . + ηm−n
om−n }. The values of the

weights ηij at each data collection time tj in a billing period T are chosen so that the
P
sum of the values of ηij in T equals to 0 (i.e., j∈T ηij = 0).
After the above computation is done, an element from the vector o is sent to the
corresponding SM. Each SM adds this element to its actual power measurement in
order to conceal it and to preserve the privacy by this way.

4.1.4

Problem Definition

Our problem can be defined as follows: Given an 802.11s-based WMN, our primary
goal is to distribute the obfuscation values to the SMs and collect the obfuscated values
from them in a secure and efficient way via TTP. Our secondary goal is to assess the
overhead of this process in a large scale AMI network and thus analyze the feasibility
of the approach for future SG applications.

4.1.5

Threat Model and Security Goals

We identified the following attacks to the privacy and security of the collection of
fine-grained meter data in the AMI and established the associated security goals.
They are organized into two sets: those targeting the consumer and those targeting
the utility company. The first set relates to the privacy of a consumer’s fine-grained
meter data:
Attack 1: The utility company misuses fine-grained meter data it obtains to analyze
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consumer behavior or shares the data with a third party for this purpose.
Security Goal 1: Obfuscate the collected fine-grained meter data to protect it from
misuse by the utility company or related third party.
Attack 2: An eavesdropper monitors the communication channel to capture meter
data in messages between a targeted SM and the gateway to determine the behavior
of its consumer.
Security Goal 2: Protect communications containing SM readings.
Attack 3: An eavesdropper compromises a gateway to gather the obfuscation basis
O that is stored to re-generate actual meter readings.
Security Goal 3: Limit the amount of obfuscation data that could be obtained if a
gateway is compromised.
The second set of attacks relates to accurate state estimation and billing:
Attack 4: An attacker impersonates the gateway and sends fabricated obfuscation
values to the SMs to change the state of the power grid.
Security Goal 4: Provide sender authentication to verify the sender and contents
of messages.
Attack 5: An attacker captures the obfuscation values and replay them to change
the state or billing.
Security Goal 5: Identify and discard replayed messages.

4.2
4.2.1

Data Obfuscation on a WMN
Overview

In this section, we describe in detail the design of a realistic architecture and procedures for obfuscating and collecting SM data. The approach has two phases: First,
obfuscation values are created by the gateway and distributed to the SMs. Second,
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each SM creates its obfuscated power reading and transmits it to the gateway. Note
that our approach avoids the assumption that each SM has a communication link
with the TTP. The gateway transmits all the data to the TTP which is responsible
to create the data vector and transmit to the utility control center (UCC) for state
estimation. TTP also performs billing computations at the end of each billing period
and stores all obfuscated customer data for archival purposes.

4.2.2

Creating the Obfuscation Vector

The gateway is responsible for creating the obfuscation vector. To do this, the utility
company first sends the basis of the obfuscation space, O, to the gateway directly.
The gateway randomly selects weights (η) for each of the vectors in O and constructs
an obfuscation vector. An example for a simple mesh topology is provided in Fig. 4.1.
In this example, upon receiving the obfuscation basis O from the utility, the gateway
randomly chooses a weight η for each vector vi in O and constructs the actual obfuscation vector o by multiplying each vector vi by associated weight and adding them
up. If there is single gateway as assumed in our case, each SM will be assigned one
element from this vector o. Hence, each obfuscation element (i.e., o[j] where j : 1 to
7) is communicated to its corresponding SM.
However, given the large size of the AMI network, this may not be feasible and
the network may need to be divided into multiple clusters of SMs each led by a
different gateway. For those cases, our approach will still apply with one difference:
Each gateway will get the same O and will create an obfuscation vector for all the
SMs. However, each gateway only serves a subset of all the SMs. Therefore, when
distributing the obfuscation values, only the SMs that are within the cluster of that
gateway will be contacted. Nonetheless, this approach may not be efficient in terms
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Figure 4.1: A simple illustration of obfuscation vector creation.

of O transmissions and computations. We will propose a more efficient approach later
in this chapter.
Let vi denote the ith vector in every O, the gateway stores a sum of (η) values
for all vi during a particular billing period T where i can get values from 1 to the
number of vectors in O. Let T be divided into the following epochs: {t1 , t2 , ...tn },
t

and ηi j denotes the η value for vi at time tj , then the sum of all η values for all vi is:
P
tj
sumi = j=n
j=1 ηi . When the final meter reading for a billing period is collected, the
gateway chooses the weight (ηitn ) for a particular vector vi so that the sumi becomes
P
P
t
tj
zero. Thus, ηitn is chosen as − j=n−1
ηi j so that j=n
j=1
j=1 ηi = 0.
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4.2.3

Secure Distribution of Obfuscation Values

Once the obfuscation vector o is created at the gateway, the next task is to send these
values to SMs in a secure and efficient way. To reduce the traffic, one possibility is
to broadcast the whole vector within the network and let each SM pick its corresponding obfuscation value. However, there are issues regarding this method. First
of all, we use TCP which does not support broadcast. Even if we use UDP without
acknowledgments, this creates unnecessary flooding in the network where some SMs
receive the same vector multiple times from their neighbors. In addition, the size
of the whole vector will grow with the increased SM count and thus may necessitate additional broadcasts due to exceeding maximum transfer unit (MTU) for IEEE
802.11 standard. Given that SMs send readings at regular intervals, we opt to use
inter-interval times to distribute the obfuscation values using unicasting capability of
IEEE 802.11s standard through its routing protocol HWMP. The gateway prepares
a packet for each SM and transmits to each SM separately.
Specifically, the gateway employs 128-bit AES block cipher to encrypt the elements
in the vector. First, it creates a unique key for each SM and exchanges them with
the corresponding SM by encrypting it with the public key (P Ui ) of its corresponding
SMi . The gateway then sends each SM its corresponding element of the obfuscation
vector (which is represented as o[i]) by encrypting it with the shared key (SK), signing
it with its own private key P RG and adding a timestamp (TS) as follows. This is
also illustrated in Fig. 4.1.
Gateway → SMi : {< o[i], T S >}SK , SigP RG ({< o[i], T S >}SK )
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4.2.4

Calculating & Transmitting Obfuscated Measurements

When an SMi receives its element o[i], it calculates its obfuscated power measurement
(opi ) by adding its current power reading (pi ) and o[i]: opi = pi + o[i]. SMi then
timestamps (TS) the sum and digitally signs the message for the gateway using its
private key, P Ri . SMi then transmits this to the gateway again by using HWMP:
SMi → Gateway :< T S, opi >, SigP Ri (< T S, opi >)
Upon receiving the obfuscated measurements from each SM, the gateway verifies
the digital signatures and timestamps. It then sends them to the TTP. For simplicity,
we assume that the gateway can wait for all the SM readings and send them as a
single packet.
TTP prepares the obfuscated measurement vector for the utility. In addition,
when the billing period ends, it can sum all the measurements to obtain the total
usage for each SM for the billing period to charge the customer. The utility receives
the obfuscated measurement vector from the TTP and uses it for performing state
estimation. Based on the O in Fig. 4.1, the calculation and collection of the measurements are depicted in Fig. 4.2. Each meter adds its current reading (circled) to the
received obfuscation values to calculate its obfuscated reading (underlined). SM4 , for
example, has a current reading of 7. It sums it with the obfuscation value it received,
-17, obtaining an obfuscated reading of -10. The obfuscated readings are securely
communicated back to the gateway which constructs the obfuscated measurement
vector, zobf . This is sent to the TTP.
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Figure 4.2: Calculation and collection of obfuscated measurements.

4.3
4.3.1

Multiple Gateways for Increased Efficiency and Security
Multi-Gateway Communication Protocol via LTE D2D

Multi-gateway communication protocol is geared for information exchange among the
gateways. We assume that the AMI network is divided into multiple clusters, where
each is led by a different gateway. Each gateway node has two radios one for 802.11s
and one for LTE. Each gateway knows the IDs of SMs within its cluster and the public keys of other gateways in advance. The gateways need to communicate with each
other to exchange the obfuscation elements using device to device (D2D) communication architecture that is recently being standardized for LTE-Advanced under proximity services (ProSe) studies [135] (also known as LTE-Direct [136]). While direct
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Figure 4.3: A simple illustration of generation, exchange and distribution of the
obfuscation vector with two gateways.

communications have been possible in unlicensed bands, e.g., using WiFi-direct, there
are various challenges, such as the high interference in the unlicensed bands, as well
as the difficulty of pairing and synchronizing D2D transmissions. In LTE-Advanced
Release-12 standardization, preliminary studies on D2D and ProSe communications
were initiated for commercial and public safety applications [137]. A major benefit of
ProSe D2D communications in LTE-Advanced is that device pairing, resource allocation, and power control can be coordinated through a base station (which e.g. can
be embedded in the UCC in Fig. 4.3). This allows improved spectral efficiency and
lower scheduling delays compared to completely uncoordinated scheduling of D2D
transmissions. Use of licensed bands also allows improved quality of service for D2D
transmissions.
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Each gateway would run the same protocol explained in the previous section
within its cluster once the obfuscation vector is formed. However, the formation of
this obfuscation vector is different in this case. The protocol begins when the utility
provider derives the obfuscation basis O. It splits O into g components where g
represents the number of gateways involved. Then each component is encrypted with
each gateway’s public key and sent to that gateway through LTE network.
When a gateway involved in the obfuscation generation receives its partial O, it
chooses the η weight(s) and calculates its partial obfuscation vector. This vector
would have obfuscation values for all the SMs in the network but the gateway distributes only the ones that belong to its cluster. The other portions are transmitted
to the other gateways (in encrypted form) so that they can distribute corresponding
values within their own clusters.
In this way, a reading of an SM in a particular cluster will be obfuscated by
adding g obfuscation values as opposed to one in the previous approach. Again, for a
particular billing period T , the η weights for the same vector are chosen in such a way
that the sum of these weights would be zero. Note that the same security operations
of signing and encryption still apply. In Fig. 4.3, you can see an illustration of how two
gateways generate obfuscation values, exchange them and distribute them to SMs.
The UCC generates the obfuscation basis and splits it for the gateways. It encrypts
them and sends to the gateways. The gateways extract the bases, exchange the values
and generate the obfuscation vector by picking random η values and multiplying them
with each vector of the O. Each gateway sends to the other gateway the obfuscation
values belonging to the meters that are in the other gateway’s area of responsibility.
Each gateway adds the obfuscation value it received from the other to its obfuscation
value and obtains ultimate obfuscation values. Then, each obfuscation element (i.e.,
o[j] where j : 1 to 8) is transmitted to its corresponding SM by each gateway.
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4.3.2

Algorithm and Analysis

When an SM receives its obfuscation element, it decrypts it and adds it to its current
reading to calculate its obfuscated reading. The obfuscated readings are signed,
timestamped and securely transmitted back to the gateway, which collects all of
readings in this cluster. The gateways construct the obfuscated measurement vector,
zobf and send the vectors to the TTP via LTE. This is the second phase of what
is given in Fig. 4.3. Each SM follows the same procedure given in Fig. 4.2. Then,
the gateways send the obfuscated measurement vectors to the TTPs over a 4G/LTE
network.
If there are g gateways, the utility provider needs to send g messages for transmitting out the partial basis. Each gateway involved in the obfuscation vector generation
would need to contact g −1 gateways to send its own obfuscation vector. The remaining steps are similar to those of the single gateway approach and at the end there
will be g total messages sent from the gateways to the TTP. Since the inter-gateway
communication will be using LTE-Direct, we argue that this will not put any burden
on the gateways. Typically, there will be 648 bits allocated for each entry of a vector.
Since LTE-Direct can send up to 3Gbps, this would allow sending up to 5000 SMs’
readings at the same time under perfect conditions.

4.4
4.4.1

Evaluations
Security Analysis

In this section, we evaluate our proposed approach based on the security goals listed
in Section 4.1.5.
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Security Goal 1: Since the fine-grained meter data is obfuscated, the actual
reading cannot be determined at any time. Because of this, it cannot be analyzed to
determine any activity or behavior of the consumer.
Security Goal 2: The obfuscated reading that the SM sends to the gateway does not
reflect the actual reading. Therefore, even if an eavesdropper captures this reading,
its inference about the activity in the house will be wrong. Also, since the gateways
disseminate different obfuscation values at each reading collection period, the eavesdropper cannot extract a pattern of the consumer’s power consumption.
Security Goal 3: If a gateway is compromised, the obfuscation information regarding that cluster could be obtained. However, since there are other obfuscation values
coming from the other gateways, the attacker needs to have access to all other gateways as well. Therefore, obtaining actual meter readings is not possible with a single
gateway being compromised.
Security Goal 4: Since all the SMs use digital signatures for messages containing
obfuscation information and measurements, the digital signature can be verified to
confirm the identity of the message sender. In addition, since the messages are digitally signed, they cannot be modified without invalidating the signature, providing
message integrity.
Security Goal 5: Since all messages are timestamped and digitally signed, the
timestamp can be checked to verify that the received message is for the current reading.

4.4.2

Experimental Setup

We implemented the proposed approach under the widely used network simulator ns3 [132], which has an implementation of IEEE 802.11s. ns-3 can realistically simulate
the physical layer and any random interference among SMs. Randomly connected
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AMI network topologies were created containing 25, 36, 49, 64, 81 and 100 nodes in
an area of size 1200m x 1200m. This area mimics the size of a neighborhood which
uses a single gateway to communicate with the utility company.
The transmission range of each SM is set to 100m [131]. The underlying MAC
protocol is IEEE 802.11g. TCP protocol is used to ensure reliability. The data
frequency of the SMs is set to 10sec [131]. The simulation is run for 1000 secs. We
tested each run for 20 different topologies and reported the average of these topologies.
All the results are shown with the error bars in the graphs for statistical significance.
For encryption, we used crypto++ library [138]. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is an approved signature algorithm for the US government
use [139] and the Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is a wellknown scheme having several standards [140]. ECDSA is used when only signature
is required and ECIES is used when encryption and signature are required. In both
cases, we used the ASN.1 secp128r1 standard curve with SHA1, having a key length
of 256 bits.
Although PKC is computationally more expensive than symmetric key encryption
we used Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) which is an emerging and promising PKC
technique because use of PKC eliminates the overhead of key management which is
a major issue in symmetric key systems.
128-bit AES generates 16-byte message authentication code (MAC) whereas ECC
generates 32-byte signature, which means ECC provides signature sizes that are comparable to that of AES with a slightly increased computational time.

4.4.3

Baselines and Performance Metrics

We considered three baselines for comparison with our approach. The first baseline
(represented as ”baseline” in the graphs) sends meter readings in clear, providing no
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privacy. The second baseline (represented as ”baseline sign”) provides authentication
but does not provide any confidentiality in transmission and the utility provider has
access to the fine-grained meter data. The third baseline (represented as ”baseline
sec” in the graphs) provides authentication as well as confidentiality, but the utility
provider still has access to the fine-grained meter data.
In addition, we analyzed our approach in terms of different setting. For instance,
we set the meter reading frequency to both 10sec. and 20sec. in order to observe
its effects especially on end-to-end (ETE) delay. We implemented three obfuscation
mechanisms based on different data transmission strategies:
1. Scheduled Obfuscation: The scheduled transmission in which a SM sends
its obfuscated reading value to the gateway at every 10sec. even if the meter
receives the obfuscation value earlier. The gateway sends obfuscation values
to the SMs for the next reporting time, simultaneously. This is the default
mechanism used in all experiments.
2. Reactive Obfuscation: The immediate sending in which the meter sends its
obfuscated reading value to the gateway as soon as it receives the obfuscation
value.
3. Relaxed Obfuscation: It is similar to the Scheduled Obfuscation, but the
gateway does not send the obfuscation values simultaneously. Instead, there
is either 10 sec. or 20 sec. between obfuscation value distribution and meter
reading reporting processes.
In analyzing the results, we considered three metrics: goodput (i.e., the amount
of data received at the application layer by the gateway per second), data delay (i.e.,
the total time it takes for a reading to reach the gateway) and packet delivery ratio
(PDR) (i.e., the ratio of packets that are delivered to the gateway compared to the
number of packets sent by the SMs).
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4.4.4

Simulation Results

The results of the experiments conducted for comparing the performance of the scheduled obfuscation approach with those of the other three baseline approaches are shown
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Figure 4.4: Scheduled Obfuscation simulation results.
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PDR
The PDR as shown in Fig. 4.4a decreases slightly for all approaches as the number of
SMs increases. This is due to increasing number of packets transmitted throughout
the network from SMs, which increases the collisions. We observe that PDR is the
highest for the baseline because it has the smallest packet size compared to the other
three approaches. The baseline sign and baseline sec approaches achieve almost the
same PDR, but mostly the baseline sign is slightly better because its packet size is
smaller than that of the baseline sec. Note that the baseline sign and the proposed
approach generate 44-byte packets whereas the baseline and the baseline sec generate
12-byte and 65-byte packets, respectively.
Although the proposed obfuscation approach and baseline sign generate the same
size packets, the former mostly achieves lower PDR. This is due to the two-way
packet traffic between the SMs and the gateways. Contrary to the other baselines,
the proposed approach needs to have obfuscation values coming from the gateway.
Our approach is scheduled and waits for the end of 10secs to send all the SM readings.
At the same time, the gateway starts sending obfuscation values for the next cycle.
Note that the obfuscation values coming from the gateway are signed and encrypted
and thus the packet size becomes 65 bytes which is even greater than the readings’
size (i.e., 44 bytes after signing). Therefore, the obfuscation values sent for the next
data cycle may collide with some of the SM readings. This slightly increases the
number of dropped packets and results in a decrease in the PDR. We will examine
the effect of using a reactive approach where the readings are sent immediately in the
next subsection.
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Goodput
As seen in Fig. 4.4b, the goodput increases as the network size grows due to the
contribution of more nodes as expected. The goodputs of the baseline sign and the
proposed approach are similar as expected. However, there seems to be a very slight
decrease in the rate of increase of the proposed approach. This is again due to the
crossing of traffic when the obfuscation values are being sent from the gateways to the
SMs and shortly after the readings are being sent from SMs to the gateway through
the same paths. While these transmissions are happening one after another, there
may still be some traffic in the network during the transmission of obfuscation values
to the leaves (i.e., the nodes at the far end of the network) of the network topology.
This can cause some interference and keep the channel busy at certain parts of the
network which eventually causes the rate of increase in goodput to reduce slightly.
However, overall these results indicate that there is no major adverse effect of the
proposed distribution and obfuscation approach in terms of goodput.
We observe that the baseline sign, the baseline sec and the proposed approach
have significantly higher goodput than the baseline has. This can be attributed to
the sizes of the packets they send. Even if the baseline has the highest PDR, the
sizes of the packets the other three approaches generate compensate this difference
and cause higher goodput.

ETE Delay
We also looked at the impact of the approach on ETE delay, an important metric for
some of the AMI applications such as demand and response. The delay of all of the
baselines is similar when the network size is smaller (i.e., up to 49 nodes) as shown in
Fig. 4.4c, and it increases because of the increase in congestion cases as the network
size grows.
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The proposed approach is expected to experience almost the same delay with the
baseline sign for all of the number of nodes, but it demonstrates lower delays after 49
nodes. This can be explained as follows: Since the SMs are waiting for obfuscation
values from the gateway, they cannot send their readings around the same time. The
obfuscation values reach the destinations at different times due to the topological
structure of the network and SMs are scheduled to send their readings at the next
sending time. Since ns-3 does not schedule the sending operation to an exact time
value but schedules it so as to be performed after a given time interval, the SMs
cannot be scheduled to exactly the same time for transmission. They are scheduled
between the same seconds, but there are time lags (some milliseconds) between each
scheduling. This apparently reduces the contention among the nodes for accessing
the channel in the network and thus MAC layer delay is reduced. Note that in the
other approaches, more nodes become involved in message sending at the same time
and thus channel access delay increases significantly due to heavy contention and
interference. In this way, our proposed approach amortizes the impact of obfuscation
distribution, making it feasible for practical cases.

Scheduled Obfuscation vs Reactive Obfuscation
In a different version of our proposed approach, the gateways send obfuscation values
at every 10 sec as in the scheduled version, but a SM sends its obfuscated reading
to the gateway as soon as it receives its obfuscation value instead of waiting for
the next reporting time. We refer to this approach as Reactive Obfuscation. We
implemented this version in ns-3, ran the same experiments as in the case of the
Scheduled Obfuscation approach and compared their performance in terms of PDR,
goodput and ETE delay.
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Figure 4.5: Scheduled Obfuscation vs. Reactive Obfuscation simulation results.
In Fig. 4.5a, we observe that PDR of the Reactive Obfuscation is almost same as
the Scheduled Obfuscation. The baseline performs better as there is no traffic coming
from the gateway for obfuscation value distribution that would cause congestion and
interference. The use of TCP ensures that the packets are delivered even if there
would be contention among the SMs to access the channel.
We also looked at the goodput of both approaches as seen in Fig. 4.5b. The
goodputs for the Reactive Obfuscation and Scheduled Obfuscation approaches show
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the same trend as in the case of PDR and they are almost the same due to receiving
similar number of packets at the gateway.
We tested ETE delay performance of Reactive Obfuscation and compared it with
that of Scheduled Obfuscation. Our results stayed within 1%-13% of the sample mean
with a 95% confidence interval. These are shown with the error bars in the graph.
While the Reactive Obfuscation performs almost as good as Scheduled Obfuscation
in terms of PDR and goodput, we observed that it reduces ETE delay significantly,
which can be seen in Fig. 4.5c. This can be attributed to the fact that the transmission
times of the readings from the SMs would be different in Reactive Obfuscation as the
obfuscation values arrive to SMs at different time. This is not the case in Scheduled
Obfuscation where all the nodes wait for a specific time to transmit their readings
even though they may have received their obfuscation values before. In this approach,
a lot of SMs experience back-off repeatedly due to unavailability of the WiFi channel
at MAC layer. This increases delay significantly. Such a situation is not the case in
Reactive Obfuscation.
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Figure 4.6: Reactive obfuscation delay value distribution for 100 node topologies.
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The Impact of Scheduling Meter Readings and Obfuscation Values
Since congestion and contention in these two obfuscation approaches increase the
number of dropped packets, we decided to investigate if this can be further alleviated
by interleaving a time gap between the transmission of obfuscation values from the
gateway and the meter readings from the SMs. This is referred to as relaxed obfuscation. Recall that in the regular scheduled obfuscation approach both the gateway and
the SMs transmit their messages to the network around the same times. The main
motivation behind this is to either reduce possible clashes among obfuscation values
and data readings or wait enough time for the network to have less traffic.
We conducted two experiments by using 100-Node topologies. In the first experiment, the time interval between the obfuscation value distribution and meter reading
reporting processes is 10 seconds while in the second one, it is 20 seconds. The results
compared with the other approaches are shown in Table 4.1. Also, a histogram of
ETE delay values is given for reactive obfuscation in Fig. 4.6, which indicates that
the values show a normal distribution which is expected due to various hop distances
of SMs from the gateway.
From Table 4.1, we observe an interesting result in terms of ETE Delay. Basically, Reactive Obfuscation beats all the other approaches including the relaxed ones
although they wait for the network to become quiet for 10 or 20secs. The difference
is significant (i.e., reduce by 5 times) while the PDR values keep around the same
rates. This takes us to the conclusion that the problem was not the clash of values
but the contention among the SMs to access the channel. In the case of Reactive
Obfuscation, the obfuscation values come at different times and thus the contention
among SMs is minimal. This is not the case of the scheduled and relaxed approaches
as they tend to transmit readings at the same scheduled time. Therefore, it is wiser
to work on data scheduling approaches in order to reduce ETE delay further.

57

Table 4.1: Delay and PDR comparison for different approaches
100-Node
Approaches
Relaxed Obfuscation10sec
Relaxed Obfuscation20sec
Scheduled Obfuscation
Reactive Obfuscation

4.5

Topologies
Delay (sec)
1.61

PDR (%)
82.89

1.31

79.92

1.77
0.35

80.46
79.23

Conclusion

In this work, we tackled the problem of user privacy preservation in SG that will
also enable distribution state estimation. We followed a data obfuscation mechanism
and proposed secure and efficient algorithms to distribute obfuscation values within
the AMI network. Specifically, we used AES for hiding and ECC for authenticating
the obfuscation values that are distributed within the network. We also considered
multiple-gateway implementations for increased security. We proposed a protocol
that utilizes LTE-Direct for exchanging of data among multiple gateways.
We implemented all the proposed approaches in ns-3 using a draft version of
802.11s for a 802.11s-based mesh network to assess their overhead. We investigated
the performance under scheduled, reactive and relaxed transmitting strategies. Simulation results showed that the obfuscation approaches are promising in terms of ETE
delay without introducing additional overhead on PDR and goodput compared to
other existing approaches. We analyzed the approaches in terms of the security goals
they provide and showed that they can ensure consumer privacy while still allowing
state estimation and billing.
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CHAPTER 5
PRESERVING PRIVACY VIA FULLY HOMOMORPHIC
ENCRYPTION AND SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION IN
THE AMI NETWORK
Automatic Meter Reading (AMR) systems collect consumption, diagnostic and
status data [141] from the consumers’ utility meters by means of a drive-by vehicle
or a hand-held device. The collected data suffice to bill the consumer and to monitor
the status of the meters on a monthly basis in the existing grid. In order better
to manage the power demand, reduce CO2 emissions, and ensure reliability [4, 129],
the ongoing Smart Grid (SG) initiative in the US proposes several modifications to
the existing grid. This requires a communication infrastructure to enable two-way
communication between the utility companies (UCs) and the meters, and the ability of
making decisions autonomously, which makes the meters ”smart” [142,143]. However,
AMR systems are far from providing the required data to implement smart functions
such as demand-load matching, demand response, dynamic pricing, etc. [144].
The necessity of such an infrastructure brings the Internet of Things [145] concept
to the existing grid. The ”Things” in SG are the sensors/intelligent electronic devices
that are deployed along with the transmission/distribution lines and the smart meters
(SMs) at the consumer side. SMs are the IoT devices that have the capabilities of
processing and accessing the Internet. They are able both to send the fine-grained
power consumption data they measure to the UC and to receive instructions from the
UC. Also, they can adjust energy usage based on the cost or availability of energy,
depending on the preferences set by the consumers. These functions can be enabled
through several new applications such as Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
AMI applications are run on a network infrastructure that connects SMs and the UC,
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typically via a wireless mesh-based network, referred to as the AMI network in the
rest of the chapter.
Collection and storage of such fine-grained data, however, raises the issue of privacy for the consumers who have to use the SMs daily [9,10]. Specifically, the collected
consumption data can be analyzed using load monitoring techniques to infer activities
of the consumers [146]. Hence, typical privacy threats include, but not limited to: 1)
Determining personal behavior patterns (can be used by marketers, government); 2)
Determining specific appliances used (can be used by insurance companies); 3) Performing real-time surveillance (can be used by law enforcement and press); 4) Target
home invasions (can be used by criminals); and 5) Location tracking based on electric
vehicle usage patterns (can be used by law enforcement). The problem is compounded
with the involvement of third party service providers (TSPs) for the management of
the collected data [147]. These service providers provide cloud services to maintain,
store, and analyze the consumers’ data on behalf of the utility companies.
Due to such privacy concerns, partially homomorphic encryption and secure data
obfuscation schemes were employed to prevent eavesdroppers from making inferences
about the consumer activity by making various assumptions on the available resources
[10, 14]. Despite such efforts, the privacy issue has been creating several problems in
the deployment of SMs throughout the US and making the consumers reluctant to
participate in SG programs [13] because all of the proposed approaches at some point
assume a trust relationship between the UC/TSPs and the consumers. The consumers
may not be comfortable with UCs/TSPs that have the right to access their private
data.
Data aggregation can be used to both hide individual meter readings and reduce
packet traffic in the network due to the high frequency metering data [129]. The
idea is to perform the aggregation within the network as meter readings are routed

60

towards the gateway from the SMs. Each intermediate SM performs an aggregation.
However, this exposes private data of a particular meter to another meter in the
network because the aggregation is performed on clear meter readings. To solve
this problem, several studies [15,16,50,74–76] suggested using partially homomorphic
encryption (PHE) [71], fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [47] or secure multiparty
computation (Secure MPC) [22] that are capable of performing certain arithmetic
operations on concealed data in a privacy-preserving fashion. Of these homomorphic
encryption systems, PHE is widely used for simple aggregation since it allows addition
on the encrypted data. However, PHE is not able to perform other operations on
the encrypted data. This may eventually affect many other SG Distribution side
operations such as state estimation, demand response, direct load control, etc.
FHE and secure MPC systems are becoming more popular since they allow both
addition and multiplication on the encrypted data, giving flexibility to the applications
to perform different computations for their needs without endangering privacy of the
consumers. However, FHE systems suffer from generating large size ciphertexts and
longer computational times, particularly for multiplication. This makes it challenging
to be used for in-network aggregation in the AMI network. Secure MPC approaches,
on the other hand, are lightweight, but they require excessive messaging which may
not be feasible to be used in an AMI network that does not allow direct communication among all members. This work aims to address these issues by introducing
the necessary mechanisms and then assessing the overhead and performance of the
use of the aforementioned mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work to implement and investigate a secure MPC-based protocol with highly reduced
messaging complexity for the IEEE 802.11s-based [148] SG AMI network.
Our contributions are three-fold in this work.
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1. For the adaptation of FHE systems in the AMI network, we propose mechanisms
to reduce the large ciphertext size and deal with packet reassembly problem [16]
when TCP is used as the underlying transport protocol. Specifically, we first
tackle a new problem due to excessive fragmentation of FHE packets. Note that
data aggregation cannot be performed in such cases since TCP does not know
the packet sizes in advance and thus cannot determine where to cut the streams
arrived at the receiver. To this end, in this work we propose a novel solution
by adding a presentation layer above the transport layer to include packet size
information at the sender side.
2. For the adaptation of secure MPC, we propose a mechanism to reduce the
message complexity. In a classical secure MPC-based protocol using secret
sharing techniques, the shares are exchanged between the meters at each data
collection round. However, this protocol consumes the bandwidth significantly.
Instead, in this work, we propose a privacy-aware communication protocol to
lower the required bandwidth. Specifically, the meters use a pseudo-random
number generator (PRNG) to compute the shares locally that are computed by
the other meters. Hence, the meters do not need to exchange the shares before
each data collection round; so, the bandwidth and the other network re/sources
are used more efficiently. In addition, we further improve the bandwidth usage
by employing in-network data aggregation.
3. Finally, we implemented the aforementioned privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols by using the ns-3 [132] network simulator. We compared the
performance of both FHE and secure MPC-based protocols to that of PHE in
terms of packet delivery ratio, throughput, and average data collection completion time in order to investigate if the use of FHE and secure MPC is feasible under realistic settings. The experimental results indicate that the secure
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MPC-based protocol is a viable option for preserving privacy with a comparable performance to PHE while it can support multiple operations. In addition,
the simulation results indicate that the proposed packet reassembly protocol
enables the realization of FHE-based data aggregation using TCP in terms of
the data collection completion time and used bandwidth.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
some background on PHE, FHE, secure MPC, the network and attack models, and
define the problem. Section 5.2 investigates the adaptation of an FHE system to the
AMI network, assesses the feasibility of FHE aggregation operations, and presents
the details of the proposed packet reassembly protocol. We present the adaptation
of a secure MPC-based data aggregation protocol in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, we
assess the performance of the proposed approaches. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes
the chapter.

5.1

Preliminaries

In this section, we provide a background information about partially and fully homomorphic encryption systems, secure MPC, and network model we used for this
work.

5.1.1

Partially and Fully Homomorphic Encryption Systems

Homomorphic encryption systems enable performing a set of operations on ciphertexts
without disclosing their actual value. When the resultant ciphertext is decrypted, the
decrypted value is equal to the value to be obtained when the same set of operations
are performed on the actual value of the ciphertexts.
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In this work, we use two types of homomorphic encryption systems: PHE and
FHE. PHE is an encryption system that enables performing either addition or multiplication operation on encrypted data. Paillier cryptosystem [71] is the most commonly used PHE system. It is an additive homomorphic cryptosystem, which means
that it is able to perform only homomorphic addition operation on a ciphertext.
Below is a more formal representation of Paillier’s homomorphic addition operation:
Let m1 and m2 be two plaintexts.
DSK ((EPK (m1 ) x EPK (m2 )) mod n2 ) = (m1 + m2 ) mod n ,

(5.1)

where x and + operators represent modular multiplication and addition operations, respectively. n is the first component of the public key (PK = (n, g) where g
is a random integer and g ∈ Z∗n2 ).
As opposed to PHE systems, an FHE system can perform both addition and
multiplication operations on encrypted data. In this work, we use Smart-Vercauteren
(SV) scheme to provide privacy which is an FHE system. SV scheme consists of key
generation, encryption, decryption, addition/multiplication, and recryption functions
[39].
We will explain two aspects here as others are already well-known: key generation
and recryption. Key generation is different in SV since some portion of the publickey is used for recryption purposes. In addition, the key size in SV is in the order of
kilobytes which is much higher than the keys in traditional schemes that are in the
order of bits. SV is a member of public-key cryptography family, so it generates a
key pair: public and secret (private) key.
The keys are generated considering three important parameters: The number of
bits (|B|) which is used to create random coefficients for the variables of the polynomials that are used to generate a hint, the number of shares (S1 ), and the number of
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cells (S2 ) in which the shares of the hint are stored. We call each tuple (|B|/S1 /S2 )
a ”key geometry”.
As more operations are performed on a ciphertext noise is accumulated in the
ciphertext. The recryption function removes this noise in the ciphertext without decrypting it and the cleartext is kept unchanged. The function utilizes the hint whose
pieces are distributed into an array in public-key randomly. In the lack of such a function, we are limited to a fixed number of homomorphic operations. When we exceed
this number of homomorphic operations the ciphertext becomes undecipherable.

5.1.2

Secure Multiparty Computation

Secure multiparty computation makes use of secret sharing to implement data aggregation. Secret sharing differs from PHE and FHE in the way of concealing the data.
It is based on dividing a secret into shares and distributing them amongst a group
of participants such that the secret cannot be reconstructed unless a certain number
of the participants collude. However, in PHE or FHE, it is sufficient to obtain the
private key in order to decrypt any message encrypted with the corresponding public
key.
Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) [149] is the most commonly used secret sharing
scheme. In SSS, we assume that there are n nodes in the network and all computations
are done in a finite field Zp , where p is a prime number. Let ri be the private secret
of node i. Node i chooses a unique point xi ∈ Zp other than zero and selects an
(n − 1) degree random secret sharing polynomial fi (x) with fi (0) = ri . It sends its
unique point xi to all other nodes and receives share values fj (xi ) computed by the
P
other (n − 1) nodes. Then, it computes F (xi ) = nk=1 fk (xi ). These steps are done
by all n nodes and F (xi ) values are sent to the gateway. The gateway can construct
an (n − 1) degree polynomial g(x) by using the F (xm ) values along with Lagrange
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interpolation, where m ∈ {1, ..., n}. The constant term of g(x) is the aggregation of
all individual n private secrets.

5.1.3

Network Model

We assume an AMI network that consists of SMs (e.g., IoT devices) and a gateway
that can communicate with a UC. The communication between SMs is based on IEEE
802.11s-based mesh standard which allows SMs to determine a route to the gateway
for sending their readings [150–152]. The gateway collects all the SM readings and
sends them to the UC using a wide area network connection such as WiMAX or
LTE [153]. A sample AMI network based on IEEE 802.11s is given in Fig. 1.1.

5.1.4

Problem Definition

Traditional encryption methods can be used to provide security for data communication, but they require decryption before data aggregation. This reveals private
meter readings to another meter and breaches the consumers’ privacy. While this can
be addressed using PHE systems, the aggregated encrypted data cannot be further
used for other applications such as distribution state estimation or direct load control
where more sophisticated computations are needed. Hence, our problem in this work
can be defined as follows: Devise network protocols that will help adapt FHE and secure MPC for deployment in the AMI network. In addition, assess their performance
with respect to PHE solutions in a realistic network to understand the overhead of
achieving comprehensive privacy.
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5.1.5

Threat Model and Security Goals

We have the following threats to the privacy and security of SM data collection in
the AMI network and identify the relevant security goals.
Threat 1: The UC can misuse fine-grained meter data to analyze consumer behavior
or worse, it can share the collected data with a third party for this purpose.
Security Goal 1: Aggregate the collected fine-grained meter data in-network before
sending to the UC to protect them from misuse by the UC or any third party.
Threat 2: An eavesdropper can monitor the communication channel to capture
meter data in messages between a targeted SM and the gateway to determine the
behavior of the SM’s user.
Security Goal 2: Protect communications containing SM readings via data concealment.
Threat 3: An attacker can compromise a SM and analyze behavior of its child meters.
Security Goal 3: Employ data aggregation techniques that can perform arithmetic
operations on concealed data.
Threat 4: An attacker can impersonate the gateway and send fabricated data collection requests to the SMs more frequently to keep them busy and to waste the network
bandwidth.
Security Goal 4: Provide sender authentication to verify the sender and to check
the content integrity.
Threat 5: An eavesdropper can capture and replay the data packets to change the
state estimation or billing.
Security Goal 5: Identify and discard replayed messages.
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5.2

FHE Scheme for the AMI Network

In this section, we first examine the complexity of the used FHE system and then
tackle the problem of packet reassembling when it is to be used in AMI systems.

5.2.1

The Complexity of Smart-Vercauteren Addition and
Multiplication Operations

As mentioned, we use an implementation of Smart-Vercauteren scheme [39] which
is an FHE system. In this work, we extended [39] so that the operations can be
performed on multi-bit operands (rather than single bits) without losing the ability
to perform decryption. We also incorporated recryption operation to provide noise
cleaning whenever needed. These operations and the communication between the
meters are highly secure because meter readings are transmitted in ciphertext and
all operations are performed on encrypted data. Also, recryption does not require
to have the original of the encrypted data. Hence, unless an attacker has the secret
(private) key, no confidential data can be revealed.
Table 5.1: Delay comparison of addition and multiplication
# of
operands
2
3
4
5

Delay (sec)
Addition Multiplication
3.99
625.09
8.49
1593.62
13.49
3562.15
19.04
7624.68

Before we use SV scheme in an AMI network, we investigated the complexity of
its operations. Specifically, we assessed the feasibility of addition and multiplication
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Table 5.2: Data size comparison of addition and multiplication
# of
operands
2
3
4
5

Data Size (bits)
Addition Multiplication
52,237
101,556
55,348
153,626
58,353
206,014
61,486
258,403

operations of SV scheme for 16-bit operands. We performed sequential homomorphic
operations on encrypted data and assessed the time and storage complexity. The
tests were performed on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B [154] having four 64-bit ARM
Cortex-A53 processors at 1.2 GHz with 1 GB RAM using Raspbian OS. The results
are given in Table 5.1 and 5.2. As shown in Table 5.1, multiplication suffers from
excessive processing times. Even for two operands, its processing time is more than
10 minutes. For the generated data size, we observed that addition generates far less
data than multiplication does. For instance, for five operands, addition generates less
than four fold of that multiplication generates. As can be seen from these results, the
multi-bit multiplication processing times in the order of minutes which may not be
applicable to all SM data collection applications. However, these types of operations
can be run on more powerful servers in the utility control centers.
Thus, for the rest of the chapter, we focus on the multi-bit homomorphic addition
that can be run on SMs. We analyze its feasibility and performance when used in an
AMI network under TCP.

5.2.2

Packet Reassembling with Secure Aggregation

In this section, we first introduce the packet reassembly problem when secure aggregation is employed. We then propose a solution to address it.
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The Packet Reassembly Problem under TCP
Given the critical nature of the SM data, we use TCP in order to ensure reliability.
Nonetheless, when data packets are transmitted over a TCP connection using FHE,
we identified that a packet reassembly problem occurs at the receiver side which needs
to be solved. Specifically, data flow in a TCP connection is controlled by the window
size (WS) field in a TCP header. The receiver of a segment states how many bytes of
data it is willing to receive. Accordingly, the sender of the segment does not send more
data than the stated value in the WS field. In this way, data flow in each direction of
the connection is adjusted so that hosts are not overwhelmed by more data than they
can handle (i.e., flow control). However, this adjustment may cause some portions of
a packet to be transmitted in different segments due to changing WS value especially
when the packet size is large. This case typically shows up in FHE systems since large
size ciphertexts are fragmented into many segments. At the receiver side, the packet
needs to be reassembled from the collected segments since it will be aggregated with
other packets coming from other child meters. In this case, the receiver (meter) does
not know the size of the sent packet from a particular sender and thus cannot know
where to cut the byte stream (consisting of multiple segments). Note that each of the
receiver’s child meters may send different size packets in case the child meters have
different number of child meters. We call this problem the packet reassembly problem.

Application
Layer

Messaging Apps.

Presentation
Layer

PRP

Transport
Layer

TCP

Internet
Layer

IP

Link Layer

PPP

(a) Placement of the PRP in protocol stack.

PRP
Header

Application Layer Packet

4 bytes

Size of Application Layer Packet

(b) An illustration of a PRP packet.

Figure 5.1: The Packet Reassembly Protocol in the network stack.
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In order to overcome this problem, we propose a new protocol which enables the
receiver meter to know the total size of the packet it will receive. We develop this
new protocol on top of the TCP layer, in the presentation layer as shown in Fig.
5.1a. The proposed Packet Reassembly Protocol (PRP) enables an aggregator meter
to reassemble a packet from its segments. The protocol adds a minimal header that
includes the packet size to the packet at the sending side while it removes the header,
reads the packet size and gathers this size of bytes to reassemble the packet at the
receiving side.
Algorithm 1 Receive(segment, f rom)
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:

buf f er ← buf f erM ap.RetrieveBuf f er(f rom)
if buf f er == null then
header ← segment.GetP RP Header()
buf f er ← CreateBuf f er(header.GetP acketSize())
end if
residualBytes ← buf f er.Add(segment)
if buf f er.IsF ull() then
appP acket ← CreateAppP acket(buf f er)
ReportU pperLayer(appP acket)
buf f erM ap.RemoveBuf f er(f rom)
if residualBytes.Size() 6= 0 then
resSegment ← CreateSegment(residualBytes)
Receive(resSegment, f rom)
end if
end if
As such, a PRP packet consists of the PRP header and the application layer

packet. An illustration of a PRP packet is shown in Fig. 5.1b. The size of the header
is kept minimum with 4 bytes and it includes the size of the application layer packet
and the identifier of the meter. Even if a packet is exposed to TCP segmentation, the
first segment is received first by the receiver meter since the TCP guarantees ordered
delivery of a stream of bytes. Thus, a meter will be able to know the total size of the
packet by using the header information in the first segment it receives.
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Protocol Pseudocode
The PRP implements two crucial functions: Send and Receive. Send function is
called by the application layer. It is utilized to send application layer packets of a
meter to another meter. Receive function is called by the transport layer when there
is a packet in the receive buffer. We provide a pseudocode for only Receive function
in Algorithm 1 because Send function is straightforward.
The algorithm, first, checks if there is a buf f er dedicated to f rom. If there is
no such a buf f er, a buf f er is created in the size of the received segment and the
segment is pushed into the buf f er. If the size of the segment is more than the size
of the buf f er, excess bytes are put into a byte array residualBytes. If the buf f er
is full, an application layer packet appP acket is created out of the segments in the
buf f er. The appP acket is sent up to the application layer and the buf f er dedicated
to the f rom is deleted from the buf f erM ap. If there is any data in the residualBytes
array, a segment resSegment is created out of residualBytes and Receive function
is called with resSegment and f rom to handle the excess bytes, recursively.

5.3

Adapting Secure MPC for the AMI Network

As mentioned in Section 5.1.2, secure MPC requires communication among all the
nodes (e.g., n(n − 1) messages need to be exchanged), which not only increases the
communication complexity, but may also render the implementation infeasible due
to the topologies of the AMI network. The challenge is to adapt secure MPC in
such a way that it can be used in an AMI mesh network topology without significant
overhead. To address this issue, we adopt the idea used in [155]. Specifically, instead
of exchanging the shares, each set of two meters agrees upon a shared key and uses
this key as an initial feed to a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) to locally
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compute the shares that will be received from the other meters. The keys can be
preloaded on the meters or the Diffie-Hellman [156], which is the most commonly
used key-exchange protocol can be used to share the secret keys.
Meter Mi

Gateway GW

Parameters

Parameters

𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐺𝑊 , 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑀𝑗 , 𝑥𝑗 ∀ 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}

𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝐺𝑊 , 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑀𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗 ∀ 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}
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𝑎𝑖 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑀𝑖

} ∀ 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}\𝑖

Choose 𝑐𝑘 > 𝑐𝑘−1
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Data Collection Round k

Req 𝑐𝑘 )𝑠𝑖𝑔𝐺𝑊
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𝑛

𝐹𝑖 𝑥𝑖 =
𝐹𝑖 =

𝑗=1
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𝑗=1 𝑃𝑅𝑁𝐺𝑖
𝑗≠𝑖

𝐾𝑗 )
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Data Aggregation
𝑛

𝑅=
𝑗=1

𝑛
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𝑗=1

𝑟𝑗

Figure 5.2: Overview of the secure MPC-based protocol we used in this work
We give an overview of the protocol we used in our work in Fig. 5.2. In the
protocol, each data collection round is initiated by the gateway. The gateway chooses
a round value ck which is larger than the values used for the previous rounds and
sends it to all meters in the network. Each meter i applies the P RN Gi (·) function ck
times with an initial seed Kj to compute fj (xi ) = P RN Gci k (Kj ) values locally, where
j ∈ {1, ..., n}/i. These values are the shares that would be computed by the other
meters. Now, we have n points: {(0, ri ), (x1 , f1 (xi ), · · · , (xn , fn (xi ))}/(xi , fi (xi )). For
the sake of clarity, we represent these points with a new tuple (Xi , Fi (Xi )). We
can construct an (n − 1) degree polynomial Fi (X) over these points. However, the
coefficients of this polynomial cannot be random, but they have to be computed. The
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Lagrange polynomials li can be used to pre-compute the coefficients by each meter i
as given in Formula (5.2):

li (x) =

n
Y
x − xj
·
x
−
x
i
j
j=1

(5.2)

j6=i

Hence, the polynomial Fi (X) can be derived as in Formula (5.3):

Fi (X) =

n
X

Fi (Xj ) · lj (X) ·

(5.3)

j=1

From Formula (5.3), the meter i can compute its own share by substituting X in
the formula with xi . Now that we have computed all shares, we can sum them up and
send the result to the gateway. The gateway constructs a polynomial over received
Fi values by using the method given above. The constant term of this polynomial is
the aggregated value of all ri values.

5.3.1

Hierarchical Secure MPC in the AMI Network

Due to the nature of secure MPC, each meter computes the sum of its shares including
the shares that would be computed by other meters; signs, and sends it to the gateway
directly. The gateway verifies the signature of the packets received and derives a new
polynomial over these summed shares. The constant term of this polynomial is the
aggregated value of the meters’ reading. Finally, the gateway signs and sends the
aggregated value to the UC.
However, in our case the AMI network is a multi-hop network where a hierarchical
relationship can be defined between the nodes in the network. Therefore, we would
like to take the advantage of in-network processing and revise the protocol to work
in a multi-hop manner. Specifically, we propose the following modifications: The
Lagrange polynomials to be computed by the gateway can be computed by each
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𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑗

4

𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑘

2 𝑉𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑀𝑖 , (𝐹𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑖 (0))𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑀𝑖
3 𝐹𝑎𝑔𝑔 = 𝐹𝑖 ∙ 𝑙𝑖 0 + 𝐹𝑗 ∙ 𝑙𝑗 0

1

𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖
Figure 5.3: A simple example for hierarchical secure MPC of a parent meter with one
child meter
meter. The meters compute their total share (Fi in Fig. 5.2) and multiply it by the
associated Lagrange polynomial li (0). Then, they sign and send it to their parent
meter. The parent meters verify the signature of the multiplied total shares and
aggregate them with their own multiplied total share. They sign the result and send
it to their parent meter (illustrated in Fig. 5.3). This process goes on up until to the
gateway. The gateway verifies the multiplied total shares and aggregates them with
its own multiplied total share. Finally, it signs the result and sends it to the UC.
By following this protocol, both the total bandwidth usage and the computational
overhead at the gateway can be reduced further.
The protocols given above are used to perform addition operation. The secure
multiparty multiplication [157] can be implemented by applying P RN G(·) function
twice consecutively followed by a degree reduction [158]. For the sake of a fair comparison with FHE and PHE, we have not implemented and discussed the multiplication
operation in this work.
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5.4

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we, first, analyze the security of the proposed approaches, then, present
the simulation results.

5.4.1

Security Analysis

In this section, we evaluate our proposed protocols based on the security goals listed
in Section 5.1.5.
Security Goal 1: Let mi ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} be the reading value of meter i. It is
encrypted with the public key of the UC (P KU C ) before transmitting.
EncP KU C (mi )
The fine-grained meter data is aggregated in-network and the resultant value
(cGW ) is communicated to the UC by the gateway.
Pn

i=1

EncP KU C (mi ) = cGW

After decrypting the resultant value, the problem turns into obtaining individual
meter readings from their summation, which is obviously impossible.
DecSKU C (cGW ) =

Pn

i=1 (mi )

The same approach applies to the secure MPC-based protocol because all operations are performed on concealed data (distributed shares of the meter readings). In
the course of operations, what the UC can obtain is only the summation of all of the
meter readings.
Security Goal 2: The concealed data packets that the SMs transmit do not reflect
actual meter readings. Therefore, even if an eavesdropper capture a data packet,
his/her inference about the activity of the consumer will be wrong. For PHE or FHE,
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in order to capture the actual reading the eavesdropper needs to know the private key
that only the UC possesses. For the secure MPC-based protocol, s/he needs to know
the (n − 1) 256-bit random numbers generated by the targeted SM as the shares from
the other SMs.
Security Goal 3: Since the employed protocols are able to perform data aggregation on concealed data, they do not disclose the actual readings even to the SMs that
perform data aggregation.
Security Goal 4: This threat applies to the secure MPC-based protocol because the
data collection in this protocol depends on data collection requests sent by the gateway. Since all the SMs use an authentication mechanism called Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for data packets they transmit, the digital signature
can be verified to confirm the identity of the packet sender and a signature cannot be
forged without the private key that created that signature. In addition, the content
of the packets cannot be modified without invalidating the signature, providing data
integrity.
{EncP KU C (mi ), SigSKi (EncP KU C (mi ))}
Security Goal 5: Since all data packets are timestamped, the timestamp (T S)
of a packet can be checked if the packet is for the current data collection round.
{< EncP KU C (mi ), T S >, SigSKi (< EncP KU C (mi ), T S >)}

5.4.2

Experimental Setup

We assessed the performance of our protocols using network simulator ns-3 [132],
which has an implementation of the IEEE 802.11s mesh networking protocol. We
created random multi-hop network topologies of size N, where N ∈ (36, 49, 64, 81,
100). For each topology, a mesh node acts as the gateway/data collector and (N-1)
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mesh nodes act as SMs that send their reports to the gateway periodically at every
60s [159] reflecting the worst cases scenarios. The data size generated at the SMs is
assumed to be 16 bits, large enough to hold the power readings. Also, we assume that
the network is synchronized with a global clock in order to have a reliable timestamp
mechanism. For each N, we created 30 random network topologies and reported
the average from these random network topologies. For TCP, we set the Maximum
Segment Size (MSS) to 1500 bytes [160].
There are two types of data aggregation mechanisms defined for the AMI network [50]. Both mechanisms are implemented: End-to-End (EtoE) aggregation and
Hop-by-hop (HbyH) aggregation. In the HbyH aggregation, a minimum spanning
tree of the network is found by the gateway meter [161] as illustrated in Fig. 2.1.
The gateway meter designates parent-child relationships to each meter based on this
aggregation network tree. Leaf meters in the network send their meter reading to
their parent meter periodically. The parent meter aggregates its own reading with
the readings received from its child meter(s). Then, it sends the resultant value to its
own parent. This process goes on up until to the gateway meter. Finally, the gateway
aggregates its reading with the aggregated readings received from its child meter(s)
and sends the result to the UC. In the EtoE aggregation, all the meters send their
reading directly to the gateway. The gateway aggregates its own reading with the
readings received from the other meters and sends the result to the UC.
The secure MPC-based protocol we used in this work makes use of SSS for data
aggregation. For the SV scheme, we used the implementation of [15]. The SV scheme
runs on top of the PRP and uses the key geometry of (384/8/5). Paillier cryptosystem
uses 1024 bit keys and the PRNGs generate 256 bit random numbers. ECDSA was
employed to provide authentication since it is an approved signature algorithm by the
US NIST [139]. We used the ASN.1 secp128r1 standard curve with SHA1, having a
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key length of 256 bits. The SMs are assumed to possess all required public/private
keys required for a secure communication with other SMs.

5.4.3

Baselines and Performance Metrics

In our simulations, we employed the SV scheme and the secure MPC-based protocol
in both EtoE and HbyH aggregation and used Paillier cryptosystem as a baseline for
comparison. The SV scheme and the secure MPC-based protocols were represented as
SV-EtoE, SV-HbyH, SMPC-EtoE, and SMPC-HbyH for EtoE, and HbyH aggregation,
respectively in the figures. We compare the performance of the SV scheme and the
secure MPC-based protocol to the following baselines that utilize Pallier PHE. Our
goal is to see how close the performance of FHE approaches to PHE.
• Paillier & EtoE Aggregation (Pai-EtoE): In this test, the meter readings were
encrypted with Paillier cryptosystem and sent directly to the gateway.
• Paillier & HbyH Aggregation (Pai-HbyH): In this test, the meter readings were
encrypted with Paillier cryptosystem and subject to data aggregation at intermediate meters.
For performance evaluation, we used the following metrics:
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): The ratio of packets that are delivered to the
gateway compared to the number of packets sent by the SMs.
• Throughput (TP): The total amount of data received by the gateway per second.
• Average Data Collection Completion Time (CT): The average elapsed time for
receiving all the power readings from all the SMs at the gateway in one round.
It is measured at the application layer and thus it takes into account the cryptosystem/Lagrange interpolation operations.
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Note that we assessed the PDR only for EtoE aggregation mechanism because in
HbyH mechanism, the throughput is reduced as there is in-network computation and,
thus, gateway throughput is not comparable to that of EtoE.

5.4.4

Simulation Results

In this subsection, we present results of the simulations we conducted to compare the
performance of the protocols with that of the baseline. We discuss each of the metrics
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Figure 5.4: EtoE and HbyH simulation results.
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Packet Delivery Ratio
As mentioned before, we give the PDR only for EtoE mechanism. As shown in Fig.
5.4a, the PDR is almost 100% until 81-node topology for all approaches. After 64-node
topology, the PDR decreases very slightly for Pai-EtoE and SV-EtoE approaches.
This is due to the fact that the size of packets these approaches generate is larger
compared to SMPC-EtoE. The larger the data size, the higher probability the more
congestion occurs. Overall, increased number of meters do not deteriorate the PDR
performance of the approaches significantly.

Throughput
We investigate the throughput (TP) performance to analyze bandwidth usage of the
proposed approaches. The goal is to use as less bandwidth as possible to accommodate other types of traffic. We give throughput figures for both EtoE and HbyH
mechanisms in Fig. 5.4b and Fig. 5.4c, respectively. Overall, it can be seen that
the HbyH TP values are smaller than the EtoE TP values. This is because the gateway receives meter readings from its child meter(s) in HbyH mechanism whereas it
receives meter readings from all other meters in the network in EtoE mechanism.
As shown in 5.4b, the EtoE TP values increase as the number of meters in the
network increases. The approaches produce TP based on the size of data packets they
generate. In this manner, SMPC-EtoE produces the least TP as expected because
it generates smaller data packets compared to the other approaches.
We observe an interesting tendency of the TP values for HbyH mechanism given in
Fig. 5.4c. For all the approaches, the values for 36 and 49-node topologies are almost
fixed. Then, it decreases until 81-node topology. Finally, it increases at 100-node
topology. This is related to the number of meters that send their reading directly to
the gateway (e.g., 1-hop meter neighbors of it), and the packet delivery delay within
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the network. As the number of meters in the network increases, the time required
for the gateway to receive aggregated meter readings increases. However, the number
of child meters of the gateway does not increase with the same ratio, which causes a
decrease in TP. The increment at 100-node topology can be attributed to a significant
increment in the number of the child meters of the gateway. When we compare the
approaches, we can see that the order of the TP values are the same as in Fig. 5.4b.
This order stems from the same reasons mentioned above for the EtoE TP values.
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Figure 5.5: EtoE and HbyH simulation results with different periods.

Average Data Collection Completion Time
Another metric we investigated is the average data collection completion time because
it is an important metric for some of the AMI applications such as demand/response.
We give the simulation results for EtoE and HbyH mechanisms in Fig. 5.5a and Fig.
5.5b, respectively. From both figures, we can see that the CT values increase for all
the approaches as the network grows. Also, from the figures, it can be seen that it is
not feasible to collect meter readings at every 60s for SV approach. Therefore, we ran
another simulation in which meter readings are collected at every 120s to investigate
if giving more time to SV will make an impact on the CT. We used -60s and -120s
suffixes to distinguish the approaches.
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Pai-EtoE/HbyH and SMPC-EtoE/HbyH require less time to complete a
data collection round than SV-EtoE/HbyH-60s and SV-EtoE/HbyH-120s approaches since size of the data packets generated by Paillier cryptosystem and PRNG
is much more smaller than that of the packets generated by the SV scheme. The increased data size causes to segment the data into smaller packets based on the window
size by the TCP. This increases the probability of the collision while having access to
the channel to transmit the data. Each collision increases the backoff waiting times,
so the collection completion time.
SMPC-EtoE/HbyH require more time than Pai-EtoE/HbyH because the meters need to receive ck from the gateway to compute the shares that would be received
from the other meters in the network. This procedure increases the data collection
completion time of SMPC-EtoE/HbyH. When we compare the data collection
mechanisms, we can see that EtoE mechanism takes more time to complete a round
than HbyH mechanism. We attribute this to the large number of meters that want to
send their readings to the same meter, i.e., to the gateway. This causes more back-off
waitings compared to those in HbyH mechanism because all of the meters attempt to
send their readings to the gateway at the same time. However, in HbyH mechanism,
meter readings are aggregated at intermediate aggregator meters rather than only
one meter and these meters receive meter readings from relatively smaller number of
meters compared to the gateway collecting meter readings by using EtoE mechanism.
This reduces the contention on accessing the medium, so the collisions.
As shown in the figures, SV-EtoE/HbyH-120s approaches complete data collection within 120s, which makes SV approach feasible. Both in EtoE and HbyH, 60s
and 120s approaches show a very similar tendency because the meters experience the
same delay since they try to send their readings at the same time. This results in the
same contention on accessing the medium, consequently, the same back-off timings.
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We expected to observe that SV-HbyH-60s/120s show better performance than
SV-EtoE-60s/120s due to the same reasons given above for Pai-HbyH and SMPCHbyH. However, SV-EtoE-60s/120s outperform SV-HbyH-60s/120s from 36node topology to 64-node topology. This is due to the packet reassembly process
at the intermediate meters when HbyH mechanism is employed. The PRP is not
used for EtoE mechanism because size of the encrypted meter reading is fixed and
the same for each meter. The computational overhead at the gateway is due to the
data aggregation process in EtoE mechanism. This overhead exceeds the overhead of
the packet reassembly process after 64-node topology. Thus, SV-HbyH-60s/120s
outperform SV-EtoE-60s/120s for 81-node and 100-node topologies.

5.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we tackled the problem of reliable and privacy-preserving in-network
data aggregation in the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network. We utilized both FHE
and secure MPC for AMI applications.
We identified a new problem called the packet reassembly problem, which stems
from varying aggregated data sizes of SV scheme when HbyH mechanism is employed
and proposed a new protocol at the presentation layer in order to overcome this
problem. Also, we proposed a new secure MPC-based protocol that can perform data
aggregation with HbyH mechanism as well.
The proposed approaches fulfill several crucial goals to provide a secure and
privacy-preserving communication environment. First of all, the messages are timestamped to prevent replay attacks and signed for message authentication (Security
Goals 4 and 5). The approaches conceal the actual meter readings by either encrypting or dividing them into shares computed over a polynomial. This prevents the
eavesdroppers from capturing the consumption information and analyzing the con-
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sumers’ consumption pattern (Security Goal 2). Since FHE and secure MPC are able
to perform arithmetic operations on concealed data, the proposed approaches implement in-network data aggregation in order not to reveal the actual meter readings to
the UC or a compromised SM (Security Goals 1 and 3).
We implemented all the approaches in ns-3 using a draft version of 802.11s for
a 802.11s-based mesh network to assess their overhead. We investigated the performance under EtoE and HbyH data aggregation mechanisms. Simulation results
showed that HbyH mechanism performs better than EtoE mechanism for all approaches except SV scheme for Completion Time metric. From the results, we inferred
that there is a threshold network size for SV scheme to employ EtoE mechanism in
periodic data collection, and that HbyH mechanism may not be a good choice for
medium-scale networks due to the computational overhead brought by the Packet
Reassembly Protocol.
For both data collection mechanisms, the secure MPC-based protocol consumes
far less channel bandwidth than SV scheme consumes. In addition, an increased data
collection period makes SV scheme more acceptable in terms of bandwidth usage.
Also, in average data collection completion time, the secure MPC-based protocol
outperforms SV scheme for both data collection mechanisms. Particularly in HbyH
mechanism, the time gap between the approaches is considerable. Overall, we conclude that the secure MPC-based protocols are much more scalable than SV scheme in
terms of bandwidth usage and average data collection completion time. They can also
match the performance of PHE and thus can be an attractive option for preserving
privacy in AMI applications.

85

CHAPTER 6
A SCALABLE SIMULATION FRAMEWORK FOR THE AMI
NETWORK
Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have numerous features such as self-organization,
self-healing and multi-hop communication, which make them flexible and adaptable,
e.g., the coverage area of the network can be extended by adding new nodes. However,
this arises reliability and scalability issues because maintaining the throughput while
expanding the network becomes a difficult challenge due to more collisions from a large
number of nodes [162]. This is also a concern for our privacy-preserving protocols
in ns-3 since we experienced reliability and scalability problems during the simulations in the previous chapter. Therefore, we decided to analyze the performance of
the network further and detect the factors that thwart reliable communication and
scalability in the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) network.
Large-scale WMNs already suffer from the reliability and scalability issues. Moreover, periodic and simultaneous packet generating applications complicate mitigating
the issues. One of those applications in the AMI network collects the consumers’
power consumption data from their smart meters (SMs) and communicates the collected data to the utility companies (UCs). In addition to the existing applications,
the UCs and the researchers have been developing new applications. Although the
UCs have a ready-to-use infrastructure, they want to test their applications’ performance on a scalable simulation environment before installation because the installation of an application to each node in a large-scale network requires too much time
and introduces an extra traffic to the network. Regarding the researchers, they completely depend on the simulators since there is a lack of large-scale AMI testbeds and
the UCs do not allow them to use their AMI network. While there is a number of simulators such as ns-2 [98] or ns-3 [132] that can be used to simulate AMI applications,
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they do not scale well beyond a hundred nodes [14, 15, 17, 28, 163–166]. Therefore, in
this work, we investigate the reliability and scalability issues of a network simulator’s
network stack and propose a scalable simulation framework for IEEE 802.11s-based
AMI applications using ns-3 network simulator. IEEE 802.11s is the mesh standard
that can be used to form a WMN among SMs. We analyze the protocols running in
the network stack in order to find the reasons of performance degradation as the network scales and propose several parameter tunings and modifications to the existing
stack as minimum as possible as will be detailed below.
The AMI applications need reliable data communication because it is required for
the reliability of the entire Smart Grid (SG). For example, the demand-response application is implemented to improve the system reliability through emergency-based
direct-load control programs [167, 168]. Therefore, each power consumption reading
by the SMs is critical to communicate to the UC reliably. The TCP is one of the commonly used transport layer protocols to provide reliability. However, its three-way
handshake procedure and header overhead introduce a burden to the network and
make it infeasible to use in large-scale networks. Also, its default congestion control
mechanism significantly reduces the throughput in case of a packet loss [169]. Instead,
a more lightweight protocol UDP can be used by incorporating a congestion control
and an acknowledgment mechanism at the application layer. The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [83] perfectly fits to this description. It is an application
layer protocol developed for resource-constrained devices to have access to the Internet. Since it is reliable and connectionless, it can be used for the AMI applications.
However, it employs a primitive congestion control mechanism that can keep the
device idle longer than needed after several retransmissions. Therefore, we propose
several simple but useful congestion control functions in this work. Also, we proposed
adding a random jitter less than or equal to 1s such that there is at least 1ms between

87

any two meters’ reading reporting times for the same reporting round to alleviate any
potential congestion.
The existing studies investigating the scalability issue in WMNs [8, 96, 162] attract the attention to the importance of routing protocols in finding a reliable routing
path to the destination. IEEE 802.11s standard runs the Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP) at the data link layer. Contrary to the classical routing protocols,
the HWMP uses Medium Access Control (MAC) addresses instead of IP addresses.
Hence, an address resolution from IP to MAC is required through the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) However, this process introduces significant packet overhead
to the network [100], consequently deteriorates the reliability and increases the latency. Therefore, we propose to implement a new interface between the HWMP and
the ARP which modifies the proactive path discovery process by adding a new field
to the route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP) messages.
Besides modifying the congestion control mechanism and the HWMP, there are
some parameters to be adjusted. For example, the maximum hop count parameter
used in the HWMP (maxTTL) needs to be increased since the default value (32) is
not sufficient to forward a packet to its destination. Similarly, the limits for packet
retransmission (dot11MeshMaxRetries) and packet failure (maxPacketFail ) on a peer
link need to be increased since the increased number of collisions while accessing the
medium cause to quickly reach these limits.
We have implemented and tested the proposed solution in ns-3 network simulator.
Instead of coding the CoAP from scratch in ns-3, we used an implementation of the
CoAP in ns-3 Direct Code Execution (DCE) [170]. The DCE is a framework that
enables executing user- and kernel-space protocols in either ns-3 or the Linux network
stack. The simulation results have shown that the proposed simulation framework
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provides a scalable simulation environment for the UCs and the researchers to test
the applications they develop for the AMI network.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
background information about the protocols mentioned above and the ns-3 DCE. In
Section 6.2, we introduce our scalable simulation framework. We present and discuss
the simulation results in Section 6.3. Finally, we summarize our work and conclude
the chapter in Section 6.4.

6.1
6.1.1

Background
The Constrained Application Protocol

The CoAP is an application layer protocol that has been developed for connecting the
resource-constrained devices to the Internet [83]. It can easily communicate with the
HTTP (Hypertext Transfer Protocol) for integration with the Web. Contrary to the
HTTP, it runs on top of UDP, thereby introducing very low overhead. Also, it needs
a very small header which is only 4 bytes when compared to the HTTP’s header.
In the CoAP, the application end points interact based on the request/response
model. It provides both reliable and unreliable message transmission. If an endpoint sends a ”CONFIRMABLE” message the recipient(s) replies with an ”ACK”
message. The sender endpoint expects to receive the ”ACK” within a specific time
interval called retransmission timeout (RTO). Due to the simultaneous accesses to
the medium by neighbor devices, the transmission collisions may happen. The transmission collisions can cause the message or the ”ACK” to be lost on the path to their
destination. Since the endpoint cannot receive the ”ACK” within the expected time
interval, the transmission is timeout. Hence, the endpoint retransmits the message.
The message retransmission is scheduled based on some functions called congestion control mechanisms. The CoAP’s default congestion control mechanism simply
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doubles the RTO value. Since the default RTO value is a random value between 2s
and 3s, and the maximum number of retransmissions is 4 by default, the retransmissions may exhaust quickly. Therefore, more complicated but useful congestion control
mechanisms were proposed [84–86, 88, 91–93]. The most accepted alternative is the
CoAP Congestion Control/Advanced (CoCoA).
The CoCoA relies on round-trip time (RTT) information. Two types of RTT information are used to calculate two types of RTO estimators. RT Ostrong and RT Oweak
are calculated based on RT Tstrong and RT Tweak , respectively. RT Tstrong is the RTT
value obtained without a retransmission whereas RT Tweak is the RTT value obtained
after a retransmission occurs.

6.1.2

The Address Resolution Protocol

The ARP is a communication protocol that is used to fetch the MAC address corresponding to the IPv4 address of a device’s targeted interface and to maintain a
table of IPv4-to-MAC address pairs [171]. This table is called ARP cache. The ARP
operations are vital for IEEE 802.11s-based networks because the routing protocol
HWMP works with MAC addresses instead of IP addresses.
When a device in a network has a packet to send to another device in the same
network it needs to know the MAC address of the targeted recipient because the
receiver of a packet can understand if the packet is for itself by checking if the target
MAC address in the packet header is equal to its own MAC address. Therefore,
the sender device checks the ARP cache if there is an entry with the targeted IPv4
address. If so, the corresponding MAC address is used. Otherwise, the ARP starts
a broadcast of an ARP request (ARPREQ) with the targeted IPv4 address (and a
targeted MAC address of FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF). If the targeted interface receives the

90

ARPREQ it unicasts an ARP reply with its IPv4 and MAC addresses back to the
requester [172].

6.1.3

The Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol

The HWMP is a hybrid routing protocol which is defined in the IEEE 802.11s standard [173]. It uses MAC addresses for routing operations instead of IP addresses in
contrast to the most of the routing protocols.
The HWMP is a hybrid protocol because it supports two modes of operation:
proactive mode (tree-based) and reactive mode (AODV (Ad hoc On-Demand Distance
Vector Routing)). In this work, we tackle the proactive mode since we are seeking a
way of contacting all of the Mesh Points (MPs) in the network with the minimal effort.
This mode uses two methods to disseminate the routing information for reaching the
root Mesh Point (MP). The first method creates routes between the root and all MPs
in the network by broadcasting proactive Route Request (RREQ) messages. The
second method distributes the routing information by using Root Announcement
messages.
The proactive RREQ mechanism builds a tree of the network so as to enable
the MPs in the network to reach the root easily. The root starts the tree building
process by broadcasting a RREQ message. Any MP that receives the RREQ message
creates or updates its forwarding information to the root and transmits the updated
RREQ. If the ”proactive Route Reply (RREP)” bit in the RREQ is set the receiver
MP unicasts a RREP back to the root. Thus, not only routing information to the
root is disseminated to all other MPs in the network but also a route from the root
to each MP is established. If an MP receives multiple RREQs it updates its routing
information to the root if and only if the sequence number of the RREQ is greater,
or the RREQ contains the same sequence number but offers a better metric.
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6.1.4

The ns-3 Direct Code Execution

The ns-3 DCE [170] is an ns-3 module that enables to execute existing userspace
or kernelspace applications and network protocols on ns-3 or Linux network stack
without needing to change the source code. It supports C/C++ applications as well
as IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, and DCCP protocols. Since it loads the executables similar
to shared libraries, the simulations use the memory in an efficient way.
In this work, we use the ns-3 DCE to execute an implementation of the CoAP,
libcoap [174], on ns-3 network stack. The libcoap is a C implementation of the CoAP.

6.2

The Proposed Scalable Simulation Framework

The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) network is the last mile communication
network in the Smart Grid (SG). It enables the two-way communication between the
consumers and the utility companies (UCs) as shown in Fig. 1.1. Thus, the UCs can
provide some services that can reduce both the peak energy demand and the unit
cost for the consumers such as dynamic pricing [175] and demand-response [168].
Moreover, the UCs and the researchers have been developing new applications and
communication protocols for the SG since it is still evolving. However, there is a lack
of an adequately large-scale environment to test the performance of their applications
considering that a typical AMI network consists of thousands of smart meters (SMs).
The UCs only have such a big infrastructure, but they, not surprisingly, do not allow
any external access to their system. As a result, the researchers have built small-scale
testbeds and made some inferences about the performance of their applications when
they are applied in a large-scale network. However, these analyses may not reflect
the real performance. An alternative to overcome this problem is to use simulators.
The Cooja and ns-3 are the most commonly used open-source network simulators
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that support mesh networks. The problem with the simulators is that they cannot
guarantee a reliable and scalable testing environment for the developed applications.
Therefore, in this chapter, we present a scalable simulation framework for the evaluation of AMI applications. In our work, we use the ns-3 network simulator since we
build the mesh network based on IEEE 802.11s standard which is not supported by
the Cooja.
We present our work in modules as in Fig. 6.1. The CoAP module needs to
use the ns-3 DCE to communicate with the ns-3 network stack while the Jitter and
ARP-HWMP modules are able to reside in the ns-3 stack without using any other

ns-3 DCE

Button
ns-3

ARP-HWMP Module

CoAP Module

Jitter Module

System
Parameters

System
Parameters

means.

Figure 6.1: The architecture of the proposed simulation framework.

6.2.1

The CoAP Module

As we mentioned in Section 6.1.1, the CoAP’s default congestion control mechanism
is primitive and may cause the device to wait longer than needed for retransmission
because of its doubling method. Therefore, the CoCoA (CoAP Congestion Control/Advanced) was proposed in order to better converge to the optimal retransmis-
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sion timeout (RTO). The CoCoA relies on the round-trip time (RTT) information.
It is expected that the RTO value converges to the optimum after some RTT measurements are obtained. However, it is vital to communicate the power consumption
data in the period that it belongs. Therefore, we need an efficient and effective congestion control mechanism which is independent of the RTT information for the AMI
applications.
In this work, we propose three RTO calculation methods which are defined below.
Fixed RTO: It is already a well-known problem that packet loss in wireless communication is not necessarily due to the network congestion. The packet may be
dropped due to lossy paths or multi-path fading [176]. Hence, increasing the RTO
at each packet loss may result in waiting longer than needed for the retransmission
unnecessarily. Instead, we propose generating a random RTO value between the approximate minimum and maximum time (considering the size of the network) required
for communicating the power consumption data to the gateway of the network. The
randomly generated RTO value is fixed and not updated upon packet loss. In this
work, we generated a random number between 4 and 6 for the fixed RTO method.
Logarithmically Increasing RTO: A function is called ”logarithmically increasing” if it is increasing more slowly than any nonconstant polynomial. We propose using a logarithmically increasing function to calculate the RTO values in order
to find the optimum RTO at minimum number of retransmissions possible. This
function quickly approaches to the optimum RTO in the case of large RTTs. In this
work, we propose two logarithmically increasing functions given below:
• Function 1 (Func1): 5.24 ∗ ln(x) + 4
• Function 2 (Func2): log1.24 (x) + 4
where x is the number of retransmissions.
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Figure 6.2: RTO calculation functions.
Exponentially Increasing RTO: In contrast to the logarithmically increasing
functions, exponentially increasing functions increase more quickly than any polynomial. An exponentially increasing function is time-efficient in the case of small RTTs.
The main drawback is that it requires more retransmissions than a logarithmically
increasing function does in the case of large RTTs. We propose the exponentially
increasing functions given below:
• Function 3 (Func3): e(x−4)/5.24 + 3.436
• Function 4 (Func4): 1.24x + 2.76
where x is the number of retransmissions.
The initial RTO value is randomly generated as in the default congestion control
mechanism when the proposed functions except the Fixed RTO are employed. We
used constant values in the functions to start the RTO values at 4s after the first
timeout for a fair comparison as shown in Fig. 6.2.
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6.2.2

The Jitter Module

In addition to the aforementioned changes and methods, a small and random jitter
can be added to the data reporting time. Since the metering devices report their
power consumption data simultaneously, medium access collisions are highly-likely
to happen [14, 15, 17, 28]. Adding jitter can decrease the probability of simultaneous
medium access attempts, consequently the packet losses.

6.2.3

The ARP-HWMP Module

The simultaneous data reporting is not the only factor that causes packet losses.
Since the AMI applications make use of IP-based technologies, they use IP addresses
to identify any device that is connected to the network, so the destination device.
However, they need to find the corresponding physical address (MAC address) of the
destination device before data transmission. ARP is used to fetch the destination’s
MAC address. However, as explained in Section 6.1.2, the ARP broadcasts the ARP
requests, and this results in network congestion and an increase in medium access
collisions. To overcome this broadcast storm problem, we replaced the default ARP
with an efficient piggybacking-based ARP (PARP) [99–101] which takes advantage of
proactive Route Request (RREQ) and proactive Route Reply (RREP) messages in
the HWMP (Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol) which is the default routing protocol
of the IEEE 802.11s standard.
The PARP modifies proactive RREQ and proactive RREP messages and creates
another interface between the HWMP and the ARP. The modified RREQ message
contains the IPv4 and corresponding MAC address of the root (the gateway of the
network) whereas the modified RREP message contains the IPv4 and corresponding
MAC address of the node that received the RREQ message. When a node receives
an IPv4-MAC address pair, it adds this tuple to its ARP table. Thus, MAC address
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resolution is handled during the proactive path discovery process (the routing tree
creation), i.e., the ARP request messages to find out the MAC address of the gateway
are completely eliminated while building the mesh network at the link layer. Moreover, a route from each node to the root and a route from the root to each node are
established.
The PARP eliminates the ARP request broadcast and significantly reduces the
number of packets traveling through the network. However, it cannot decrease the
minimum number of hops required for a packet to arrive to its destination. There is a
parameter called Time-to-Live (TTL) which is defined in the HWMP. It restricts the
maximum number of hops that the packet is allowed to be forwarded. In case that the
default value of the TTL parameter is less than the minimum number of hops from a
node to its destination, the packet cannot be delivered to the destination. Therefore,
we adjusted the TTL parameter based on the network size.
The HWMP uses the Link Management Protocol (LMP) [177] to discover the
nodes that are in the communication range and to keep track of the links between
the peers. It provides transmission reliability at the medium access layer in a similar
way that is used for reliable transport layer protocols. When a device transmits a
packet it waits for an ACK. If it does not receive an ACK within a specific time
interval the packet is retransmitted. A parameter (dot11MeshMaxRetries) restricts
the number of retransmissions. Moreover, another parameter (maxPacketFail ) limits
the maximum number of packet transmission failures before closing the link. In our
analysis, we revealed that the value of these parameters are vital for the scalability of
the simulation environment. Therefore, we fine-tuned the value of both parameters
based on the network size.
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6.3
6.3.1

Performance Evaluation
Experimental Setup

We developed the proposed simulation framework in the most commonly used network simulator ns-3 [132], which has a draft implementation of IEEE 802.11s standard
which is a wireless mesh standard that connects wireless hosts in a multi-hop fashion.
The underlying MAC protocol is IEEE 802.11g. The ns-3 does not have an implementation of the CoAP, so we used the libcoap [174] which is a C implementation of
the CoAP. Since we needed to run an executable, we used the ns-3 DCE module.
The experiments were conducted on a grid topology containing 1024 nodes (32
nodes by 32 nodes) with a distance of 100m between each neighbor nodes. The
gateway was placed at one of the corners of the grid.
We assumed that the smart meters report their 512-byte power consumption readings at every 5mins [178]. We added random jitter to the starting time of each
node’s application such that the time difference between the starting time of any
two applications cannot be more than 1s and less than 1ms. Before starting the
application, the nodes are given 1min to create links to their neighbors.
We removed the maximum retransmission constraint in the CoAP. We chose
maxTTL to be 70, and dot11MeshMaxRetries and maxPacketFail to be 10. Also,
we removed the maximum number of data retransmissions constraint in the TCP for
a fair comparison with the proposed CoAP.

6.3.2

Baselines and Performance Metrics

In the simulations, we used the UDP, TCP and CoAP as baselines to demonstrate the
importance of the transport protocol in reliability and scalability. We integrated these
protocols into the proposed framework for a fair comparison. Note that the CoAP
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modifications are not included in the framework for these simulations. We used the
following metrics to compare their performance with that of the RTO calculation
functions given in Section 6.2:
• Packet Delivery Ratio: This is the ratio of the number of smart meters that
are able to communicate their reading to the gateway of the network to the
total number of smart meters to report in the network.
• Throughput: This is the amount of data received by the gateway of the
network per second.
We tested the proposed RTO calculation methods for the CoAP and compared
their performance inter se. We used the following metrics to measure their performance:
• Redundant Receptions: This is the total number of redundant receptions
of the same packet at the application layer of the gateway. The redundant
receptions mostly occur when the RTO value is less than the RTT.
• Completion Time: This is the time elapsed between the first transmitted
meter reading and the last reading received by the gateway of the network. It
includes the computational delay that is introduced by the piggybacking-based
ARP.

6.3.3

Simulation Results and Discussion

In this section, we evaluate and discuss the simulation results in two stages. First, we
compared the performance of the protocols and methods mentioned in the previous
subsection in terms of packet delivery ratio and throughput in order to investigate
their scalability. Then, we eliminated those that are not scalable and compared the
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Figure 6.3: Simulation results.
performance of the proposed RTO calculation functions in terms of total number of
retransmissions and completion time to show their efficiency.
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): As shown in Fig. 6.3a, the UDP achieves
the lowest PDR as expected because it is an unreliable protocol which means that
after it transmits a packet, it does not care about whether the packet was received
by the destination or not. It is followed by the TCP which is a reliable protocol.
However, its PDR is less than 60% although we removed the data retransmission
constraint. This is due to the three-way handshake procedure because the TCP needs
to establish a connection before data transmission. The connection is established after
the communication of the three messages (SYN, SYN+ACK and ACK) between the
peers. The increased network congestion interferes this procedure, and the connection
cannot be established. However, the CoAP does not need a connection but provides
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reliability with ACK messages and handles the network congestion by means of the
congestion control mechanisms. Thus, it outperforms the TCP with a PDR of 85%.
Since it is allowed to retransmit a data packet 4 times at most, and its default
congestion control mechanism can exceed this limit easily, the CoAP cannot scale
as the network grows. Therefore, we removed this limit and proposed five novel RTO
calculation functions. Hence, they can provide reliability by achieving a PDR of
100%.
Throughput (TP): The data traffic that we use for this study is expected to
produce approximately 14 kbps throughput at the gateway in the end of a meter
reading collection period ((1023 SMs * 512 bytes * 8 bits/byte) / (1000 bits/Kbit) /
(300 seconds per data collection period)) when assumed that there is no redundant
receptions at the gateway. In Fig. 6.3b, we give the throughput produced by each
method. As expected, the UDP and TCP do not generate this amount of throughput
because they cannot achieve a 100% packet delivery to the gateway. However, the
CoAP produces more throughput than the expected although it cannot achieve a
PDR of 100%. This is due to the redundant receptions of the same packet at the
gateway. Finally, we can make the inference that the RTO calculation functions in
the modified CoAP provides reliability at the expense of high bandwidth consumption.
When compared to each other, it can be seen that the fixed RTO calculation function
prominently produces the least throughput. This can be attributed to the fact that
the fixed RTO function generates random RTO values in a larger interval (4s and
6s) than the CoAP does (2s and 3s). This both decreases probability of the medium
access collisions and prevents from premature RTO values which are less than the
RTT.
Redundant Receptions (RRs): In the analysis of the simulations, we revealed
that the functions made a SM to cause five redundant receptions at most. As can be
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seen in Fig. 6.3c, the Fixed RTO function causes less redundant receptions. This is
due to the same reason given in the throughput discussion. In our further analysis,
we realized that the Func3 causes approximately 20% more retransmissions than the
Func1 does although it generates less redundant receptions at the gateway. This
indicates that the Func3 incurs more packet losses when compared to the Func1.
Completion Time (CT): As shown in Fig. 6.3d, the Fixed RTO function
takes the least time to complete a meter reading reporting period from all SMs to
the gateway when compared to the others. This is due to the fact that the randomly generated RTO value is fixed and greater than the RTT. Since the RTO value
is fixed, the waiting time for the next retransmission does not increase. Similarly,
since the Func3 and Func4 are almost fixed and slowly increasing in the beginning,
their waiting time for the next retransmission and the increase at the waiting time
are far less than those of the Func1 and Func2. Consequently, the exponentially
increasing RTO functions complete the meter reading reporting period earlier than
the logarithmically increasing RTO functions can.

6.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have investigated a scalable simulation framework for evaluation of
the IEEE 802.11s-based Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) applications. We
analyzed the ns-3 DCE’s network stack and revealed the drawbacks that hinder the
reliability and scalability. We proposed to use a modified version of the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) for the scalability. Moreover, we replaced the Address
Resolution Protocol (ARP) with an efficient and piggybacking-based ARP (PARP)
to dissolve the address resolution traffic in the proactive path discovery process of the
Hybrid Wireless Mesh Protocol (HWMP). Furthermore, two critical parameters of the
Link Management Protocol were updated so as to increase one-hop data transmission
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reliability. Simulation results indicate that the proposed framework can successfully
scale provided that the protocol parameters highlighted in this chapter are adjusted
based on the network size. In addition, the Fixed RTO function consistently outperforms the other proposed functions.
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CHAPTER 7
A REALISTIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF PRIVACY
PRESERVING PROTOCOLS FOR THE AMI NETWORK
It has been reported that cities are responsible for consuming 60-80% of energy generated worldwide [179], and contributing CO2 emissions significantly [180]. To reduce
CO2 emission and use energy resources efficiently, the cities should be designed and
built in a smart way [181]. A smart city can monitor and integrate the aspects of its
critical infrastructures such as transportation, communication and power infrastructure, thereby optimizing resource use and maximizing benefits for its citizens [182].
From the point of power management, smart cities require a smart grid that can monitor generation, transmission, distribution and even consumption of power so that it
can take required actions for a more stable, reliable and scalable grid, consequently
a more consistent grid for a smart city. The Smart Grid (SG) is the integration of
sensors and advanced communication technologies with the conventional power grid,
which enables monitoring real-time power consumption, thereby billing accurately,
efficient power generation, and enabling demand response [183, 184].
The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) network has been one of the most
important components of the SG that relates to ordinary consumers. It is the last mile
communication network in the SG, which enables two-way communication between
the consumers and the utility companies (UCs). Thus, it can collect fine-grained
power consumption data from the consumers and communicate them to the UCs
for not only providing better demand response but also help in distribution state
estimation and increase the efficiency [14].
The AMI network is comprised of smart meters, communications networks, and
data management systems [185,186]. The communication within the network of these
components can be carried out via different technologies such as power-line commu-

104

nication (PLC), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), 802.11 (WiFi), and 802.15 (Bluetooth and
ZigBee) [6]. The AMI network serves thousands of consumers, so it covers large areas.
Therefore, using wireless technologies to build the AMI network is more feasible since
they require far less cabling work and infrastructure, deployment and maintenance
costs [187–190].
Building wireless mesh networks (WMNs) is the best option to communicate
through such large area networks with the least effort because it makes end-to-end
communication easy by distributing the routing task among the intermediate nodes
located between the communicating hosts. IEEE 802.11s [148] and ZigBee [191]
are the two most commonly used open standards that can support WMNs. IEEE
802.11s is a wireless local area network (LAN) standard and an amendment to the
IEEE 802.11 standard for mesh networking whereas ZigBee is an IEEE 802.15.4-based
WMN stack specification for personal area networks (PANs) which require less power
and cost less when compared to LANs. In addition, IEEE 802.15.4g [192] Smart Utility Networks Task Group developed a physical layer amendment to IEEE 802.15.4 in
order to provide control over very large scale networks with minimal infrastructure.
Although WMNs can be used to build the AMI infrastructure, the power consumption data transmitted through the air is highly vulnerable to be eavesdropped.
To overcome this problem, the data can be encrypted (confidentiality) and signed (integrity and authentication) before transmission. However, the secure communication
alone is not sufficient to provide consumer privacy in the AMI network because the
utilities can still have access to the consumers’ actual power consumption data. In
particular, with the availability of smart meters, utilities collect data more frequently
(e.g., from seconds to minutes [4]) as opposed to once a month for billing purposes.
It has been shown that such fine-grained power consumption data can be used to
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infer the consumers’ instantaneous activities [146]. Therefore, recent years witnessed
a variety of solutions to preserve the consumers’ privacy [50].
One solution is to aggregate meter readings in the network before sending them to
the UCs, either at each hop (Hop-by-Hop (HbyH) aggregation) or at the gateway of
the network (End-to-End (EtoE) aggregation) [17,26,27,193]. In this way, individual
readings which are encrypted will not be exposed to any other meter and only an
aggregate reading will be available at the gateway. However, both methods have
their own risks. In HbyH aggregation, actual meter readings of the consumers at the
edge of the network are revealed to the one-hop-ahead consumers whereas in EtoE
aggregation, each meter’s reading can be disclosed in case of a collusion with the
gateway. To eliminate this flaw, several privacy-preserving protocols were proposed
for the AMI network [14,15,17]. The unique feature of these protocols is the ability of
performing arithmetic operations on concealed data of which homomorphic encryption
and secure multiparty computation [24] are the two most known examples.
While homomorphic encryption and secure multiparty systems are bringing privacypreserving features, their computation and communication costs are typically high,
which may not fit well in to the characteristics of the AMI network. As future AMI
systems are expected to run various applications in addition to billing (e.g., demand
response, outage management, privacy-preservation, etc.), their performance abilities need to be evaluated under different conditions. In particular, since privacy has
been a hotly debated issue for the AMI, the overhead of privacy-preservation on the
underlying wireless AMI infrastructure is crucial.
To this end, there has been some efforts to assess the performance of IEEE 802.11sbased AMI networks that run secure and privacy-preserving protocols [14, 15, 17,
26–28]. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is not any comprehensive
work in the literature that evaluates the performance of these protocols in a realistic
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testbed under various conditions such as transport/application layer protocols and
data aggregation protocols. This is not surprising because both the actual AMI
networks are not accessible to the researchers, and there is not any realistic AMI
testbed that is available to them. Therefore, one of our motivations in this work is to
build a realistic AMI testbed and make it accessible to the researcher and educators.
In addition to IEEE 802.11s, ZigBee is another well-known wireless mesh networking technology that can be used to build the AMI network. It has different features than IEEE 802.11s mesh and considered more lightweight that would consume
less resources in terms of computation and communication. Similarly, the literature
lacks performance evaluation work of these protocols in a ZigBee-based AMI network testbed as well. Therefore, in this work, we aim to compare the performance
of ZigBee- and IEEE 802.11-based AMI networks under different privacy-preserving
protocols. In addition to standard encryption, we utilize the fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [18–21] and secure multiparty computation (secure MPC) [22–24].
We test them with both UDP and TCP. In addition, we integrate the Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP) into the FHE-based protocol to provide a reliable but
lightweight communication. Also, we run them with both EtoE and HbyH aggregation mechanisms to investigate the effect of data collection method used. The
performance comparison is specifically done under actual testbed that was built at
Florida International University Engineering Center. Note that we opt not to utilize
simulation as it has been shown that the ns-3 simulation results for AMI networks
do not match well with the testbed results [26, 27]. We exclude IEEE 802.15.4g in
this work because 802.15.4g-compliant devices on the market operate at sub-1GHz
channels [194–197] in order to provide long-range connectivity which would prevent
us testing multi-hop data communication which is one of the most essential features
of a mesh network within a limited area (e.g., a building). In addition, in some of the

107

countries, the sub-1GHz bands are not licensed exempt, which will make it impossible
to be tested by researchers.
The testbed consists of 20 nodes. We attached a Digi XBee S2C [198] to a Raspberry Pi 3 (Raspi3) [199] through one of its USB ports via Sparkfun’s XBee explorer
dongle [200] to imitate a smart meter [201]. For IEEE 802.11s-based testbed, we
used the Protronix wireless USB adapter having a Ralink RT3070 chipset [202]. Our
contributions can be listed as follows. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study using ZigBee technology to build an AMI network testbed. We test the FHE
and secure MPC-based privacy-preserving protocols running on top of UDP and TCP
on this testbed. The CoAP is introduced to increase reliability of the FHE-based protocol. We compare and contrast the abilities of ZigBee and IEEE 802.11s standards
in terms of AMI applications. Finally, we would like to note that the testbed will be
open to researcher and educators for experimentation [203].
We conducted comprehensive experiments with the privacy-preserving protocols in
our AMI testbed by varying several system (both hardware and software) parameters.
Experiment results indicate that the secure MPC-based protocol is a better option in
case it is equipped with EtoE data aggregation and TCP in an IEEE 802.11s-based
mesh network. In addition, the FHE-based protocol with CoAP is also promising
in terms of message delivery. Zigbee, on the other hand, is not suitable for heavy
privacy-preserving protocols.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
the components of a privacy-preserving and secure AMI network. In Section 7.2,
we give the details about the ZigBee- and IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network testbed
development. We present and discuss the experiment results in Section 7.3. Finally,
we summarize our work and conclude the chapter in Section 7.4.
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7.1

Components of a Privacy-Preserving and Secure AMI
Network

In this section, we present a background information about the AMI network, the
tested privacy-preserving protocols along with the implemented data aggregation
mechanisms and authentication components.

7.1.1

Network Model

We considered an AMI communication network consisting of smart meters that are
connected via a WMN (IEE 802.11s and ZigBee) with a gateway serving as a relay
between smart meters and the UC. The smart meters measure mainly the real-time
electrical energy consumption of the consumers in addition to power quality and
instantaneous values such as voltage and current at their connection points. A typical
infrastructure for the considered AMI in this chapter is shown in Fig. 1.1.
IEEE 802.11s standard allows mesh networking among the meters through 802.11
MAC/PHY layer standard [148]. It uses the HWMP as its default routing protocol
to find a multi-hop path towards the destination. The nodes in 802.11s WMN are
given names based on their roles. All nodes are considered as Mesh Points (MP) and
are able to provide connectivity at the data link layer between other MPs. If an MP
also provides connectivity to the Internet, it is termed a Mesh Portal Point (MPP).
In our mesh network, the gateway is the MPP which collects meter readings that are
sent by the MPs (i.e., meters) via multi-hop routes.
ZigBee is the other wireless mesh networking technology we used in this work. It
is based on IEEE 802.15.4 MAC/PHY layer standard [51]. Although the standard
does not define the mesh networking, ZigBee stack employs some network layer protocols such as Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) and Routing Protocol for
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Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) to implement mesh networking. In a ZigBee
network, one of the nodes must be the ZigBee coordinator which is the root of the
network and refers to the gateway in our mesh network. The rest of the nodes can be
either a ZigBee router or a ZigBee end device. In our mesh network, the rest of the
nodes are ZigBee router because they should be capable of forwarding data packets
towards the destination [204].
There are some differences between TCP/IP and ZigBee stacks. ZigBee does not
have a transport layer between application and network layers. Hence, it implements
application layer acknowledgments for end-to-end reliable communication. However,
it retransmits the data, only up to 2 times until it receives an acknowledgment.
Also, MAC layer acknowledgments are used to provide reliability between neighbor
nodes [205].

7.1.2

Data Aggregation Mechanisms

In-network data aggregation is used to aggregate the meter readings and send an aggregated power consumption information instead of the individual readings to the UC.
Typically, two data aggregation mechanisms are implemented in the AMI network:
Hop-by-Hop and End-to-End aggregation.

Hop-by-Hop Aggregation (HbyH)
A minimum spanning tree of the network is found, and the root of this tree is designated as the gateway/data collector of the network. After that, the parent-child
relationships are assigned to each meter. Leaf meters in the network send their
consumption readings to their parent meter. The parent meter aggregates its own
reading with the readings from its child meter(s). Then, it sends the resultant to its
own parent. This process goes on up until to the gateway meter. Finally, the gateway
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aggregates its reading with the readings from its child meter(s) and sends the result
to the UC.

End-to-End Aggregation (EtoE)
In this mechanism, the aggregation is not performed at the intermediate meters.
Instead, every packet is aggregated when it arrives at the gateway which acts as the
data collector. One of the meters acts as the gateway meter and all other meters send
their readings to the gateway. The gateway aggregates the readings from all other
meters with its own reading and send the resultant to the UC.

7.1.3

Fully Homomorphic Encryption - The Smart-Vercauteren
Scheme

Homomorphic encryption enables performing arithmetic operations such as addition
and multiplication on encrypted data. Roughly speaking, homomorphic encryption
can be divided into two: partially homomorphic encryption (PHE) and fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). The former allows to perform only one operation (either
addition or multiplication) whereas the latter allows both addition and multiplication.
While PHE cryptosystems have been known for years, FHE cryptosystems are
gaining more attention in recent years since the work of Gentry in 2009 [47]. In
his FHE scheme, a ”hint” about secret key is placed into public key. Even if the
hint is not enough to decrypt a ciphertext, it can be used to process the ciphertext.
To this end, Smart and Vercauteren [40] presented an FHE scheme which has both
relatively small key and ciphertext size. Smart-Vercauteren (SV) scheme consists
of key generation, encryption, decryption, homomorphic addition/multiplication and
recryption functions. The recryption function removes noise in the ciphertext without
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decrypting it and the cleartext is kept unchanged. The function utilizes the hint
whose pieces are distributed into an array in public-key randomly. In the lack of such
a function, we are limited to a fixed number of homomorphic operations. When we
exceed this number of operations the ciphertext becomes undecipherable. In this way,
the ciphertext can be used for more addition and multiplication operations.
SV scheme is a member of public-key cryptography family, so it generates a publicsecret (private) key pair. Key generation is different in SV since some portion of the
public-key is used for recryption purposes. In addition, the key size in SV is in the
order of kilobytes which is much higher than the keys in traditional schemes which are
in the order of bits. The keys are generated considering three important parameters:
The number of bits (|B|) used to create random variables for the coefficients of the
polynomials that are used to generate a hint, the number of shares (S1 ) which the
hint is divided into and the number of cells (S2 ) in the array containing the shares
of the hint. Each tuple (|B|/S1 /S2 ) is called a ”key geometry”. We used (384/8/5)
geometry in this work.
There had not been a publicly available implementation of any FHE scheme until
when Perl et al. [39] presented a working implementation of the SV scheme [40]. The
SV implementation in [39] was meant only for single bits. However, we need multibit operations that will be used on smart meters. Therefore, we used the algorithms
in [15, 17, 28] to support multi-bit addition and multiplication. These algorithms include some functions from external libraries. We also note that data types used in
these operations are large integers since cryptographic operations need more complicated and larger data types than primitive data types. In order to implement the
functions, the GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic Library (GMP) is used, which
further relies on another library called Fast Library for Number Theory (FLINT).

112

7.1.4

Secure Multiparty Computation

Secure multiparty computation (secure MPC) is based on dividing a secret into shares
and distributing them amongst a group of participants such that the secret cannot be
reconstructed unless a certain number of the participants collude. One of the most
commonly used secret sharing scheme is Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) [149].
In SSS, we assume that there are n nodes in the network and all computations
are done in a finite field Zp , where p is a prime number. Let ri be the private secret
of node i. Node i chooses a unique point xi ∈ Zp other than zero and selects an
(n − 1) degree random secret sharing polynomial fi (x) with fi (0) = ri . It sends its
unique point xi to all other nodes and receives share values fj (xi ) computed by the
P
other (n − 1) nodes. Then, it computes F (xi ) = nk=1 fk (xi ). These steps are done
by all n nodes and F (xi ) values are sent to the gateway. The gateway can construct
an (n − 1) degree polynomial g(x) by using the F (xm ) values along with Lagrange
interpolation, where m ∈ {1, ..., n}. The constant term of g(x) is the aggregation of
all individual n private secrets.
Tonyali et al. [17] proposed secure MPC-based data aggregation protocols for
EtoE and HbyH aggregation in the AMI network that does not require exchanging
the shares, so reduces communication overhead. In this work, we test and compare
the performance of these secure MPC-based protocols in the testbed we built.
The tested secure MPC-based protocol for EtoE data aggregation works as follows.
In the very beginning of the protocol, each pair of two-meters agrees upon a shared
key, and this key is used as a feed to locally compute the shares that would be received
from the other SMs if we used a classical secret sharing scheme. This is done only
once, so we assume that these keys are either preloaded on the SMs or shared via a
key-exchange protocol such as the Diffie-Hellman [156] in our experiments. In each
data collection round, the gateway chooses a round value which is greater than the
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value used for the previous round and unicasts it to each SM in the network. Each
SM computes its own shares locally that would be received from the other SMs. A
polynomial is constructed by using these values and the Lagrange polynomials. Each
SM computes its own share based on this polynomial, sums all shares up and send the
result to the gateway. The gateway constructs a polynomial over the received values.
The constant term of this polynomial is the aggregated value of all SM readings.
Please refer Chapter 5 for more detail.
The HbyH aggregation version of this protocol slightly differs from its EtoE aggregation version in the way of computing the Lagrange polynomial for the gateway.
This polynomial is computed by each meter instead of the gateway, and each meter
multiplies its total share by the associated Lagrange polynomial and sends the result
to the parent. This goes on up until to the gateway. Finally, the gateway aggregates
all received values with its own multiplied total share. The aggregated value is the
aggregation of the readings from all meters.

7.1.5

Digital Signatures and Public Key Certificates

Although the FHE and the secure MPC can provide privacy, this is not sufficient
for a secure communication system. A secure communication system should be able
to guarantee the integrity of the data in transit between hosts, which means that it
enables to detect if the data has been changed on the way to the destination. In
addition, the receiver of a message should be able to verify the source of the message
(sender authentication) [206]. Such a system can be implemented by integrating message authentication codes or digital signatures into the privacy-preserving protocols.
The message authentication codes require to have a separate pair of symmetric keys
for each communicating peers. Therefore, we used digital signatures in this work.
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Digital signatures are based on public-key cryptography (PKC). In PKC, two
mathematically-linked keys are used: public and private keys. While keeping the
private key secret, the public key is shared with all peers to communicate. To create
a digital signature, a one-way hash of the message is created, and then encryption is
applied with the private key. The encrypted hash is appended to the original message
and sent to the destination. The receiver can check the integrity of the message and
verify the source of the message by using the encrypted hash that is appended to the
message and the public key of the sender [207].
To avoid fake public keys and rely upon the signatures, the key pairs are created
by a trusted third party which is called certificate authority (CA). The CA creates the
key pair, signs the public key with its private key in a certificate (public key certificate)
and send them to the requester entity. In this way, communicating peers can verify
that the received public key belongs to that particular entity. Due to some reasons
such as private key compromise, malicious activity, the CA can revoke a certificate.
In such a case, the relevant public key should not be used for any encryption or
verification operation. Hence, the CA adds this certificate’s serial number into a
public list which is called certificate revocation list (CRL). Therefore, an entity should
check the public key of another entity to communicate against the CRL [208].

7.1.6

Data Transport/Application Protocols

In this section, we present the transport/application layer protocols in the TCP/IP
stack we used in this work.

User Datagram Protocol (UDP)
UDP is a connectionless transport layer protocol that does not guarantee message
delivery. Once a UDP message is sent no state is retained by the protocol. Hence, it
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is not exposed to excessive header overhead. Thus, it avoids processing delays in the
protocol stack.

Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
TCP is a stream-based and connection-oriented transport layer protocol that provides reliable, ordered, and error-checked message delivery. TCP needs to establish a
connection before data transmission. To provide a reliable communication channel,
it keeps track of state of the connection. Therefore, it has a bigger header when
compared to UDP.

Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
CoAP is an application layer protocol that has been developed for connecting the
resource-constrained devices to the Internet [83]. CoAP runs on top of UDP, thereby
introducing very low overhead. It provides both reliable and unreliable message transmission. If an endpoint sends a CONFIRMABLE message the recipients reply with
an ACK (acknowledgment) message. The sender endpoint expects to receive the ACK
within a specific time interval called retransmission timeout (RTO). If the ACK is
not received before RTO, the transmission is timeout. Hence, the endpoint retransmits the message. The message retransmission is scheduled based on some functions
called congestion control mechanisms. The CoAPs default congestion control mechanism simply doubles the RTO value.

7.2

The AMI Network Testbed Development

In this section, we describe our IEEE 802.11s- and ZigBee-based AMI network testbed.
We give the technical details about the electronic components and the software tools
we used to build the testbed.
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Figure 7.1: The layout of the floor which hosts the testbed.
We built the testbed in a 64m by 96m block on the third floor at Florida International University Engineering Center. Fig. 7.1 provides the representation of the
network with IEEE 802.11s and ZigBee links. We tried to place the nodes as distant
as possible from each other. In this figure, the white circle represents the gateway of
the testbed while the blue ones represent the ordinary meters. The testbed is comprised of 20 nodes. Please, note that node #45 is the node that we used as a relay to
access the other nodes. Since it is a part of the mesh network, it can forward network
packets to its neighbors, but it is not capable of generating data packets.

7.2.1

Nodes

The nodes should be capable of processing as well as forwarding data packets, i.e.,
networking. To this end, we used a Raspberry Pi 3 (Raspi3) shown in Fig. 7.2a with
each node as a processing unit. Raspi3 includes the Broadcom BCM2837 system-onchip (SoC) having four high-performance ARM Cortex-A53 processing cores running
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at 1.2GHz with 32KB Level 1 and 512KB Level 2 cache memory, which is built specifically for Raspi3 and linked to a 1GB LPDDR2 memory module. Also, it includes
an 802.11n supporting WiFi module. Raspbian [209] is Raspberry Pi Foundation’s
officially supported operating system which is an optimized Debian distribution based
on Linux kernel. Please note that the kernel version should be greater than 4.1 to
support mesh point mode in the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI testbed.

(a) Raspberry Pi 3.

(b) Sparkfun XBee Explorer Dongle.

(c) Protronix USB WiFi Adapter.

(d) Digi XBee S2C.

Figure 7.2: Major components of the testbed nodes.
We integrated a complete authentication mechanism in the communication between meters based on certificates. Specifically, we created a root certificate authority
(CA) and made it authorize an intermediate CA in order to avoid a single point of
failure in case the root CA is compromised. We used the intermediate CA to create
the public key certificates and the private keys on behalf of the root CA. In addition,
we maintained a CRL for the certificate authentication. As shown in Fig. 7.3, the
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Figure 7.3: A complete authentication mechanism for secure data communication.
intermediate CA issues both the public key certificates and the CRL for all meters
in the AMI network testbed. When a meter sends a data message to another meter,
the recipient, first, checks the sender meter’s certificate against the CRL to see if it
is revoked for a reason. If the certificate is revoked the message is discarded. If it is
not, then the signature on the message is verified with the sender’s public key. If the
signature is valid, then it is forwarded to the relevant application. Otherwise, it is
discarded.

7.2.2

Gateway

The gateway is an interface of the AMI network opening to the Internet. Hence, it
is responsible for the communication between the meters and out-of-network entities.
For example, it collects power consumption data from the meters and communicate
them to the UCs. The other nodes in the testbed send their readings to the gateway
periodically. This is implemented by using the data aggregation mechanisms defined
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in Section 7.1.2. In addition, the certificate authority contacts the gateway when
there is a new certificate or CRL issued. Then, the gateway distributes the CRL to
all of the meters or sends the certificate to its owner in the network. Since all of these
extra tasks require much more computational power and storage capacity, it is wiser
to equip the gateway with more powerful devices.

7.2.3

Communication Interfaces

The IEEE 802.11s-based Mesh Networking
All of the nodes in the IEEE 802.11s-based testbed are run as mesh points. Although
Raspi3 has a wireless module, we need to use an external device to make it a mesh
point because the built-in module driver (Broadcom brcmsmac) does not support
mesh mode [210]. Therefore, we use a Protronix USB WiFi dongle shown in Fig. 7.2c
along with RasPi3. The WiFi dongle is a high gain wireless USB adapter. It has
a 4dBi detachable antenna and a Ralink RT3070 chipset which is run by rt2800usb
driver, so enables mesh networking.
In order to create a WMN, we need some tools to create and configure the network. The first tool we need is iw which is a configuration tool for wireless devices.
Before creating and configuring the mesh by using the iw tool, we need to stop the
N etworkM anager service because it interferes with the new interface for the mesh
network.
After stopping the NetworkManager service and installing all required tools, we
created a mesh interface and configured it to join a specific mesh network. We started
with creating a mesh point interface. Although it is not obliged, we set the communication channel to 11. We do not run the DHCP on the nodes since we want to have
a complete control on the network. Hence, we assign an IP address and the netmask
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to determine the subnet for each node manually and set the interface up. Finally, the
Raspi3 joined the mesh network.
In order to avoid Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) messages which creates
additional traffic [101], we manipulate the ARP cache by adding the IP-MAC address
pair of each node in the network.
All commands to configure and build the testbed are given in Appendix .1.

The ZigBee-based Mesh Networking
The other technology we used to build the AMI network testbed is ZigBee technology.
In this testbed, we use the Digital International’s XBee ZigBee S2C module shown
in Fig. 7.2d for mesh networking.
XBee is a low-cost and low-power consuming wireless connectivity module as
expected from a ZigBee module. It includes Silicon labs’ EM357 transceiver that
enables XBee to communicate in a range of up to 60m indoor/urban and up to
1200m outdoor (line-of-sight). The XBee has 15 General Purpose Input/Output ports
available, but it does not have a USB port. Therefore, we employ the Sparkfun’s XBee
explorer dongle shown in Fig. 7.2b. This dongle enables data communication between
Raspi3 and XBee thanks to FT231X USB-to-Serial converter. Also, it includes an
on-board voltage regulator to supply XBee the required power to operate.
In a ZigBee-based mesh network, a node can be either a ZigBee coordinator, router
or end device. In this testbed, we have one ZigBee coordinator and 19 ZigBee routers.
In order to use an XBee as a coordinator or a router, we need to configure it before
joining the mesh network. We use the XCTU [211] to configure the XBees. The
XCTU is a graphical network configuration platform developed by Digi International
Inc. The layout of the XCTU is given in Fig. 7.4.

121

Figure 7.4: The XCTU layout (Image courtesy of Digi International Inc.).

There are three main differences between the coordinator and router in configuration. First of all, the coordinator should set the coordinator enable (CE) flag. Later,
each device should have a unique node identifier (NI). Finally, the router should
enable the power-on join verification (JV) check so that the XBee discovers 64-bit
address of the coordinator when it first joins a mesh network. After the network is
built, it is visualized in the XCTU as shown in Fig. 7.5.
In order to send our custom data packets that the privacy-preserving protocols
generate, we need to run the XBee in API mode. Hence, we can structure the data
frames to be transmitted. The frame begins with the start delimiter which is 0x7E
in hexadecimal. It is followed by the most and least significant bytes of the packet
length. The frame ends with the frame data and its checksum.
We encountered a communication issue between the RasPi3’s Universal Serial
Bus (USB) which is connected to the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter
(UART) and XBee dongle’s serial interface. Although the XBees were able to com-
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Figure 7.5: A visual representation of the testbed in XCTU.

municate to each other, which can be understood from the LED on the dongle, they
were unable to transfer the received data to the RasPi3. We tried to reconfigure USB
and UART parameters of the Linux kernel running on the RasPi3s. However, the
problem was related to the freescale bypass application that is installed on the XBee
module. To communicate through serial interface, serial communications peripheral
of the freescale should be connected to the microprocessor’s UART channel. To this
end, the XBee module should be switched to bootloader mode first, then bypass
mode. This can be implemented by issuing a ’U’ character, and then a ’B’ character
from the RasPi3 to the XBee module.
The Raspi3 communicates with the XBee over the serial port. Therefore, we need
to initialize a serial port between the devices. Fortunately, The RXTX.org team
provides a Java API [212] for communicating with the XBee modules in API mode.
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7.2.4

Integrating a Raspberry Pi 3 with a Smart Meter

Smart meters are the devices that make a metering infrastructure really advanced.
Therefore, we used a hand-made smart meter which is capable of measuring voltage,
current, power, sold power, and consumed power along with our RasPi3s in our
testbed as can be seen in Fig. 7.6b. We integrated the RasPi3s with the meter so
that power consumption values can be read from the meter and communicated to the
gateway through the communication interfaces. We used an RS232-to-TTL converter
to connect RS232 serial bus on the meter to the General-Purpose Input/Output
(GPIO) pins on the RasPi3 for serial communication. However, we found out the
mini-UART can limit the GPIO capabilities on the RasPi3. This is due to a software
change in Raspbian that allows the main UART to use the GPIO pins. To this end,
we needed to disable the UART for bluetooth.

(a) The GPIO pins on a Raspberry Pi (b) A smart meter integrated with
3.
a Raspberry Pi 3.

Figure 7.6: Components of an integrated AMI testbed node.
The GPIO pins have a 3V tolerance, so the RasPi3 uses TTL communication. In
TTL communication, a 1 is represented with 3.3 to 5V while a 0 is represented with
0V. This is a problem since the smart meters use RS232 which is a more widely used
standard in which 1 is represented with -3V through -25V and 0 is represented with
3V through 25V. Due to the differences, we needed to have a converter to convert
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from TTL to RS232. The converter has to be connected to the GPIO pins such that
the VCC goes to the pin 1, the RXD to pin 10, TXD to pin 8, and GND to pin 6
as shown in Fig. 7.6a. After connecting them, we executed a simple python script to
read data from the smart meter and used Minicom [213] to send data. We tested the
integrated system and found out that a continuous reading of data was not working
effectively, so we programmed the RasPi3 so as to send a request character ’ ?’ and
then the smart meter replies with the data.

7.3

Performance Evaluation

This section describes the details of the testbed setup, performance metrics and baselines and provides a thorough analysis of the performance results.

7.3.1

Experimental Setup

We first describe how we setup the testbed using IEEE 802.11s or Zigbee standards.
The IEEE 802.11s module in Linux kernel requires to run some commands to build
the mesh network. Since it requires to connect a monitor to each Raspi3 every time we
want to build the network and run the commands given in .1, we wrote a shell script
with these commands and defined it as a service to run on boot. Hence, the nodes
can join the mesh network without needing physical human intervention. This is not
required for the ZigBee-based mesh network because once the XBees are configured
properly, they can join the mesh network automatically. However, we still need to
run the data aggregation protocols manually so that all of the nodes start reporting
their readings at the same time. For this purpose, we use ClusterSSH tool [214] which
is able to control multiple SSH sessions from a single input window. We wrote a shell
script including the command which is unique for each node, to run the protocol to be
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tested and copied it into each node in the network with the same name. Once we run
the script via the ClusterSSH, all of the nodes execute their own specific command.
We use the Linux date command to synchronize the date and time of all devices
in the network for more precise delay measurements.
We created two different spanning trees of the network for the IEEE 802.11s-based
mesh network. The first tree was created based on the information of next hop on
the path to the gateway in the routing table maintained by HWMP. The second tree
was created based on signal strength of links between the neighbor nodes. The more
a link gets stronger, the more probable it can be the next hop.
Likewise, signal strength of ZigBee links was used to create a spanning tree for
the ZigBee experiments. All of the trees are shown in Fig.s 7.7a, 7.7b and 7.7c,
respectively.
The underlying MAC protocol for the IEEE 802.11s is IEEE 802.11g whereas the
ZigBee-based testbed is based on IEEE 802.15.4 standard. The Raspi3s are running
the Linux 4.9.33 kernel which implements IEEE 802.11-2012 standard [215] while the
XBee implements ZigBee standard [191]. To avoid any interference, we ran the WiFi
and ZigBee mesh on channel 11 (2.462GHz) and channel 15 (2.425GHz), respectively.
The readings from the meters were 16 bits, large enough to hold a real meter reading
data.
All of required keys, certificates and a CRL are issued and exchanged between the
devices before running the protocols. We used OpenSSL v1.1.1 [216] to create the
required private keys, certificates and a CRL. The CRL consists of 100 serial numbers
other than those of the certificates we created for the experiments. Also, ECDSA was
employed to provide authentication since it is an approved signature algorithm by
the US NIST [139].
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(c) The tree created based on ZigBee signal strength.

Figure 7.7: The trees used in the experiments.
We implemented all of the protocols in Java, except the FHE-based protocol which
is coded in C. The source codes for these protocols will be shared through our AMI
testbed’s website [217].
We prepared two groups of experiments. In the first group, we set the data
collection period to 60 seconds [159] for all protocols except the FHE-based protocol
because our preliminary experiments showed that ZigBee needs more than one minute
to transmit the encrypted reading efficiently since it allows limited size of data payload
due to the constraints of the XBee module. Therefore, we created a second group of
experiments in which the data collection period is set to 6 minutes for FHE-based
protocol experiments. Since both FHE- and secure MPC-based protocols are privacy-
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preserving, we added the secure MPC-based protocol into the second experiment
group for performance comparison. We ran the protocols for 30 rounds and presented
an average of the test results for statistical significance.

7.3.2

Baselines and Performance Metrics

To assess the performance of privacy-preserving protocols (i.e., MPC- and FHE-based
protocols), we have used a number of baselines. The default baseline is the data aggregation on the plaintext readings. In addition, we use 256-bit AES as a second
baseline which provides security to a certain extent but not privacy because it requires to decrypt the encrypted readings before the aggregation. In the figures, these
approaches are represented with P lain, AES, SM P C, and F HE, respectively.
The message size of a data packet generated by each method tested in this work
is given in Table 7.1. Since the SV scheme encrypts the readings bit-by-bit, the
FHE-based protocol transmits them in this format as opposed to the other methods.
Table 7.1: Message overhead for plaintext, 256-bit AES, SV scheme, Secure MPC,
and ECDSA signatures.
Message size (in bytes)
Plaintext
256-AES
SV scheme (per encrypted bit)
Secure MPC
ECDSA Signature

2
16
931
32
132

For performance evaluation, we used the following metrics:
• Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): This is the ratio of the number of data
packets received by the gateway to the total number of data packets that are
expected to be received by the gateway.
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• Throughput (TP): This is the average amount of data received by the gateway
per second.
• Completion Time (CT): This is the elapsed time for gathering all the measurement data from all nodes and aggregating them at the gateway in one
round. We measure it at the application layer so that it takes into account the
cryptographic operations.

7.3.3

Experiment Results

In this section, we evaluate and discuss the experiment results in terms of packet
delivery ratio, throughput and completion time in order to investigate their reliability
and efficiency. In the figures, AT , SS and ZB represent the spanning trees created
based on HWMP’s airtime (AT ) metric [218], WiFi signal strength (SS) and ZigBee
(ZB) signal strength, respectively. U DP and T CP represent the transport layer
protocols UDP and TCP while ZigBee represents ZigBee itself.

Packet Delivery Ratio
EtoE vs HbyH: As shown in Fig. 7.8, all of the protocols except SM P C achieve
relatively higher PDR values when they employ HbyH aggregation. This is due to the
reduced number of hops to forward a packet to the destination. Also, this decreases
the number of packets traveling to the same destination in the network, consequently
reduces the packet lost because of the contention during accessing the medium. In
contrast, SM P C shows a reverse tendency. We attribute this to the protocol’s different way of functioning. Specifically, the participant that computes the secret (the
gateway) unicasts a value to each of the other participants in order to reduce the
communication overhead due to the share exchanges [17] in traditional secret sharing
schemes [149, 219]. This two-way data communication causes extra contention and
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Figure 7.8: The packet delivery ratio for P lain, AES and SM P C approaches as an
indication of the reliability.

results in poor performance. This affects the PDR significantly because a parent
meter needs to receive the encrypted readings from all of its child meters in order to
aggregate them and report the aggregated value to its parent. If any of the readings
cannot be received by the parent, then the aggregation process is stuck at that point
and this results in a lower PDR at the gateway. This persists even for the T CP
which is a reliable protocol because the number of retransmissions is limited, and the
protocol gives up retransmitting the data packet after reaching this limit. Nonetheless, SM P C can achieve more than 80% of PDR with EtoE − T CP aggregation.
We attribute this to the direct communication channel between the meters and the
gateway. Once the connection is established, data packets can be communicated to
the gateway directly. If any of the meters cannot establish the connection, only the
reading of this meter cannot be received. However, in HbyH − T CP , if any of the
parent meters cannot receive the reading from any of its child meters the gateway
cannot receive any reading from that branch including this parent meter. Therefore,
SM P C would not be a good choice for HbyH aggregation.
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AT Tree vs SS Tree: The performance of all approaches shows a similar tendency
on different trees. That is, the approaches with AT − U DP always perform better
than those with SS − U DP . This is due to the fact that the routing table is formed
based on the AT metric, while in SS there can be cases where some children access
their parents in multiple hops. In general, using TCP makes significantly positive
impact on any trees. However, with SM P C, the effect of TCP is much significant.
Therefore, we can conclude that SM P C should be used with TCP, preferably on AT
trees.
802.11s vs ZigBee: As can be seen from the figure, there is a contention between
T CP and ZigBee. If we exclude SM P C because of its way of functioning, we can say
that ZigBee performs at least as good as T CP . This is due to the fact that T CP is
a connection-oriented protocol, and that it can neither send nor receive data packets
unless a connection is established. Considering that we conducted the experiments in
a building with walls and plenty of electrical devices such as workstations, personal
computers and the access points for wireless Internet connection, it is inevitable to
be exposed to interference and attenuation. ZigBee suffers from interference far less
than WiFi does because we operate it on a channel which is not overlapping with
the three non-overlapping channels (channels 1, 6 and 11) adopted in the US [220].
However, as we are keen on investigating the performance of SM P C, we observed
that Zigbee suffers a lot with SM P C as opposed to other approaches. This suggests
that IEEE 802.11s should be preferred in SM P C implementations. However, if only
security is of concern, Zigbee (with AES) is better.
UDP vs TCP: We have already implicitly discussed the impacts of T CP and U DP .
To sum up, U DP achieves the least PDRs in both EtoE and HbyH aggregation
since it is inherently connectionless which means that there will be no transport layer
retransmissions if any of data packets is lost. T CP outperforms U DP under all
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conditions. This can be attributed to the retransmission mechanisms of T CP . If the
sender does not receive an ACK within a certain time it retransmits the message to
the receiver host.
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Figure 7.9: The throughput produced at the gateway by P lain, AES and SM P C
approaches.

EtoE vs HbyH: We investigated the throughput performance to analyze bandwidth
usage of the protocols. As can be seen in Fig. 7.9, EtoE aggregation always produces
more throughput than HbyH aggregation does. Even those protocols that achieve
more than 95% PDR in HbyH aggregation produce two-third less throughput than
that was produced in EtoE aggregation. This is due to the fact that the meter
readings are aggregated at intermediate meters in HbyH aggregation.
AT Tree vs SS Tree: The approaches produce more TP on AT tree than the TP
produced on SS tree. This is due to the PDR achieved by the approaches. As we
already discussed the reasons under PDR that also relates to TP, we keep it short in
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this subsection. Note that we calculate the TP based on the amount of data received
by the gateway during the experiments, and we do not normalize the values.
802.11s vs ZigBee: ZigBee produces more TP where it achieves more PDR than
802.11 approaches, and vice versa. However, the rates are different in TP cases. That
is, the gap between Zigbee and 802.11s-TCP is much less now. This can be attributed
to the headers added at the Application Support Sublayer (APS) in ZigBee protocol
stack [191, 205].
UDP vs TCP: Low TP values of U DP stem from lower PDR. Since T CP provides
a reliable communication service it can achieve more message delivery when compared
to U DP . The difference between TP values of AES and SM P C approaches is larger
than the difference between their PDR values. This can be attributed to the larger
size of data packets generated by SM P C approach.
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Figure 7.10: The completion time of all meter readings for P lain, AES and SM P C
approaches.
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The last metric we investigated is data collection completion time. Data collection completion includes receiving readings from all of the meters and performing an
aggregation operation. Therefore, some of the bars are missing in Fig. 7.10 because
the gateway did not receive the readings from all of the meters for even one round.
EtoE vs HbyH: The approaches using HbyH aggregation take less time to complete
a data collection round when compared to those using EtoE aggregation. This can be
attributed to the lower number of packets traveling throughout the network, thereby
reducing the contention during the medium access. This results in shorter backoff
times when compared to EtoE aggregation, consequently lower completion time.
AT Tree vs SS Tree: As expected, the approaches need more time to complete a
data collection round on SS tree. This is because the data packets sent by some of
the child meters need to be forwarded several times before delivering to the parent
meter. This is due to the fact that the IEEE 802.11s standard’s default routing
protocol HWMP which uses airtime metric creates different paths than those we
created based on WiFi signal strength.
802.11s vs ZigBee: As can be seen from the figure, it is not possible to compare
802.11s and ZigBee performance in terms of EtoE data aggregation since SM P C was
not able to be completed. Thus, we investigated them from the point of HbyH data
aggregation. ZigBee requires less time than the others do. We attribute this to the
less interference on the channel it operates. However, for SM P C this was not the
case. Only 802.11s was able to finish the data collection under SM P C. Therefore,
while Zigbee is more suitable for Plain data or AES, it is not suitable for SM P C.
UDP vs TCP: The protocols running on T CP usually require more time than the
others do. This is due to the fact that the T CP needs to establish a connection to the
destination before sending data packets. Also, retransmissions add some more extra
time. SM P C requires more time when compared to the approaches running on T CP
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since the gateway needs to establish separate TCP connections to unicast a value to
be used for share computations to all of the meters. Moreover, communication of this
value is exposed to a similar contention that occurs in EtoE aggregation.

SMPC vs FHE Experiments
Previous group of experiments have demonstrated the performance of SM P C with
respect to other baselines. In this group of experiments, by keeping the same data
collection period, we compared the performance of SM P C to F HE-based protocols
in terms of the same metrics. Our goal is to observe their pros and cons under different
environments.
As mentioned, F HE-based protocol transmits the encrypted meter reading bitby-bit since even an encrypted bit is very large in size. This results in excessive
number of packet transmissions, consequently very high rate in packet losses. While
we employed TCP to deal with these packet losses, TCP comes with heavy overhead.
Therefore, in addition to TCP, we decided to employ the CoAP for the F HE-based
protocol to ensure reliable message delivery with a more lightweight protocol when
compared to TCP. We measured and compared its performance with UDP and TCP.
CoAP is represented with CoAP in the figures.
We also tested both protocols on the ZigBee tree (ZB) while they are running
on the IEEE 802.11s-based mesh network. This is an additional tree (other than AT
and SS trees) and we aimed to see if the protocols can perform well on an IEEE
802.11s-based mesh network while the topology is more suitable for ZigBee mesh.
Impact of Data Aggregation Mechanism: The impact of data aggregation
mechanism varies based on the metric in question. As can be seen from Fig.s 7.11a
and 7.11b, while the F HE-based protocol with HbyH aggregation is comparable to
that of EtoE aggregation, SM P C-based protocol with HbyH aggregation performs
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remarkably worse than that of EtoE aggregation. This is due to the fact that the
SM P C-based protocol requires the meters to receive a value from the gateway to
compute the shares that the other meters would compute for this receiving meter.
This makes it more difficult to communicate an aggregated reading to the parent
because an intermediate meter cannot aggregate the readings unless it does not receive
that value from the gateway even if it already received the readings from all of its
child meters.
As shown in Fig.s 7.11c and 7.11d, HbyH data aggregation reduces the bandwidth
use regardless of the protocol because when data packets are aggregated the result
value does not allocate more resources. This is because the cryptographic operations
used in the protocols are based on finite field arithmetic.
Similarly, we can say that HbyH data aggregation on T CP reduces the time
required to complete a data collection round from Fig. 7.11e. We attribute this to
the extra time required for establishing a connection before sending the data packets.
This time increases in EtoE aggregation because all of other meters in the network
attempts to establish a connection and causes medium access collisions. This increases
backoff waiting times, and consequently the data collection time.
Impact of Tree Topology: As can be seen from the figures in Fig. 7.11, the
protocols tend to perform better on WiFi-related trees (AT and SS) when the testbed
is built on IEEE 802.11s standard. This can be attributed to the differences between
ZigBee and IEEE 802.11s in creating links between neighboring meters. A one-hop
neighbor meter in ZigBee mesh can be two or more hops away in IEEE 802.11s
mesh. This increases the probability of packet losses when ZB tree is used for data
aggregation in a IEEE 802.11s mesh.
When we compare the performance of the protocols on AT and SS trees, it can
be seen that the protocols perform better on AT tree. We attribute this to fact that
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AT is formed based on the underlying routing protocol. The next hops in AT tree is
the same with the next hops in the HWMP’s routing table. When SS tree is used,
some of the parent meters are multiple hops far from the sender meter according to
the HWMP’s routing table.
Impact of Transport/Application Protocol: PDR and CT performance should
be investigated together in order to evaluate the impact of the transport/application
protocols used. T CP and CoAP protocols which both provide reliability for message
delivery achieves the most packet delivery ratio, and more importantly they manage
to complete at least one data collection round in EtoE data aggregation. In addition,
as can be seen in Fig. 7.11f, CoAP can complete at least one data collection round
on ZB tree whereas ZigBee cannot complete even once. This is due to the fact
that CoAP maintains the state of each transmitted message without establishing a
connection with the receiver. Thus, if any of the messages is not delivered this can
be detected, and the message is retransmitted by the sender. Moreover, CoAP ’s
congestion control reduces packet drops due to network congestion.
Impact of Mesh Technology: The experiment results indicate that the performance of ZigBee varies based on the size of the concealed meter reading. Hence, The
performance of SM P C-based protocol on ZigBee is better than that of U DP , but
worse than that of T CP while the performance of the F HE-based protocol is the
worst when ZigBee mesh is used. This is because in F HE-based protocol, ZigBee
needs to fragment an encrypted bit into 5 fragments since it allows to send at most
256-byte payload in a data packet. Moreover, those packets are subject to further
fragmentation based on the available buffer [191]. Due to the increased number of
fragments to be handled, medium access contention increases dramatically. This results in data loss, consequently lower PDR and poor performance. In general, Zigbee
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cannot complete any rounds in SM P C and F HE. For 80211.s, the rounds can be
completed when using T CP for SM P C and they are much quicker than F HE.
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Figure 7.11: SM P C vs F HE experiment results.
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7.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have evaluated the performance of two open-source wireless mesh
networking standards, i.e., IEEE 802.11s and ZigBee, under security and privacy
requirements of Smart Grid (SG) Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks.
We built a testbed out of Raspberry P i 3s that implement IEEE 802.11s and ZigBee
wireless mesh networking standards in order to mimic the AMI network. We presented
a comprehensive explanation about how we built the testbed so that the readers can
easily reproduce the same testbed environment.
We employed fully homomorphic encryption (F HE) and secure multiparty computation (SM P C) based protocols which are both secure and privacy-preserving
along with SSL certificates and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
signatures for authentication. Moreover, we used End-to-End (EtoE) and Hop-byHop (HbyH) data aggregation mechanisms. Furthermore, we integrated the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP ) into F HE-based protocol to provide both
reliable and lightweight communication.
To begin with, the results for the first group of experiments have demonstrated
that HbyH data aggregation mechanism is much suited to be used for the AMI
network since it reduces throughput and completion time significantly although it is
susceptible to packet losses due to the dependency between tree levels. The protocols
running on 802.11s mesh technology is more robust than those using ZigBee although
those using ZigBee performs almost equally or outperform those using 802.11s mesh
for cases where privacy is not of concern (plain data or AES encryption). Specifically,
ZigBee can be a good alternative to 802.11s mesh for the cases where a whole concealed
reading can fit into a single ZigBee data packet and HbyH aggregation is employed.
Secondly, we compared the performance of the two privacy-preserving protocols,
SM P C- and F HE-based protocols. Experiment results have shown that the SM P C-
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based protocol can be an alternative to F HE-based protocol when the AMI network
is built on IEEE 802.11s mesh, and EtoE data aggregation mechanism is employed.
On the other hand, the F HE-based protocol with CoAP has shown a remarkable
performance with both EtoE and HbyH data aggregation. It can be a viable option if
data collection is performed in more than every 6 minutes. We infer that CoAP is the
most suitable choice in terms of message delivery and throughput for data-intensive
protocols such as the F HE-based protocol at the expense of long data collection
completion times.
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CHAPTER 8
SECURE AND RELIABLE FIRMWARE UPDATE PROTOCOLS FOR
THE AMI NETWORK
One of the major difficulties we had in our testbed work in the previous chapter was
in distributing source code of the protocols as we updated them since we were revealing
some bugs during the preliminary tests. However, it was not efficient to collect all
devices, loading new code and placing them back each time we needed to update the
protocols. Therefore, we used scp (secure copy) which is a file transfer protocol runs
over ssh (secure shell) to distribute the new code to the devices over the wireless
mesh network. It was not efficient to unicast the new code either because we needed
to change several parameters in the scp command each time we needed to update
them. Therefore, we wanted to develop a more efficient method for distribution of
new code. In this chapter, we investigate this problem in the firmware update concept
since the same problem is likely to occur in this concept in the Advanced Metering
Infrastructure (AMI) network.
Smart meters (SMs) are comprised of some smaller electronic parts such as NIC
(Network Interface Card) [221] and processor [222] which execute some programs
called firmware that control, monitor and manipulate the data in the device. The SM
firmware is developed by SM vendors and updated in order to fix the bugs detected,
improve its functionality and add new functionalities to the device. In addition to
SM vendors, utility companies (UCs) may also need to update their service software
due to some regulations on the related law as well as bugs and functionality improvement/enhancement. For example, a legislation in Florida state can obligate Duke
Energy to update the firmware/software running on the SMs they installed in this
state. Also, a firmware update can target legacy SMs of specific brand(s) or model(s).
That is, an update can target a subset of the SMs as well as all the SMs in an AMI
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Figure 8.1: An AMI network with different brand SMs
network. For example, the AMI network given in Fig. 8.1 consists of different brand
SMs. A firmware update released by SilverSpring targets only blue nodes in the
figure. The update should be downloaded and installed by these SMs only.
The firmware update process is initiated by the party that releases the update file
(e.g., SM vendor, UC). The party notifies the gateway of the network that there is
an update for the SMs. The gateway sends a firmware update request to the SMs
that the update targets. Then, the targeted SMs download and install the update
[123]. Rather than unicasting the request, it should be multicast to the targeted SMs
because unicasting wastes both network bandwidth and processing resources of the
device. Also, this needs to be done manually which is cumbersome when there is
large number of SMs. However, multicasting requires the SMs to know that there
is an update for them beforehand so that they can join a multicast group. If the
SMs knew that there is a firmware update for them, then they would download and
install it without waiting a request. In addition, multicasting may not be available
in wireless environments. Even if it is available, the reliability and security is a big
concern. Reliability is due to use of UDP in such environments for reduced overhead
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while security refers to confidentiality and authentication. Another alternative is to
broadcast the request which causes not only the targeted SMs but also those that are
not targeted to download and install the update, which wastes more bandwidth and
processing resources.
To overcome this problem, we propose employing ciphertext-policy attribute-based
signcryption (CP-ABSC) [34]. CP-ABSC provides not only confidentiality and access
control but also data integrity and message authentication. It is based on satisfying
an access tree with a set of attributes assigned by attribute authorities [223]. The
access tree defines who can grant access to the encrypted data while the attributes are
used to decrypt the encrypted data by satisfying the access tree. CP-ABSC signcrypts
the data based on the access tree, and the ciphertext can be designcrypted if the set
of attributes with which the private key was created satisfies the access tree.
In this work, we propose secure and reliable application layer multicasting (multicastover-broadcast) protocols based on CP-ABSC for firmware update in the IEEE 802.11sbased AMI network. In general, in these protocols, the firmware provider signcrypts
the firmware update file and a firmware update request with an access tree that defines the targeted SMs, and sends them to the gateway of the network. The gateway
broadcasts the firmware update request. The SMs that possess the set of attributes
that can satisfy the access tree can designcrypt the request and initiate the FTP (File
Transfer Protocol) to download the update file.
CP-ABSC fulfills the needs of data integrity and sender authentication. However,
the aforementioned protocol cannot guarantee that all SMs in the network receive
the firmware update request at least once since broadcasting runs on top of UDP
which is an unreliable protocol. Therefore, we introduced an ACK (acknowledgment)
mechanism into the protocol. Once the gateway broadcasts the request, it waits an
ACK from each of the SMs for a certain amount of time. If it does not, then it
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broadcasts a much smaller packet called alarm message that triggers the SMs that
have received the request to broadcast a copy of the request. This repeats until
the gateway receives at least one ACK from each SM in the network. We call this
Broadcast-Alarm (Bcast-Alarm) protocol.
Despite the fact that Bcast-Alarm protocol is both secure and reliable, it generates too many duplicate packets traveling throughout the network. This wastes the
network bandwidth and processing resources of the SMs. In addition, signcryption
operation increases the size of the update request. It is very likely to increase in the
number of packets lost because when the size of a datagram exceeds the maximum
transmission unit size it is split into smaller packets. If any of these packets is lost,
then the whole datagram is lost. Therefore, in this work, we introduce network coding
into Bcast-Alarm protocol and remove the alarm messages in order to reduce the size
of application layer packet transmitted at a time. In the new protocol which is called
Broadcast-Network Coding (Bcast-NC), the gateway (encoder) divides the request
into a certain number of same size data packets, encodes and broadcasts them. The
SMs (decoders) buffer the coded packets and decode the update request when they
have sufficient amount of innovative coded data. The SMs that have decoded the
request send an ACK to the gateway. The gateway keeps broadcasting coded packets
until it receives at least one ACK from each of the SMs.
We implemented the proposed protocols under ns-3 [132] and used Kodo [224]
for network coding, which is an open source network coding library. We compared
their performance with that of unicasting (Ucast) in terms of communication delay,
completion time of firmware update process and throughput. The simulation results
indicate that Bcast-NC protocol is comparable to Ucast in terms of throughput,
and that it utilizes the network bandwidth much more efficiently than Bcast-Alarm
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protocol does. However, Bcast-Alarm protocol outperforms Bcast-NC protocol with
regards to the completion time.
Our main contributions in this chapter can be summarized as follows.
1. We propose secure and reliable multicasting protocols based on CP-ABSC for
firmware update in the IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network.
2. The proposed protocols are implemented under ns-3, which is a very commonly
used network simulation tool, and their performance is assessed and compared
with that of unicasting.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, we give a background
information about CP-ABSC and network coding in Section 8.1. In the following
section, we introduce our secure and reliable firmware update protocols. In Section
8.3, the simulation results are presented and discussed. Finally, we summarize our
work and conclude the chapter in Section 8.4.

8.1
8.1.1

Preliminaries
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Signcryption

One of the most known access control methods is to use attribute-based encryption (ABE) methods. The two commonly used ABE methods are key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE) [225] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [226]. KP-ABE differs from
CP-ABE in the way of creating private keys and performing encryption/decryption
operations. In KP-ABE, private keys are created based on an access tree, and data
is encrypted with a set of attributes. A ciphertext which is created with a set of
attributes can be decrypted if the set of attributes satisfies the access tree with which
the private key was created. In contrast, CP-ABE encrypts the data based on the
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access tree, and the ciphertext can be decrypted if the set of attributes with which
the private key was created satisfies the access tree.
KP-ABE is not convenient in our case because we define the SMs with the attributes assigned by the attribute authorities while encrypting the data based on the
access tree. On the other hand, if KP-ABE is employed it will require to issue a new
private key each time the firmware update targets a different group of SMs, i.e., the access tree changes, which introduces a communication overhead. Therefore, CP-ABE
fits in firmware update context better than KP-ABE. However, CP-ABE provides
confidentially and access control but no data integrity and message authentication.
That is, an encrypted firmware update request cannot be checked if it is altered on
transit or if it is sent by an unauthenticated party. If the request is processed without an integrity check a piece of malicious code injected during the transmission can
damage the device and even brick it. Similarly, a DoS (Denial of Service) attack can
be performed against the update provider by sending a plethora of download requests
if an authentication mechanism is not employed [227]. To that end, we propose using
ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption (CP-ABSC) [34] in this chapter since
it integrates digital signatures with CP-ABE in order to provide not only confidentiality and access control, but also data integrity and message authentication with
an insignificant increase at computational cost, which are required in AMI network
communications.
We assumed that each SM has a private key created with 10 attributes and that
the update requests are signcrypted with a simple access tree of three attributes
as given in Fig. 8.2. For example, a firmware update request signcrypted based on
this access tree targets the OpenWay Centron meters running Linux 4.4.39 or 4.1.36
kernel. The structure of the access tree affects the size of the signcrypted data and
the computational delay of signcryption/designcryption operations.
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Figure 8.2: An example access control tree
In CP-ABSC, a multicast group is defined based on the access rights of the data
of interest. The access rights are specified by the data source and represented with an
access tree. The access tree is an access structure containing a set of attributes along
with AND and OR relations. Instead of revealing the identity of the destinations, it
defines who can access the actual data. The data is signcrypted based on this access
tree. The corresponding ciphertext can be designcrypted by any user who has a secret
key computed with a set of attributes that can satisfy the access tree.
CP-ABSC consists of the following four primary algorithms [34]:
• System Initialization This algorithm is executed by a certificate authority
(CA). After creating a bilinear mapping e : G1 × G1 → G2 where G1 and G2 are
two cyclic groups of prime order p, it computes the system public parameters
denoted by P K and the master key M SK. P K is shared with the users while
M SK is kept secret to create a secret key for each user in the system.
• Key Generation This algorithm is also executed by the CA. It takes M SK
and a set of attributes S as input and computes a secret key SK, a signing key
Ksign and a verification key Kver . SK and Ksign are sent to the owner of S, and
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Kver is published to the other users to verify any message sent by the owner of
S.
• SignCryption This algorithm is executed by a user who requires any other
user who wants to access his data to possess some attributes that can satisfy
the access tree specified by himself. It takes a plaintext message M , an access
tree T that specifies the access policy of the message M , the public key P K
and the signing key Ksign as input. Then, it computes and returns a ciphertext
along with a relevant signature CTsign .
• DeSignCryption This algorithm is executed by a user who wants to access
the actual message concealed in a signcrypted message CTsign . It takes the
signcrypted message CTsign , the private key SK and the verification key Kver .
It returns the message M if the verification process is successfully completed.

8.1.2

Network Coding

Network coding (NC) is a technique that increases the network bandwidth efficiency
in both wired and wireless networks by eliminating packet header overhead. It can
be utilized from the physical to the application layer since it provides error correction
as well as encoding/decoding. There are two types of NC: inter-flow NC and intraflow NC [35]. In this work, we use intra-flow NC since the data packets traveling
throughout the network are from the same data flow.
In broadcast-based communication systems, random linear NC (RLNC) is utilized
because it does not need a centralized control over the encoding/decoding operations
and produces close-to-optimal throughput [228]. In RLNC, the data source divides
the data to be broadcast into generations as illustrated in Fig. 8.3. Each generation
contains same number of k packets denoted pi , i = 1, 2, · · · , k, which are d bytes
each. A random linear combination of all the packets in a generation is computed
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Figure 8.3: Data partitioning before encoding a generation
separately to obtain an encoded packet x =

Pk

m=1

αm pm for each generation, where

α
~ is the encoding vector. The encoding vector is included in every encoded packet
for future decoding purposes. When an encoded packet x is received, the receiver
checks if the encoding vector of this packet is linearly dependent with that of all
other encoded packets received thus far. If so, this packet is discarded. Otherwise,
the packet which is called an innovative packet is stored in the buffer, and the receiver
tries to decode all the packets stored in the buffer by performing Gaussian elimination
whose computational complexity is O(k 3 ).
Each αm in the encoding vector α
~ is randomly selected from a Galois field GF (2q )
where q is a positive integer. A Galois field (finite field) consists of finite number of
elements and all operations defined in this field are closed, which means that every
operation performed on two elements from this field results in an element in the same
field. It is critical to choose a finite field for RLNC applications because there is a
trade-off between computational cost and efficiency of the coding. That is, the chosen
field determines the time required for generating encoded packets and the possibility
of generating linearly dependent and consequently useless packets.
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8.1.3

Problem Definition

Assuming that the firmware update publishers can determine the SMs in an AMI
network, whose firmware need to be updated, they can be notified through the gateway of the network that there is an update. The gateway can unicast a firmware
update request to the targeted SMs, which is a costly process in terms of the required
bandwidth and computational power. Please note that the gateway gets busy with
sending literally the same data several times instead of dealing with waiting jobs in
the job queue. Instead, the requests can be multicasted to the SMs. However, wireless mesh standards (e.g. IEEE 802.11s and 802.15.4) do not support IP multicast
because they implement routing on MAC addresses instead of IP addresses. Even
if they supported IP multicast, this would not be feasible because it requires the
targeted SMs to know that there is an update for them beforehand and to send a
multicast group join message to the gateway. If the targeted SMs knew that there is
an update for them, they would download the update file, so would not need to be
notified with an update request.
The firmware update process should be reliable because if a consumer cannot
download and install the firmware update that fixes a critical bug, the consumer
may suffer from a security vulnerability. If the bug is related to the communication
protocols, then it can affect the communication in the whole network since some nodes
act as intermediary to relay the data of multiple-hop away nodes in WMNs.
Referring the given information, the problem we address in this chapter can be
defined as follows: Given an IEEE 802.11s-based AMI network with n SMs, update the
firmware of a group of SMs without revealing their identities in a secure and reliable
way.
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8.1.4

Threat Model and Security Goals

The firmware update requests and the firmware update itself need to be communicated
in a secure way. Also, the firmware update file has to be kept private between the
publisher (the meter vendor or the UC) and the SMs to be updated because the
firmware might be proprietary [229]. We identified the following attacks to the privacy
and security of the firmware update process in the AMI and established the associated
security goals.
• Attack 1: An eavesdropper monitors the communication channel in order to
obtain the firmware update file. The eavesdropper can detect some bugs and use
them for further attacks; infamize the publisher company or improve/enhance
their own firmware if s/he works for a competing company.
• Security Goal 1: Conceal the firmware update such that only the SMs that
the publisher targets can reveal it.
• Attack 2: An attacker in the middle can capture and alter the firmware update
file so as to damage the SMs.
• Security Goal 2: Provide data integrity to verify the content of the update
file.
• Attack 3: An attacker impersonates the gateway and sends fabricated firmware
update requests to the SMs to initiate a DoS attack against the gateway.
• Security Goal 3: Provide sender authentication to verify the sender and contents of the requests.
• Attack 4: An eavesdropper captures and replays a legitimate firmware update
request to initiate a false download.
• Security Goal 4: Identify and discard replayed requests.
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Figure 8.4: Overview of the secure multicasting protocol we proposed in this work

8.2

The Proposed Firmware Update Protocols

In this section, we introduce the two firmware update protocols. We present a general
overview of the successful use case in Fig. 8.4 and explain the details of the protocols
in the next section. We assume that the certificate authority issued all required keys
to the SMs in the network before the protocols are run.
The publisher of the firmware update signcrypts the firmware update file F W U F
(CTsign (F W U F )) and a firmware update request F W U Req (CTsign (F W U Req)) and
transmits them to the gateway of the network over the Internet. The publisher
signcrypts both data because the firmware is assumed to be proprietary and it should
not be revealed even to the gateway if the gateway is not one of the targeted SMs.
While transferring the CTsign (F W U F ) a file transfer protocol such as FTP (File
Transfer Protocol) should be used since its size is likely much larger than that of an
ordinary communication message. Our protocols tackle the part after the communciation of the CTsign (F W U F ) and CTsign (F W U Req).
In our protocols, we utilize ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)
to sign every timestamped packet although CP-ABSC provides data integrity and
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message authentication because the integrity and the authenticity of the timestamp
T S should be ensured since it can be fabricated or altered in transit.
Algorithm 2 F W U N otif y(CTsign (F W U Req))
1: F W U REQ ← Concat(CTsign (F W U Req), T S)
GW
2: < F W U REQ, σ >← Sign(F W U REQ, SKECDSA
)
3: SendT o(< F W U REQ, σ >, IP v4(255.255.255.255))
4: Schedule(Secs(t), Broadcast Alarm)
5: done ← T RU E
6: repeat
7:
< ACK, σ 0 , f rom >← Recv(socket)
8:
Success/F ail ← V erif y(< ACK, σ 0 >,
SM
P KECDSA
)
9:
if Success then
10:
< ACK, T S 0 >← Split(ACK)
11:
Y es/N o ← IsExpired(T S 0 )
12:
if N o then
13:
AckM ap.Add(f rom, T S 0 )
14:
if AckM ap.Size() == #SM s then
15:
Cancel Schedule(Broadcast Alarm)
16:
done ← F ALSE
17:
end if
18:
end if
19:
end if
20: until done

8.2.1

Broadcast-Alarm Protocol

We assume that the gateway has successfully received the CTsign (F W U F ) and
CTsign (F W U Req) before running this protocol. A pseudocode for the operations performed by the gateway is given in Alg. 2. The gateway timestamps the CTsign (F W U Req)
GW
(F W U REQ), signs it with its secret key SKECDSA
generated for ECDSA operations

and broadcasts it (< F W U REQ, σ >). Then, it begins to wait for a certain amount
of time, e.g., t secs to receive at least one ACK from each SM in the network. If it
does not, Broadcast Alarm function is called. In this function, an Alarm message
which is much smaller than the < F W U REQ, σ > is created, timestamped, signed

153

and broadcast. In the end of the function, it is re-scheduled in a way to be called after
t secs. This repeats until the gateway receives at least one ACK from each SM in the
network. If an SM receives an Alarm message it broadcasts the < F W U REQ, σ > if
it already received it. Otherwise, it does nothing.
Recv function is non-blocking in the real implementation, but we assume it is
blocking in the pseudocode in order to give the idea behind the protocols. In fact,
it is called by the lower layer protocol (UDP in our work) when any data packet is
received by the socket that is being listened. When an ACK is received its signature
σ 0 is verified. If it succeeds its timestamp T S 0 is checked if it is expired. If not, it
is added to a hash map. If the number of entries in the hash map is equal to the
number of SMs in the network the scheduled Broadcast Alarm is canceled.
Algorithm 3 F W U F Download(< F W U REQ, σ >)
1: Success/F ail ← V erif y(< F W U REQ, σ >,
GW
P KECDSA
)
2: if Success then
3:
< CTsign (F W U Req), T S >← Split(F W U REQ)
4:
Y es/N o ← IsExpired(T S)
5:
if N o then
6:
ACK ← Concat(Ack, T S 0 )
SM
)
7:
< ACK, σ 0 >← Sign(ACK, SKECDSA
0
8:
SendT o(< ACK, σ >, IPGW )
9:
F W U Req/F ail ← DeSignCrypt(
SM
P ublisher
CTsign (F W U Req), SKCP
)
−ABSC , Kver
10:
if V erif ication Succeeds then
11:
Initiate F T P ()
12:
Download F W U F ()
13:
end if
14:
end if
15: end if

When an SM receives the < F W U REQ, σ > it runs the F W U F Download function whose pseudocode is given in Alg. 3. First of all, the signature is verified with
GW
the public key of the gateway P KECDSA
generated for ECDSA operations. If it suc-
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ceeds F W U REQ is split into CTsign (F W U Req) and T S. The T S is checked if the
CTsign (F W U Req) was already received before. Otherwise, the SMs may face replay
attacks. If it is a new firmware update request, then the SM timestamps an Ack mesSM
sage (ACK), signs it with its secret key SKECDSA
generated for ECDSA operations

and sends it (< ACK, Signature0 >) to the gateway. Finally, the SM tries to designSM
crypt the CTsign (F W U Req) with its secret key SKCP
−ABSC generated for CP-ABSC
P ublisher
operations and the verification key of the firmware update publisher Kver
. If

the process is successfully completed, then the SM initiates the FTP protocol and
downloads the CTsign (F W U F ).
The download process requires to run another protocol since an update file can
be 400KB-2MB in size [121]. The FTP (File Transfer Protocol) is one of the most
commonly used protocols to transfer files between two hosts in a network. In our
work, we use the FTP protocol to download the firmware update from the gateway.

8.2.2

Broadcast-Network Coding Protocol

Broadcast-Network Coding (Bcast-NC) protocol differs from Bcast-Alarm protocol
mostly in the way of broadcasting the signcrypted request and the lack of Alarm
messages. In this protocol, the gateway keeps broadcasting encoded packets of the
request which are much smaller than the request itself at every t seconds until it
receives at least one ACK from each SM in the network.
When an SM receives an encoded packet it checks whether the packet is innovative
or not. If not, the packet is discarded. Otherwise, the SM stores the packet in a buffer
and performs Gaussian elimination on all the packets stored in the buffer to check
if sufficient amount of data is gathered to recover the whole request. If the SM can
successfully recover the whole request it follows the steps given in Alg. 3.
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8.3

Performance Evaluation

In this section, we analyze the proposed protocols from the security point of view and
measure their performance based on some metrics defined in Section 8.3.2.

8.3.1

Security Analysis

We evaluate the proposed protocols based on the security goals listed in Section 8.1.4.
• Security Goal 1: The firmware update publisher signcrypts the update file
with an access tree that can be satisfied by the attributes of the targeted SMs
before sending it to the gateway. This prevents not only the non-targeted SMs
but also the eavesdropper from obtaining the actual update file.
• Security Goal 2: Since the firmware update file is also signcrypted, during
the designcryption operation, the SMs can detect if it is altered.
• Security Goal 3: The gateway signs all timestamped messages before transmission. Hence, a fabricated request will be discarded because it will fail in the
verification step at the SM.
• Security Goal 4: Since all messages are timestamped, the timestamp can be
checked to identify a legitimate but replayed request message.

8.3.2

Baselines and Performance Metrics

We compared the performance of the proposed protocols with that of a simple unicastbased protocol (Ucast). In Ucast protocol, the gateway is assumed to know which SMs
are targeted. Thus, it unicasts a timestamped and signed firmware update request
(< U castReq||T S, σ >) to each targeted SM one-by-one and waits an ACK from each
of them for a certain amount of time t. If it does not receive an ACK from any one of
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the SMs within t sec, then it re-unicasts the request to that SM. This repeats until the
gateway receives an ACK from each of the targeted SMs. Since the targeted SMs are
known by the gateway, the update request is not encrypted but signed with ECDSA
for an authenticated communication.
When an SM receives the request it verifies its signature and checks the timestamp
to avoid a replay attack. If these processes do not fail, then the SM establishes a
TCP connection to the gateway in order to initiate the FTP protocol to download
the firmware update file.
We used the following metrics to measure their performance.
• Request Delivery Ratio: This is the ratio of the number of SMs that received
at least one firmware update request to the number of SMs that are supposed
to receive a firmware update request depending upon the protocol considered.
• Communication Delay: This is the average time elapsed between sending and
receiving a data packet, which includes transmission and propagation delays.
• Completion Time: This is another time-based metric which measures the
average time elapsed between the first request message sent by the gateway and
the end of the FTP protocol to download the FWUF. It includes the computational delays due to the cryptographic and network coding operations.
• Communication Throughput: This is the average amount of communication data (FWUF data excluded) received by each SM per second. We excluded
FWUF data in order to observe messaging overhead introduced by each protocol.
• Total Throughput: This is the average amount of data (FWUF data included) received by each SM per second.
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8.3.3

Experimental Setup

We implemented the baseline and the proposed protocols under the most commonly
used network simulator ns-3 [132], which has an implementation of IEEE 802.11s
standard. The underlying MAC protocol is IEEE 802.11g.
The experiments were conducted on randomly created topologies containing 36,
49, 64, 81 and 100 nodes (SMs) in an area of 1200mx1200m. This area mimics a
realistic neighborhood area network with one gateway which is used to communicate
with the UC/SM vendor. The communication range of each SM is set to 100m [101].
The simulations were run with 30 different topologies for 500s and we reported the
average of the results from these topologies. At each topology, 10 distinct nodes were
randomly chosen as targeted SMs.
All protocols including Ucast were run on top of UDP for the sake of a fair
comparison despite Ucast could have been run on top of TCP since it does not use
broadcasting.
The values of t parameter were optimized via a set of preliminary simulations. As
a result of these simulations, we chose t to be 5 sec and 2 sec for any size of network
in Bcast-Alarm (and also Ucast) and Bcast-NC protocols, respectively.
As aforementioned in the previous sections, we used ECDSA to sign all timestamped messages. ECDSA is a signature algorithm approved by the US government [139]. We used the ASN.1 secp128r1 standard curve with SHA1 hashing algorithm, having a key length of 256 bits. ECDSA was also used to sign/verify ACK
and Alarm messages since they also do not need to be encrypted but authenticated.
We used the ECDSA implementation in crypto++ library [230].
We used a network coding library called Kodo [224] to encode/decode the update
requests. We chose k and q to be 12 and 8 [231], respectively.

158

The update file to be downloaded was assumed to be 2MB [121]. Size of all
data/packets and computational delay of the major operations considered in the
simulations are given in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, respectively. The operations were run on
a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B [232] in order to measure the computational delays.
Table 8.1: Size of data/packets
Packet/Data
F W UF
CTsign (F W U F )
F W U Req
CTsign (F W U Req)
U castReq
Alarm
Ack
TS
Signature

Size (bytes)
2097152
2098692
4
1540
4
4
4
8
32

Table 8.2: Computational delay of the major operations
Operation
Delay (ms)
Sign(Ack/Alarm/U castReq||T S)
0.4148
V erif y(SignatureAck/Alarm/U castReq||T S )
0.8221
Sign(CTsign (F W U Req)||T S)
0.4362
V erif y(SignatureCTsign (F W U Req)||T S )
0.83
DeSignCrypt(CTsign (F W U Req))
23.1566
Download(CTsign (F W U F ))
14954545

8.3.4

Simulation Results

In this section, we compare the performance of the proposed protocols with that of
Ucast protocol based on the aforementioned metrics.
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Figure 8.5: Broadcast-Alarm vs. Broadcast-Network Coding simulation results.

Request Delivery Ratio
First, we investigate the reliability of the protocols. Since our protocols run on top
of UDP which is unreliable, we made use of Alarm messages and network coding
along with an acknowledgment mechanism to make them reliable. Thanks to these
methods, all of the protocols achieved a 100% request delivery ratio at the expense
of communication and computational delay overhead.

Communication Delay
We investigate the effect of the protocols on the communication delay between the
SMs. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 8.5a. All the three protocols show
an increasing tendency as the network grows. Since Bcast-Alarm and Bcast-NC
protocols use broadcasting, the increase in these approaches can be attributed to the
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contention at the medium access because the increase in the number of nodes that
want to access the medium results in an increase in backoff waiting time. Another
factor that raises the delay with the growing network is the probable increase in
average distance between the gateway and randomly chosen 10 SMs at each topology.
Ucast approach is affected by the latter only because it uses unicasting and there are
randomly chosen 10 targeted SMs for all topology sizes.
When compared to Ucast protocol, Bcast-NC protocol takes less time while BcastAlarm takes more time. Since unicasting needs to communicate RTS/CTS (request
to send/clear to send) messages before sending a frame, broadcasting performs better
than unicasting. This is the reason that makes Bcast-NC perform better than Ucast.
However, Bcast-Alarm approach suffers from excessive number of packets including
Alarm messages and re-broadcast update requests which increase backoff waiting time
and consequently the communication delay.

Completion Time
As can be seen in Fig. 8.5b, the values for all the protocols usually show an increasing
trend. This is due to the contention during accessing the medium as explained in the
previous subsection. However, the performance order among the protocols change in
this metric due to the computational delay introduced by each protocol. For example,
Bcast-NC requires the most time since it needs to run Gaussian elimination on the
buffered encoded messages at every time an encoded message is received whereas
Ucast requires the least time because it only verifies the signature on the request.
The fluctuations in Ucast and Bcast-Alarm protocols can be attributed to the
positions of the randomly chosen SMs at each topology. Although this case is also
present in communication delay for both protocols, it is affected much less than
the completion time because we do not consider lost packets in the communication
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delay computation. Nonetheless, loss of an update request/Alarm/Ack message whose
communication delay is significant increases the completion time as much as the
communication delay of this message. The farther a SM is randomly chosen, the
more delay the completion time incurs.

Communication Throughput
The throughput was measured to analyze the bandwidth usage of the protocols. The
values were computed based on the communication delay of each transmission. As
shown in Fig. 8.5c, the values for Bcast-Alarm are very high and decreasing whereas
those for Bcast-NC and Ucast protocols are almost fixed for all topology sizes. This
is due to the fact that each SM having a copy of the request broadcasts it at each
time an Alarm message is received in Bcast-Alarm. The decrease in Bcast-Alarm can
be attributed to the increasing number of nodes while the number of targeted SMs is
fixed because we are calculating an average for all SMs in the network.
Although the same size request packet is used by both Bcast-Alarm and Bcast-NC
protocols, Bcast-NC produces less throughput because it broadcasts the request as
encoded but smaller packets at the cost of computational overhead and a small data
overhead due to the encoding vector. Also, Bcast-NC does not require to send the
whole request when an ACK is not received by the gateway. Instead, the decoder
waits for sufficient number of innovative encoded packets which are much smaller
than the request itself.

Total Throughput
In total throughput, we took downloading the CTsign (F W U F ) into consideration and
the values were computed based on the completion time of each individual simulation.
The total throughput values are given in Fig. 8.5d. As opposed to communication
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throughput, the values fall as the network scales since the number of SMs is fixed for
all topology sizes and we computed the total throughput per SM.
When we compare them between each other it can be seen that the order among
the protocols is different than the communication throughput. Ucast protocol produces the most average throughput per SM whereas Bcast-NC produces the least.
This is due to the fact that the protocols incur different amount of computational
delays. Bcast-NC produces the least total throughput since it performs Gaussian
elimination each time it receives an encoded packet, which is a computationally expensive operation. It is followed by Bcast-Alarm because it incurs designcryption
operation whereas Ucast protocol incurs only signature verification which takes 27
times less time than designcryption operation.

8.4

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have investigated smart meter (SM) firmware update in the IEEE
802.11s-based AMI network. We proposed two secure and reliable multicast protocols based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption (CP-ABSC): BroadcastAlarm (Bcast-Alarm) and Broadcast-Network Coding (Bcast-NC). CP-ABSC is employed to provide a secure and flexible SM notification. Bcast-Alarm protocol uses
Alarm and ACK messages to provide reliability whereas Bcast-NC reduces bandwidth
requirement by making use of network coding. We implemented the protocols and
measured their performance in ns-3 network simulator. Simulation results indicate
that all of the protocols are reliable by achieving 100% request delivery ratio and
that Bcast-NC is more preferable compared to Bcast-Alarm because it consumes less
network bandwidth although it takes more time to complete the process and requires
more computational power. Since firmware update is not a real-time process and SMs
are battery-free devices, these disadvantages can be ignored.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUDING REMARKS & FUTURE WORK
In this dissertation, we tackled the consumer privacy issues in the IEEE 802.11sbased AMI network communications. In order to prevent the utility companies and
eavesdroppers from analyzing the frequently collected power consumption data and
thereby making inferences about household/manufacturing activities, we proposed
several protocols by employing existing privacy-preserving techniques in the AMI
network context. We used data obfuscation for privacy-preserving state estimation.
Moreover, to increase the security and efficiency, we proposed a new design with multiple gateways. We implemented and tested different versions of the proposed protocol
under the widely used network simulator ns-3 which has a draft implementation of
IEEE 802.11s standard. Simulation results showed that the obfuscation approaches do
not cause extra end-to-end delay and uses the channel bandwidth efficiently without
introducing additional overhead on packet delivery ratio.
To reduce network traffic and conceal the private data irreversibly, we introduced
some data aggregation methods into the AMI network data collection mechanism,
that can perform arithmetic operations on concealed data. Specifically, we adapted
fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and secure multiparty computation (secure
MPC). We tackled a new problem due to excessive fragmentation of FHE packets
and proposed a novel solution by adding a new layer above the transport layer. We
implemented and tested the proposed protocols under the ns-3 network simulator.
Simulation results showed that the FHE-based protocol is not feasible for large-size
networks in terms of the time to complete a data collection round, and that the secure
MPC-based protocol is much more scalable than the FHE-based protocol in terms of
bandwidth usage and average data collection completion time.
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We proposed a scalable simulation framework for researchers and other parties
that develop applications for the AMI network. We investigated the ns-3 DCE’s network protocol stack profoundly and detected the factors that thwart the reliability
and scalability. We used a modified version of the Constrained Application Protocol along with five different retransmission timeout (RTO) functions. In addition,
we replaced the classical Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) with an efficient and
piggybacking-based ARP to improve the proactive path discovery process. Moreover,
we updated two critical parameters of the Link Management protocol to improve onehop communication reliability. Simulation results showed that the proposed changes
the reliability and scalability significantly, and that a fixed RTO value adjusted based
on the network size can outperform some polynomial functions.
We built a testbed that implements IEEE 802.11s and ZigBee wireless mesh networking standards in order to mimic the AMI network. We presented a comprehensive
explanation about how we built the testbed so that the readers can easily reproduce
the same testbed environment. We employed FHE- and secure MPC-based protocols which are both secure and privacy-preserving along with SSL certificates and
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures for authentication.
Moreover, we used End-to-End (EtoE) and Hop-by-Hop (HbyH) data aggregation
mechanisms. Furthermore, we integrated the Constrained Application Protocol into
the FHE-based protocol to provide both reliable and lightweight communication. By
varying these parameters, we conducted a comprehensive performance comparison
study. Experiment results indicated that the secure MPC-based protocol can be an
alternative to the FHE-based protocol when the AMI network is built on IEEE 802.11s
standard, and EtoE data aggregation is employed. On the other hand, the FHE-based
protocol with Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) can be a viable option if data
collection is performed in more than every 6 minutes. Also, we inferred that CoAP
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is the most suitable choice in terms of message delivery and throughput for dataintensive protocols such as the FHE-based protocol at the expense of long data collection completion times, and that HbyH data aggregation mechanism is much suited
to be used for the AMI network since it reduces throughput and completion time significantly. Finally, experiment results showed that the protocols running on 802.11s
mesh technology is more robust than those using ZigBee. However, ZigBee can be a
good alternative to 802.11s mesh for the cases where a whole concealed reading can
fit into a single ZigBee data packet and HbyH aggregation is employed. The testbed
is accessible to the educator and researchers at https://amitestbed.fiu.edu/.
Finally, we developed two secure and reliable remote firmware update protocols
based on ciphertext-policy attribute-based signcryption (CP-ABSC) and network coding. Both protocols were implemented and tested under the ns-3 network simulator. Simulation results showed that the CP-ABSC enables reliable multicast-overbroadcast while the network coding significantly reduces the bandwidth requirement.
Hereinafter, we present several key directions for future research.
• Throughout this dissertation, we used an implementation of the Smart-Vercauteren
scheme, libScarab, where we referred to fully homomorphic encryption. Although it was useful for our tests, it suffers from key/ciphertext size and computational delay for multiplication. However, new implementations have been
published since then such as HELib and SEAL [233]. These implementations
can also be investigated for both privacy-preserving and feasible AMI network
communications in further studies.
• One of the biggest problems we encountered while working on the scalable simulation framework was the simulation duration. 400- and 1024-node topologies
took almost 2 and 5 days, respectively. Therefore, to distribute the workload,
the proposed framework can be moved to clusters and be run in a distributed
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manner by means of the standard Message Passing Interface. Also, there were
not any applications running other than the periodic data reporting application in this work. In a future work, the frequency of the data reporting can be
increased, and new applications can be installed along with the periodic data
reporting. Moreover, we tested the framework on a 1024-node grid topology.
Running it on a larger and random topology will definitely reveal some new
problems. To this end, the framework can be improved such that it can be used
for larger and random topologies as well.
• The ns-3 DCE can be used with the Linux network stack as well as its own
stack implementation. However, we were unable to use it due to the problems
we faced while integrating the PARP, so we used the ns-3 network stack. These
problems can be resolved, and the simulations can be conducted on the Linux
network stack in order to obtain more realistic results.
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.1

Commands for the IEEE 802.11s-based Testbed

A helpful tool usbutils and the firmware can be downloaded and installed on Raspi3
by running the following commands.
$sudo apt-get update
$sudo apt-get install wireless-tools usbutils
$sudo apt-get install firmware-ralink
where $ sign represents the terminal prompt. We use sudo command to get root
privileges. This is required for kernel-space operations.
iw tool can be installed, and N etworkM anager service can be stopped by running
the following commands.
$sudo apt-get install iw
$sudo killall NetworkManager
The network interface can be configured by running the following commands.
$sudo iw dev wlan0 interface add IfName type mp
$sudo iw dev IfName set channel 11
$sudo ifconfig IfName IPAdd netmask Mask up
$sudo iw dev IfName mesh join MeshID
where IfName, IPAdd, MeshID and Mask represent the interface name, the assigned
IP address, the mesh identifier and the subnet mask, respectively.
The ARP cache on RasPi3s can be manipulated by running the following commands.
$sudo arp -i IfName -s IPAdd MACAdd
where MACAdd represents the MAC address associated with the IPAdd.
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